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ABSTRACT 
 
 Advocates of religious exemptions and religious priority often stake their case on 
the belief that religion occupies a special political category discrete from other ethical 
frameworks. Yet there remains a significant gap in the literature regarding the 
conceptual status of religion among moral systems within a liberal democratic state. 
Surprisingly, little work has been done in justifying why religion, as opposed to other 
ethical frameworks, should be seen as distinctive or prioritized. What is it about religion 
that would demand this level of protection? What conception of religion are we to use 
when thinking about how to order society? What, if anything, makes religion different 
from a legal perspective? Although many scholars have addressed related issues, most 
contributions have glossed over the logically prior question of how we are to understand 
religion theoretically. On the other hand, those who deny religious distinctiveness and 
priority have done little to systematically justify their dismissal.  
In order to fill this gap, I extract both from politics and from academic literature 
on liberal democratic theory the assumptions that underlie these debates, focusing on 
theoretical accounts of what exactly religion is from a political perspective. I find that 
there are insufficient grounds for demanding categorically distinctive or priority 
treatment for religion on the level of politics. Arguments for such treatment are often 
circular and fail to accomplish their original aim of justifying why one subset of the 
population merits privilege. I do not argue that ethical exemptions themselves are always 
inappropriate but rather that religious believers cannot be granted such exemptions to the 
 iii 
 
absolute exclusion of nonreligious citizens. In examining public rhetoric and 
constitutional history of the United States, I show that the priority placed on religion 
often results from a misunderstanding of the relationships between religious liberty and 
both national history and contemporary political practice. Finally, undertaking a case 
study from contemporary liberal theory, I show that there are other theoretical resources 
for defending religion without resorting to an arbitrary category.  
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION: RELIGION AS A POLITICAL CATEGORY 
 
MOTIVATION 
In January of 2011, I taught my first collegiate course. My upper-level course 
Constitutional Rights and Liberties had thirty students, and I was eager to share with 
them my excitement for the law. After a few days of introduction, our first substantive 
area of discussion was the Free Exercise Clause. Eager to spark a fascination with the 
material in the students’ minds from the beginning, I began by asking a lot of big idea 
questions familiar to this area of jurisprudence, hoping to preview the complexity of 
these issues, questions like: What counts as a religion? What protections belong to 
religion as a result of the Free Exercise Clause? Does the Free Exercise Clause mean that 
religious believers should receive special exemptions from laws? And why are we 
talking specifically about religious exemptions; what makes religion different from other 
types of ethical beliefs?  
When I heard myself ask the last question, I was struck by the fact that I actually 
did not have much to say in response. I had long considered myself an advocate of legal 
perspectives that give special status to religion, such as those in the tradition of Sherbert 
v. Verner1 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,2 but I had never once stopped to think about why 
religious groups might be fundamentally different in a way that demands this atypical 
treatment. It simply seemed obvious to me at the time. Religion is sacred. We have a 
                                                 
1 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
2 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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long tradition of respecting religious beliefs. Of course religion is a unique phenomenon 
on a number of levels. But it troubled me that I could not give an explanation as to why 
these factors demanded this privileged political status.  
As a student of the intersection of law and political theory, it occurred to me to 
turn to the theoretical literature. I expected that this field, naturally, would have already 
produced a theoretical defense of religion’s special status. Surely theorists had by now 
employed their conceptual tools in response to the needs of the legal community. But 
upon looking through this material, I found no satisfactory answer and hardly any 
answers at all. After several months of considering the significance of this lacuna and 
imagining how I might answer the question myself, I came to the conclusion that there 
might not be such an explanation, even considering for the first time the possibility that 
religion ought not to be treated differently.  
The absence of an adequate theoretical discussion of religious specialness was 
especially surprising to me given how visible questions about religious exemptions have 
been, especially in the United States. Yet the nature of legal discussions in particular 
frames the religious issue in a way that can obscure the deeper theoretical point. The 
legal debate has focused on the question of whether or not the framers of the 
Constitution, either by intention or implicit assumption, allowed for the possibility of 
justifying exemptions in crafting the First Amendment, or on the other hand, whether 
there were resources grounded in the US legal tradition for creating these privileges. 
While some involved in these discussions might at times suggest that religious groups 
ought not to receive special status, they are frequently constrained by the context of law 
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and must make their claims within the bounds of judicial history and precedent, making 
it difficult to focus purely on the conceptual, normative question.3  
It occurred to me that there exists the possibility that, since these are essentially 
two distinct questions, one might arrive at the conclusion that religious exemptions are 
mandated by US jurisprudence or the text of the US founding document but also that 
they are not normatively desirable. Under this reading, an interest group would have 
essentially written itself a privilege into the fabric of the institution back when the 
culture was far more homogeneous. Religious interests might possess an unfair 
advantage, then, when this paradigm is applied to the present day, after the further 
separation of social spheres often considered the byproduct of modernization that further 
extracted religion from the majority of political considerations.4 This concern is reflected 
in Justice John Paul Stevens’s concurrence in the exemptions case City of Boerne v. 
Flores5: “…[T]he statute [granting religious exemptions] has provided the Church with a 
legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for 
religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.” Such a 
discriminatory arrangement, even using “discriminatory” in the least pejorative way 
possible, demands rigorous theoretical justification.  
                                                 
3 See Chapter IV.  
4 See the literature on religious fundamentalism as a global phenomenon created as a reaction to 
modernization, such as: Torkle Brekke, Fundamentalism: Prophecy and Protest in an Age of 
Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 265; Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 40; Michael Emerson and David Hartman, “The Rise of Religious 
Fundamentalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 32(2006): 127-144; Peter Herriot, Religious 
Fundamentalism: Global, Local and Personal (New York: Routledge, 2009); George Marsden, 
Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Introduction; Malise 
Ruthven, Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).   
5 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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It is possible, after all, that we might find exemptions unique to religion to be 
morally undesirable and yet required implicitly by the US Constitution. This possibility 
highlights the pressing significance of the question as to the normative desirability of 
such a distinction. Many facets of the political world have in the past been 
constitutionally sanctioned and yet later considered by the nation morally offensive, 
often to the point of requiring constitutional amendment to correct the imbalance as in 
the case of slavery and women’s suffrage. Thus, the debate cannot stop at 
constitutionality but must also address normativity.  
Most exemptions debates do not usually begin with the point of asking why 
religion deserves special protection. They begin with the presumption that if anything 
deserves special status, if we are to use tools like exemptions at all to help any interest, it 
would of course be religion. But the answer to this forgotten theoretical question would 
have an extraordinary impact on how we approach, for example, the jurisprudential 
question of whether to grant ethical exemptions exclusively to religion. But the 
normative question raised in this example highlights the format that a discussion of the 
place of religion in the public sphere should take and highlights features of the 
discussion often missed when addressed from other starting points.  
 
THE QUESTION 
Advocates of religious liberty often defend its special status among liberty 
concerns with a great fervor. They fight for their cause with a deep-seated conviction, 
stemming from their connection to the religious belief itself. The conviction that goes 
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into protecting one’s right to follow the dictates of divinity can evoke great emotion. Yet 
the intensity of one’s convictions can obscure more technical questions, such as whether 
or not isolating religion to a separate sphere of political process is in fact even the best 
way to protect religious interests. In an attempt to approach the theoretical question 
objectively, I do not begin by presuming that it would even be in the best interest of 
advocates of religious causes to argue for special status. The occupation of a special 
status entails its own host of problems which could conceivably yield even more troubles 
in certain scenarios. Therefore, until proven otherwise, I do not discredit the possibility 
that the interest of religious liberty might best be addressed using the same legal 
channels available to advocates of any other liberty. 
Personally, I do not believe either that we are purely rational beings or that we 
are guided purely by our rational ideas. Just as often, we use our reason to articulate a 
part of ourselves that we understand only on the level of passion.6 Therefore, the 
attachment to religion may very well run deeper than ideas reducible to rational 
premises. However, I am likewise a believer that demands for special political treatment 
must be translated into publicly accessible language. Whenever egalitarian ideals are 
threatened, the logic of formal justice must be used in argument.7 But while we can and 
must submit these political and legal claims to priority to more rigorous consideration, 
that does not, in my view, diminish the validity of religious attachments in themselves.  
                                                 
6 For a beautiful articulation of this position, see the opinion of the Court in Cohen v. California, 430 U.S. 
15 (1971), which says in engaging in First Amendment expression that the emotive content may often 
demand just as much protection as the cognitive content of speech.  
7 See the Chapter II section on burden of proof and the discussion of Mansbridge. 
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When it comes to religion in the realm of politics, I suspect that the legal and 
political frameworks we apply stem from an outdated viewpoint. The model used to 
orient religion in politics is rooted in a society, culture, and politics that no longer exist. 
When we apply the Free Exercise Clause from any sort of originalist understanding, for 
example, we are employing principles from a time in which religion played a radically 
different role in the United States. We are attempting to address contemporary needs 
with legal tools that no longer reflect our political situation. It is worth examining the 
model that continues to motivate discussion about religion in the contemporary context. 
Though my interest is not in providing a comprehensive historical account of these 
frameworks but rather a primarily contemporary one, some consideration of context is 
appropriate. I will therefore briefly examine William Penn as an exemplar of the logic of 
the contemporary model of religion. 
Although arguments about the importance of religion are plentiful worldwide, 
there is a unique brand of discourse about the relationship between the state and the 
religious liberty of its citizens in the United States. The United States at the time of its 
founding was deeply rooted in the tenets of Christianity. Among canonical figures, 
William Penn provides a useful illustration. Penn, a seventeenth-century political leader 
and author, founded the colony of Pennsylvania. He was a Quaker and, as a member of 
an unpopular minority religious group took a great interest in theories of religious 
liberty. I draw attention to Penn because he provides an argument in the clearest form 
that I find comparable to the unarticulated logic present in many contemporary debates. 
While he does not explicitly address the topic of exemptions, he portrays religious 
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decisions as uniquely deserving of protection in the political sphere. He defines liberty 
of conscience in such a way that religious choices occupy a central place in terms of 
political priorities.  He says, “First, By Liberty of Conscience, we understand not only a 
meer Liberty of the Mind, in believing or disbelieving this or that Principle or Doctrine, 
but the Exercise of our selves in a visible Way of Worship, upon our believing it to be 
indispensibly required at our Hands, that if we neglect it for Fear or Favour of any 
Mortal Man, we Sin, and incur Divine Wrath.”8 Religion for Penn is more than a 
preference; it constitutes a set of imperatives that one is compelled to follow. The 
mandates of religion are not optional for those adherents. They are absolutely necessary. 
They are requirements for how life must be lived. For Penn, a belief in punishment from 
God and a threat to one’s status in the afterlife elevates the gravity of acting upon 
religious principles. The weight of the mandates comes from the consequence of 
disobedience. Religious belief entails a price sheet of punishments. Thus, in this model, 
there was a clear distinction between a religious ethical choice and a nonreligious ethical 
choice since, unlike a nonreligious moral belief, the religious dictate makes moral 
choices eternal life and death situations, and thus of concern to the state.  
Penn’s position exhibits what I take to be the underlying logic of even 
contemporary claims to religious priority within a pluralist society, that religious 
mandates are categorically distinct. I presume that the weight of metaphysical 
significance is imbued to all religious beliefs, irrespective of the actual metaphysical 
content of the belief. Yet if we treat religion as a broad grouping of beliefs, extending 
                                                 
8 From “The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience” [1670], in The Political Writings of William Penn, ed. 
Andrew Murphy (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2002), 85-86. 
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beyond merely the Christian tradition, a number of ethical frameworks will be included 
under the category that do not fit this clear model of afterlife punishment from a judge. 
William Herbrechtsmeier, for example, uses the case of Buddhism to argue that “belief 
in and reverence for superhuman beings cannot be understood as the chief distinguishing 
characteristic of religious phenomena.”9 Besides, many of the instances in which religion 
is invoked in these issues do not constitute the critical point between admission or 
rejection from paradise, and it is not self-evident why a non-critical obstacle to religious 
virtue is any different from, for example, an obstacle to an atheist's achievement of some 
natural, non-religious virtue.10 
 The challenge of making a category like “religion” clear in a political context is 
vast and complex. I hope to contribute toward resolving some of the ambiguity 
surrounding religion as a political category through a process of triangulation, 
contributing to the case against religious distinctiveness on several dimensions. Penn's 
model, or rather something quite like it, has persisted in the fabric of how we understand 
religion. At the very least, we continue to apply, even if unintentionally, an overly 
simplistic, and likely historically obsolete, model to complex contemporary issues. 11 
Treating religion as a self-contained, reified political category that inherently demands 
particularized treatment is an unnecessary and potentially costly political move. Perhaps 
                                                 
9 William Herbrechtsmeier, “Buddhism and the Definition of Religion: One More Time,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 32.1(1993): 1-18, 1.  
10 Even some advocates of religious distinctiveness agree that cost cannot be the standard used in granting 
exemptions, as it would allow too many nonreligious claims to qualify. See Sonu Bedi’, “Debate: What Is 
So Special about Religion? The Dilemma of the Religious Exemption,” Journal of Political Philosophy 
15.2(2007): 235-249, 243-244. 
11 My claim here is analogous to Elisabeth Ellis’s argument that property rights as commonly employed 
are relics of a paste age. “Citizenship and Property Rights: A New Look at Social Contract Theory,” 
Journal of Politics 68.3(2006): 544-555.  
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religious priority might have been useful in a certain context, for example in a culturally 
homogeneous society where the overwhelmingly dominant ethical framework is 
constituted by religion. But it does not meet the needs of a modern pluralist society. 
What is interesting to me as a student of political theory is that there is so much 
faith put into a concept for which countless pages of political texts have failed notably to 
produce even a mildly satisfying explanation. I see my project first and foremost as a 
suggestion that current modes of addressing these topics are completely inadequate. I 
hope to spark further conversation on the topic and to encourage scholars of religion and 
legal-political thought to think more carefully about how we make arguments, and if 
nothing else to call for an increase in the quality of such arguments.  
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT PROJECT 
This project will analyze the way the political category gets used in liberal 
democratic theory and politics. I will argue that religion is often not a useful category in 
the sphere of politics and that it can be extremely misleading. I argue that religion is best 
handled under the same law and policies as other groups. Although we need not ignore 
the ways in which religion in practice often appears different from other citizen qualities, 
these differences are insufficient to justify special treatment. If a system is failing to 
address religious interests, then the proper response would be to change that system, 
rather than to demand special treatment within the old, broken system.   
 My goal in this project is to bring some clarity to the discussion by making it 
clear what the implications of these arguments are and noting systematic trends in their 
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construction. Part of the challenge is that this issue is largely missed by political theory 
literature in particular. As such, there is very little literature directly addressing it. In 
practice, the two sides of this debate are speaking past each other. There are those who 
think the political category of religion is special, and there are those who do not. They 
begin with their respective starting assumptions and proceed accordingly. But the 
problem is that there is no systematic engagement with these basic foundations. Those 
presuming religion’s specialness take this fact for granted to the point that their 
arguments are foreign to detractors, and those denying its specialness fail to direct their 
arguments at the concerns raised by religious advocates. The primary goal of this project 
is to focus our attention on this fundamental question of why religion. I then hope to 
provide a framework upon which future discussion can be built by clearly articulating 
where the project of defending religious specialness fails, rather than uncritically 
embracing it or prejudicially dismissing it.  
Perhaps two authors come closest to actively engaging this question as I have 
articulated it. Sonu Bedi, whom I will address extensively in Chapter II, nobly sets forth 
the project but then falls victim to presuming religious distinctiveness before he proves 
it. Brian Leiter12 directly explores these issues and denies religious distinctiveness, but I 
find that Leiter, while he frames the question appropriately, does not do an adequate job 
of addressing the arguments as they arise in practice. He turns directly to the theoretical 
canon, focusing on extensions of Kantian and Millian arguments, and asks what it might 
say about religious distinctiveness. He begins with the question and immediately 
                                                 
12 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
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proceeds to explore how one might hypothetically attempt to justify such a status and 
finds that such a project would fail. I prefer, on the other hand, to address the concerns 
of those “on the ground” who are actively making such arguments in a political context. 
Therefore, significant work remains in drawing attention to this issue and, most 
importantly, in attempting to shape the contours of how the discussion should take 
place.13  
For the sake of keeping this project within a manageable scope, I limit myself to 
discussions that take place within liberal democratic theory. For one thing, the 
arguments that I consider, regardless of whatever theoretical system they embed 
themselves within, tend to assert these arguments as if in a self-contained universe. The 
arguments about the status of religion are unique in that they demand to be applied in all 
times and at all places.  
Upon laying out this foundation and then exploring the demands made by 
advocates of the political category, however, I argue that religion does not inherently 
demand special treatment within a liberal democratic system. There is nothing about 
religion or religious beliefs or religious citizens that make them items of greater concern 
to the state than their nonreligious counterparts. I claim that invocations of religion as a 
political category exploit the ambiguity that surrounds the issue.  
This project does not engage in an explicit discussion of “what counts” as a 
religion. This is because, while intimately related, the questions of classification and of 
                                                 
13 Note also that a work such as, for example, Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007) does not occupy a central place in this work because he 
approaches the issue from more of a communitarian approach than a liberal democratic one. Ideas centered 
around community do not comport with the vision of liberal democracy propounded here.  See the 
discussion of Finnis in Chapter III under the section “Theoretical Arguments for Priority.” 
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normative implications are completely distinct. What matters most for the purposes of 
this discussion is the question of what occupying a position in that category means for 
those involved. Once a state has determined who counts, what next? 
There are numerous other ways of going about this project, and many important 
parts of a project aimed at dismantling, or at least challenging, religious distinctiveness 
are beyond the scope of this project. One could examine, for example, the harsh 
treatment of religion in the public sphere, especially in the Rawlsian tradition. One could 
examine the debate in the context of religious establishment. One could focus more on a 
comparative context, and examine the numerous other instances in other liberal 
democracies where these same issues are being raised. One could, of course look at 
traditions outside of liberal democracy. However, I have distilled this project into the 
following pieces of this puzzle, which I believe are sufficient to highlight the needs of 
the literature, address some systemic obstacles, and suggest possible directions for future 
work.  
The first two substantive chapters address two overlapping but technically 
separate arguments for special treatment: religious distinctiveness and religious priority. 
Some scholars or politicians make arguments that imply both as the two are not mutually 
exclusive, but they each represent a discrete line of logic. Chapter II addresses 
arguments for religious distinctiveness, that the political category of religion represents a 
discrete set of beliefs that are markedly distinguishable from nonreligious beliefs. 
Regardless of whether or not religion is somehow more important, these arguments 
focus on religion’s uniqueness, claiming that the particular needs of religion demand 
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particularized forms of treatment.14 I focus in this chapter at demands for religious 
exemptions, as the theory can be most clearly distilled from this discussion. I argue that 
this position amounts to one subgroup of a population demanding additional benefits 
from the state, and that this demand must be justified accordingly. Instead, I find that 
arguments for religious distinctiveness tend to rely on circular logic and presume from 
the beginning that religion is inherently unique. Religion, then, has not passed the bar to 
fully distinguish itself from other forms of belief.  
 Chapter III, then, considers claims of religious priority, that religious liberty in 
itself is of greater interest to the state than other forms of liberty and than other rights 
guaranteed to citizens. I approach this question by focusing on the claims that religion is 
the “first freedom,” a favorite rhetorical move in the United States and among US 
presidents in particular. I examine the origin of the phrase and parse its possible 
theoretical implications based on its uses. I then argue that the phrase “first freedom” 
wildly exploits ambiguities in the way that political discussion takes place so as to gain 
leverage. I suggest that the phrase misconstrues the priorities of the state and 
consequently does more harm than good. 
 Chapter IV considers US constitutional law surrounding the Free Exercise Clause 
and in particular the debate surrounding religious exemptions. While there are many 
works that trace this debate, most of them focus on questions of interpretation of the 
                                                 
14 Sandra Day O’Connor, for example, provides an interesting case study illustrating this assumption that 
religion demands distinctive, though not priority, treatment. In establishment cases, she promotes an 
endorsement standard, wherein the government crosses constitutional lines by either “endorsement or 
disapproval of religion,” requiring it to remain neutral on the subject (concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668 (1984); see also her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1984)).  And yet, in her 
concurrences Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), she argues for special exemptions for religious believers.  
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document of the Constitution, whereas our interests in this project are purely normative 
and less tied to contingent national histories. To that end, I extract the way the US 
Supreme Court has answered the question of “why religion?” across time so as to 
provide a case study of how one governmental body has expressed a view about the 
substance of the political category of religion. I construct different accounts of this 
category implied by the Court by focusing on three “moments” or stages of 
interpretation of the clause: early Court interactions with free exercise in which the 
Court refused to grant special status to religion, the advent of exemptions and deference 
to religion in the Warren and Burger Courts, and the return to the current non-
exemptions standard. 
 After challenging the legitimacy of religion’s special status in Chapters II and III 
and showing the varying practical implementations of such a category in Chapter IV, I 
will turn to the question of how religion can be protected without granting it special 
status. In Chapter V, I argue that religion can still be protected by working within the 
system. I take one particular strand of theory within liberal democratic thought as a case 
study. Transformative political liberalism rejects the idea of special status for religion, 
but it also allows the state to use its “non-coercive” powers, such as withholding tax 
breaks, to target illiberal religious beliefs for the purpose of changing them. I argue 
against this logic from within the political liberal framework, demonstrating that it is 
possible to counter such an attack on religious liberty without resorting to an 
inegalitarian special political category. The transformative political liberals fail to 
maintain their status as political liberals while introducing the transformative element.  
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 Finally, Chapter VI briefly concludes by surveying two current or recent issues, 
one national and one local, in which the political category of religion is often invoked in 
a way that belies the lack of understanding of either the category or of the system in 
general: demands for religious exemptions from the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act and from a university allocation of student fees toward a campus LGBT center. 
These examples illustrate how, in practice, use of religion as a political category often 
stems from misunderstanding both the project of politics and the nature of religion in 
contrast to other beliefs around.  
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CHAPTER II 
RELIGIOUS DISTINCTIVENESS:  
EXEMPTIONS AND THE POLITICAL CATEGORY 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 In 1996, homeowners in the Fan, a well-to-do neighborhood of Richmond, 
Virginia, asked city officials to investigate the operations of a soup kitchen run by the 
local Stuart Circle Parish. The group alleged that the program violated a 1991 city 
ordinance that restricts how often soup kitchens in residential areas can run and how 
many can attend. Religious leaders from around the city rose in protest, sparking bills 
sponsored by members of the city council to keep the government from interfering with 
these and other religious practitioners in the use of land as part of an exercise of their 
religion. The leader of the meal ministry, Patti Russell, said in defense of the massive 
response from the religious community, “We’re not just a bunch of mindless do-gooders. 
We feel this is something that churches are impelled to do—to care for people who need 
help.”15 On behalf of the actions of the homeowners to call for the policy’s enforcement, 
David Johannas, the man who lodged the complaint asked, “In a country that is supposed 
to be a free country, why is it that religious groups get more freedom than other 
groups?”16 
 The debate sparked in this instance illustrates a question of general theoretical 
                                                 
15 Jan Cienski, “Soup Kitchen Issue Spurs Religious Freedom Debate,” The Freelance Star, 4 February 
1998. 
16 Ibid. 
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significance: should liberal democracies treat religious groups differently from other 
groups by virtue of their being religious? In other words, do citizen actions motivated by 
religious belief occupy a discrete category of actions, demanding unique treatment by 
the state? Many have argued that the term “religion” ought to invoke differential 
political treatment, a perspective I will refer to as a “discrete” category of religion. This 
question has taken on heightened salience in countries that include guarantees of 
religious freedom in their institutional charters. In the United States, for example, some 
have read the text and historical jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution as guaranteeing unique protections to religious 
practitioners. In liberal democracies around the world, requests have been made for 
religious exemptions from public safety regulations, conventional work schedules, 
antidiscrimination laws in hiring practices, military service, work uniforms, vaccination 
requirements, narcotics regulations, mandatory school attendance, and numerous other 
policies, often while invoking arguments similar to those raised by the Richmond 
residents. Approaches incorporating a discrete political category are distinct from 
multicultural approaches in that they portray religious moral choices as unique on an 
ethical level in ways that are relevant to laws. But what is it about some moral choices 
that categorically demand distinctive political treatment? 
 I find that attempts to justify the distinctiveness of religion have failed thus far 
when it comes to exemptions from otherwise generally applicable laws. Moreover, they 
must fail, I propose, in the absence of any possible categorical justification. The most 
appropriate response is to treat all moral frameworks equally, on an ethical basis that 
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uses normativity, the presence of a moral dilemma, rather than religion as the standard. 
We can justify normativity, but not the category of religion, as a legitimate basis for 
exemption from the law. 
 The project here is to evaluate and ultimately to challenge the merits of this 
putative political category. The first section will highlight the tendency of work 
employing the category to overlook central issues. Focusing specifically on religious 
exemptions, I suggest that arguments for religious distinctiveness are insufficient to 
justify preferential, or even deleterious, treatment. The second section responds to 
concerns from advocates of the discrete concept, particularly aiming to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of treating all ethical categories on the same grounds for the purpose of moral 
exemptions. I argue that from a specifically political perspective, religious and 
nonreligious frameworks have more in common where it matters for state consideration 
than they have differences.  These similarities justify using the same process of granting 
exemptions to both under the broader banner of ethical, rather than specifically religious, 
exemptions.  
 While this is by no means the first piece to argue that religion should not be treated 
distinctively,17 I approach the subject by looking for systematic errors in current 
arguments for this discrete conception, thereby enhancing the debate surrounding 
                                                 
17 17 See: Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Religious 
Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Corey Brettschneider, 
“A Transformative Theory of Religious Freedom: Promoting the Reasons for Rights,” Political Theory 
38.2 (2010): 187-213. These authors tend to spend more time fleshing out how a system functions without 
segregating religion rather than focusing on the question of why religion should not be elevated. Again, 
Leiter is one other exception when it comes to considering this issue, but as discussed in Chapter I, his 
work is less useful for this project as he takes more theoretical approach than the applied approach 
employed here.  
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religious exemptions. Currently, advocates of the discrete view, which would place 
religious interests into their own category of legal issues, ignore central questions that 
must be addressed before accomplishing the ambitious goal that they pursue.  This 
absence weakens the pull their arguments have on those who do not take the priority of 
religion for granted. Opponents of the discrete view, on the other hand, tend to take the 
inappropriateness of special treatment of religion as an article of faith instead of directly 
addressing the concerns of the former group. The scholarly discussion of the topic has 
progressed in two opposite directions rather than moving forward as one dialectic. I 
attempt to lay out the grounds on which argumentation must proceed, in an effort to 
bridge the gap in communication between the two perspectives in the hopes of 
increasing communication across the groups. Many of these arguments can be applied to 
cultural exemptions as well, and many scholars bundle religious and cultural exemptions 
together. But in this piece I evaluate a type of argument that prioritizes the ethical 
dimension unique to religious beliefs, as such arguments are distinct in their line of 
reasoning and quite common in public discourse. 
 I direct the discussion toward the single question of what, if anything, makes 
religion special in political considerations. To that end, I am not addressing whether or 
not exemptions are generally speaking an appropriate or prudent means of protecting the 
interests of citizens. Rather, I am considering the question in the context of a system, 
specifically a liberal democracy, that has already elected to use exemptions as a means to 
ensure that the laws do not inadvertently and unnecessarily bar citizens from achieving 
fulfillment. Though I will return to technical questions later, I suggest that we would do 
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better to begin by asking if the project of elevating religion in terms of priority is worth 
pursuing in the first place. The question in this specific form circumvents many 
disciplinary ways of investigating the uniqueness of religion and hones in on those 
features that might demand that religion be treated as a distinct political category, rather 
than as a distinct moral, philosophical, personal, sociological, historical or empirical 
category.18 I conclude that religious claims must be evaluated by the same standard as all 
other ethical beliefs and that religious believers must justify request for unique treatment 
through the same arguments available to everyone else. Ultimately, embracing language 
that applies to all citizens signals a willingness to speak the language of justice that 
applies to all.  
 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF  
To begin, we must ask what we would expect of a successful attempt to 
distinguish religion as a special category and clearly articulate the aims of such a project. 
One the one hand, specific national histories might have traditionally chosen to elevate 
religious claims to a higher level of protection, as legal scholars like Michael McConnell 
(1990; 1992) claim that the US Constitution has done.19 But there remains still the 
burden of theoretical justification for why such treatment might be required by or even 
appropriate to liberal democracies generally. For a liberal democracy, the default 
position must automatically be one of consistent treatment across individuals. Thus, it 
                                                 
18 “Political” meaning having features relevant for judicial or legislative consideration, and more so salient 
in political considerations to the point of being dispositive.  
19 Michael W. McConnell, “Origins and Historical Understandings of the Free Exercise of Religion,” 
Harvard Law Review 103(1990): 1409–1517; “Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to 
Critics,” George Washington Law Review 60(1992): 685–742. 
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would be incumbent upon advocates of categorically distinct treatment to specify the 
features that demand heightened distinctive treatment from the state. Jane Mansbridge 
argues that such a rule generally governs the process of delegitimating special treatment 
given to one group over another. She says:  
Once the set of reasons sustaining the wall [conceptually separating the two 
groups] has come under attack, the burden of proof falls on the defender of the 
wall. The defender must adduce reasons for treating the two categories 
differently that will stand up under scrutiny. In the logic of formal justice, 
equality has a privileged position as default. It seeps in automatically once the 
reasons for different treatment have been shown wanting.20 
If the group demanding special treatment cannot justify such privilege through publicly 
accessible reasons, then the privilege is discredited and the arbitrary lines must be 
erased.21  
Mansbridge makes this argument based on her study of activist groups that 
challenge a dominant group’s social hegemony. Such groups challenge the status quo of 
asymmetrical treatment by calling attention to the inequalities. When the subjugated 
group can make a convincing case for why the distinctions in treatment are unjustified, 
the dominant group often experiences not only a sense of outrage at the accusation of 
                                                 
20 Jane Mansbridge, “Cracking Through Hegemonic Ideology: The Logic of Formal Justice,” Social 
Justice Research 18.3(2005): 335-347, 337. 
21 Although in the case of religion this protection has been extended to groups beyond simply the dominant 
Christian group, as will be evidenced by Bedi’s arguments below, this could be seen as the result of a 
previous challenge to the hegemony of Christianity within the realm of religion, a challenge that resulted 
in the sphere being expanded to include other religions as well in the telling of whose religion counts. The 
challenge to the hegemony of religion more broadly, then, could be spun in Mansbridge’s terms as a 
second counter-hegemonic movement.  
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injustice but also a reluctant sense of duty to move toward balanced treatment.22 
Organized activists often posit the theories that “everyday activists” then implement in 
practical daily activities. She offers as an example the efficacy of the idea of a “male 
chauvinist.” Armed with this conceptual tool, ordinary women became empowered to 
challenge the status quo, often their position in the household in relation to their 
husbands, once they were exposed to arguments rooted in language that calls for 
equality. The women she interviewed reported experiencing success at reaching men by 
using the phrase. Thus, she argues, the logic of formal justice provides a basis for 
demanding egalitarian treatment.  
Returning to the case of religion, then, while some may point to this position as 
arbitrarily placing the burden of proof upon religious claimants, the request is analogous 
to claiming a greater share of public resources. A request for an exemption demands at 
least additional attention from the courts and frequently accommodation in the form of 
modified or altogether unique regulation of the claimant’s activity compared to other 
citizens. Consequently, such a demand would have to be justified by a corresponding 
difference in situation, appropriate to the level of distinct treatment requested. To claim 
that religion merits across-the-board higher access to ethical exemptions requires the 
establishment of altogether discrete category, at least conceptually speaking, even if in 
practice lines may bleed into each other. Such a category must include specifications of 
which features qualify a claim for such treatment, so as to create a test to distinguish 
legitimate and illegitimate claims.   
                                                 
22 Ibid., 339. 
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 For purposes of illustration, consider this placement of the burden of proof in 
light of the case presented above with the soup kitchen. To address concerns that 
religious groups have “more freedom”, the question that must be answered in this 
particular case is as follows: if the city has determined that those motivated simply by 
their ethical belief in providing for the poor should not be allowed to operate in this 
venue, why should religious groups be immune from the restriction? Considered outside 
the context of this dispute, it is hard to accept that most groups driven to meet the needs 
of the indigent by running soup kitchens could be labeled “mindless do-gooders”. 
Similar acts of service are more commonly viewed at least as public spirited if not even 
demonstrative of public virtue. These groups that, as widely considered, perform a noble 
public function are expected to adjust the locations of their establishments according to 
zoning restrictions, as it is presumed that they can fulfill said function in a variety of 
locations. Religious groups, likewise, are typically not compelled by their religion to 
perform the duties of feeding the poor exclusively within the doors of their sacred 
buildings, and they are not barred from conducting these activities in any zone-
appropriate location. Some essence unique to religious ethical beliefs must demand the 
unique attention. Abstracting from this case, we might approach the theoretical project 
from the perspective of justifying to those citizens not acting in a religious capacity what 
it is about religion per se that makes it special on political grounds. With this approach 
laid out as the foundation upon which to begin the inquiry, I will now consider how 
various attempts to establish a separate category for religious exemptions have 
proceeded.  
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ARGUMENTS FOR THE POLITICAL DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION 
The Primordial View: Categorical Distinction 
Among the few theorists to focus directly on this question is Sonu Bedi. He 
opens a recent piece saying, “Too often we assume that religion is special.”23 He 
promises to take up the “neglected inquiry” in the form of “why, at the most basic level, 
does a particular religious group even deserve a simple exemption from a facially neutral 
law but not a mere preference or a voluntary association.” Bedi is especially concerned 
with distinguishing “the Jew from the Rotarian, the Christian from the Democrat, or the 
Sikh from the mere hat-wearer.” He considers four common alternatives to creating a 
separate category of religion that might serve to distinguish which central practices merit 
protection, such allowing for exemptions on the basis of: a respect for diversity in the 
form of non-mainstream beliefs; deference to beliefs that are a part of longstanding 
traditions; consideration of the cost that would face religious claimants if not exempted; 
and a general framework normativity that considers the religious belief as it would any 
other non-religious ethical belief. He ultimately finds that none of these serves the end of 
sufficiently protecting those practices he considers most deserving of protection without 
also admitting for qualification too many superfluous practices based on a mere weak 
preference. The impracticality of these alternatives, Bedi argues, requires us to take what 
he calls a “primordial” view of religion. He concludes from the failure of alternative 
justifications that ‘the only way to effectively justify this exemption is to treat the 
                                                 
23 Bedi, “Debate: What Is So Special about Religion?” 235. 
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affiliation or practice as non-voluntary, as anything but contestable or fluid.’24 He says 
that a primordial view of religion must take the belief to be prior and essential.  While he 
acknowledges that much of contemporary theory has moved in the opposite direction of 
treating religion as primordial and toward viewing it as a matter of choice, he makes 
what one might consider a rather practical conclusion, that it is impossible to protect 
these central practices any other way.   
The most problematic part of Bedi’s approach, which is also representative of 
many policy discussions surrounding the question, is that the search into why we should 
consider religion special is built upon the presupposition that religion is special. He 
responds that we must conceptualize religion in this way, even if it may not fit perfectly 
onto either our experience or idea of the phenomenon, because such conceptualization is 
necessary to give religion the protection it deserves. But this has done nothing toward 
addressing the question as he himself framed it. He has done nothing to establish why 
we should treat a group differently. He frames his project as an answer to the question of 
why religion should merit this protection, but he instead answers his “why” with a 
“how”, offering a mechanism for how we might distinguish them as opposed to a clear 
articulation of why we should bother to distinguish them in the first place. Instead of 
offering a full justification of why religion should be treated differently, his work 
addresses the practical question of identifying which practices would merit the 
protection, assuming that the need for protection has been established. Note here the 
conflation of the two issues of normative justifiability and practicality of its 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 236. 
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implementation. While proposing to treat the first issue, it seems that Bedi is instead 
primarily troubled by the application problem of proliferation. If grants of protection 
expand beyond religious groups, it may be impossible to draw the line anywhere short of 
granting an exemption for so many activities that the system cannot function.  
Much of the time he is preoccupied with how to distinguish religion from those 
practices we are least likely to want to protect, such as vague preferences. Although this 
is relevant for addressing the proliferation problem, the question as he sets it up demands 
another type of test as the focus.  The standard that should be used consistently 
throughout such an argument, the true test case for the project he has in mind, should be 
distinguishing a religious claim from another citizen requesting the same exemption but 
motivated by ethical principles that might otherwise be considered generally 
praiseworthy by society but that are not based in religion. Thus, rather than comparing 
Sikhs and members of a club dedicated to advocacy of wearing hats, the best case test 
scenario would be a circumstance like our opening scenario, a case in which the end of 
feeding the hungry has already been established as an important social value.  
An underlying fault of this approach is that he starts from the wrong point of 
reference, ignoring the appropriate direction for a burden of proof for a group 
demanding more goods of the state than other groups. He presumes that we can all agree 
that if we want to apply exemptions to anything, we would apply them to religions. In 
his final rejection of viewing religion as a voluntary association, he concludes, “Put 
simply, religion cannot both be ‘special’ and like any other voluntary association.”25 The 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 247.. 
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question Bedi is actually addressing is different than the question that he set out to 
answer, at least as he expressed it. It appears that he is primarily interested in addressing 
the proliferation problem, protecting too many groups for the exemptions project to be 
sustainable, what Courtois calls the Pandora’s Box problem.26 Leiter observes of 
arguments for religious exemptions generally: “Notice, of course, that there is no 
principled reason for expanding exemptions this way; the proposal is motivated entirely 
by…practical and epistemic worries.”27 This critique, when applied to Bedi, highlights 
how his entire approach sidesteps the substantive theoretical issues, leaving the 
discussion of practical considerations theoretically unsound.  
Rather than claiming to discover what makes religion more deserving, he might 
have formulated his project as: assuming that we know we want to protect religion, is 
there any broader category we might use that would still guarantee protection for 
religious groups without getting into the perennial exemptions complication of 
proliferation? But his failure to recognize the difference between his stated target and his 
actual final destination represents an endemic problem for theoretical work on this topic, 
which tends to consider the needs of religious exemptions in a vacuum separate from 
nonreligious ethical beliefs.28 
                                                 
26 Stéphane Courtois, “Conscientious Conviction and Subjective Preference: On What Grounds Should 
Religious Practices Be Accommodated?” Philosophical Papers 40.1(2011): 27-53, 43 
27 Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion, 97. 
28 Many treatments of the subject touch on issues that directly parallel comparable nonreligious beliefs but 
fail to move beyond the narrow framework of religion or adequately justify a consideration of religious 
liberty as a discrete category from other dimensions of liberty. For example: Kent Greenawalt, Religious 
Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 198-200 addressing 
appropriateness of religious category indeterminate and dependent upon one’s personal convictions; H.N. 
Hirsch, “Let Them Eat Incidentals: RFRA, the Rehnquist Court, and Freedom of Religion,” in Obligations 
of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: Religious Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies, ed. Nancy 
Rosenblum (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000): 280-293; Douglas Laycock, “Church 
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 Although most arguments for the categorical distinctiveness of religion attempt 
to benefit religion, the same category can be used to the detriment of religious claims. 
Some theorists make the same mistake of reifying the idea of religion into a political 
category but to the opposite end of scholars like Bedi. Yossi Nehushtan, for example, 
uses the category of religion actually to create a barrier that would inhibit religion from 
gaining access to state distribution of exemptions.29 His approach appropriates the 
category of religion to create an antireligious bias, though using the same conceptual 
mechanism as Bedi in isolating “unique” features of religion.   
 Nehushtan closely identifies religion with intolerance. He does not condemn 
religious beliefs themselves, however, but rather acts of intolerance. He suggests dealing 
out retribution for intolerance according to the “principle of proportionality,” whereby 
response is in kind and matches the degree of wrong done. Perhaps one of the most 
surprising features of his theory, however, is the range of actions that he would put under 
the banner of intolerance. He explains, “Intolerance can take the form of condemning 
another, insulting him, undermining his values, making him feel uncomfortable or 
unwelcome, avoiding his presence, discriminating against him, refusing to assist him, 
restricting his speech or behavior, and so on.”30 No intolerant action, he suggests, could 
ever be the recipient of an exemption.   
 The way Nehushtan has defined intolerance, any religion that makes a definitive 
                                                                                                                                                
Autonomy Revisited,” Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 7(2009): 253-278; Michael W. 
McConnell, “Believers as Equal Citizens,” in Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: Religious 
Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000): 90-110; Frank S. Ravitch, Masters of Illusion: The Supreme Court and the Religion Clauses 
(New York: New York University Press, 2007), see especially Chapter 7. 
29 Yossi Nehushtan, “Religious Conscientious Exemptions,” Law and Philosophy 30(2010): 143-166. 
30 Ibid., 158. 
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statement of values risks the label of intolerant. Any statement of belief that challenges 
another’s belief system risks at least “undermining his values” and “making him feel 
uncomfortable”. He has defined the idea so broadly as to label even any challenge to the 
status quo as an act of intolerance. It is not clear under Nehushtan’s system how one 
could advocate change or promote a belief that is not shared universally without 
incurring the ire of the state. The effect would chill religious expression, and likely many 
other forms of expression along with it. This definition is drastically overbroad, as 
becomes more significant as he progresses through his argument. 
 The most problematic part of his analysis for religious adherents comes in his 
extrapolation from observed instances of intolerance to a distinct political category. He 
justifies this additional focus on religion on the basis of empirical findings. He says, 
“Scholars do not dispute the strong and unique empirical links between religious 
orientation and prejudice or intolerance”, accompanied by a string of citations to 
psychology literature. On the basis of mere unspecified correlation, he has categorically 
included all religious among the intolerant. 
 This connection is surprising considering that he admits that the fit is “not 
necessarily compelling. Yet it is a relevant, presumably weighty justification that should 
be included within the balance of reasons.”31 Yet on this weak evidence, he suggests that 
the mere presence of religion ought to decrease one’s candidacy for ethical exemptions, 
if not categorically excluding one. He calls the latter strict exclusion the “broad thesis” 
and the weaker form, in which the presence of religion merely increases the scrutiny 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 161. 
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placed on an exemption request, the “weak thesis”. He admits, likely given his 
admittedly weak justification, that there is no determinative argument for the broad 
thesis, but that he is inclined toward the position nonetheless. 
 Though Nehushtan’s categorization of religion may be based on weak 
connections, it provides an important illustration that the presumed category of religion 
can just as easily work against the aims of religious adherents. The presumption of 
categorical distinctiveness should not be presumed to be an absolute good in political 
contexts. It can just as readily be employed in other areas, when evaluated alongside 
other state interests, to burden religious claims. Thus, the challenge posed by Nehushtan 
ought to underscore the significance of key theoretical grounding of the political 
construct. Categorical distinctiveness cannot be assumed exclusively to provide for 
protections. In certain cases, a broadly construed ethical basis for exemptions that 
evaluates religion on the same grounds as other ethical frameworks can actually be 
construed as a mean between the prioritizing and the deliberate undermining of religious 
interests, rather than as an attack on religious interests in itself.   
 
Religion as the Model: Distinct but Porous 
While Bedi and Nehushtan promote an impermeable boundary of religion, other 
approaches continue to promote the priority of religious over nonreligious approaches 
but allow for certain nonreligious ethical claims to qualify inasmuch as they correspond 
to religion. Martha Nussbaum worries about the complication that ensues from labeling 
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religion one among many ethical frameworks.32 She posits that describing religion as a 
strong ethical commitment makes it impossible to prioritize religious practices over 
nonreligious practices. Where Bedi focuses on several possible nonreligious contenders, 
Nussbaum specifically addresses normativity, sharing his suspicion that it represents the 
best possible alternative to making religion a category.  She, too, ultimately decides that 
it does an insufficient job of weeding out trivial claims, instead falling back on giving 
religious observers protection as the default position. But this betrays the same bias, as it 
is only necessary to adopt this category if you are assuming from the beginning that 
religious practices are those most deserving of protection among ethical beliefs.  
In her reductio ad absurdum employed against normativity, she asks: 
What about the idea that religious requirements are experienced as obligatory and 
nonoptional?... It fails to include people who don’t experience their religion this 
way, a serious problem when we include religions that have no structure of 
authority and no textual source. Buddhism, Reform Judaism, Unitarianism, and 
quite a few other religions have no category of the nonoptional: everything is to 
be judged by the conscience of the individual.33  
The critique of normativity amounts, however, to an observation that a moral dilemma 
cannot be considered adequate because of its failure to include groups that do not fit the 
traditional groupings of religious adherents. Yet she fails to address the theoretical 
question of why these groups would need a category of special protection if they have 
                                                 
32 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008), 167-174. 
33 Ibid., 167-168. 
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not demonstrated a moral dilemma. In the individual assessments which she later admits 
must be admitted, it is clear that adherence to one authoritative doctrine or sacred text is 
not the sine qua non of receiving an exemption. Thus, the Buddhist ultimately would 
receive protection under normativity if, in fact, a moral dilemma called for one. She 
dismisses the moral quandary as irrelevant precisely because using it would not map 
onto traditional religious categories, which is not a per se dismissal of its usefulness. She 
adds concerns similar to Bedi’s regarding the potential of normativity to protect “trivial” 
attachments, with similar results. This reasoning, for her, leaves the subject matter as the 
last viable standard left standing.  
Unlike Bedi, however, Nussbaum admits that certain nonreligious claims might 
be brought under the banner of religious protection, inasmuch as they exhibit the same 
traits that make religion worthy of protection in the first place. Her preference, for 
example, in defending the 1965 decision United States v. Seeger34 over its 1970 
successor Welsh v. United States35 illustrates her aversion to claiming that the two 
ethical enterprises of religious and nonreligious living are comparable. In Seeger, the US 
held that conscientious objectors to war might qualify for exemption from mandated 
combat duty if they can demonstrate the following: “A sincere and meaningful belief 
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of 
those admittedly qualifying for the...” Under this model, others might be candidates for 
moral exemption by virtue of their fitting the model provided by religion. The model at 
least succeeds in expanding protection to unorthodox religious beliefs and a select few 
                                                 
34 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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nonreligious ethical beliefs deemed sufficiently “religion-like”. Under the Seeger 
precedent, however, the extension is restrained such that it does not allow for general 
ethical objections. It was Welsh, then, that expanded the protections beyond exclusively 
religious terms to include “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code” that can demonstrate ethical significance. 
Nussbaum finds fault with Welsh for its perceived watering down of the 
distinctiveness of religious concerns and its flattening of the category of exemptions. 
Nussbaum takes for granted that religious actions occupy a place of priority in terms of 
the state’s attention. She remains deeply concerned to maintain the dichotomy between 
higher level and lower level actions as distinguished by their relation to transcendent 
ends. Although her category may have a somewhat permeable boundary, she still relies 
on promoting two distinct forms of treatment for actions according to the religiousness 
of their aims.  
This trend is especially common among those who use the language of 
preserving religion as a “basic good”. Koppelman argues that replacing religion as the 
determinative factor with conscience would lead to too underinclusive a system of 
exemptions, as not all practices and actions that ought to be protected under the bounds 
of religion would be captured by the notions of duty implied by the idea of conscience.36 
People may engage in religious activity for a number of reasons, he suggests. He cites, 
for example, habit, adherence to custom, curiosity about religious truth, and religious 
enthusiasm as alternative motives for religious worship that often take the place of the 
                                                 
36 Andrew Koppelman, “Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?” University of Illinois Law Review 
(2006): 571-603, 571. 
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duty or fear of divine consequences implied by notions of conscience. On this account, 
he suggests, religion ought to be seen as a broader category, one defensible in no way 
other than categorizing it as distinct from other human goods. He selects as his referent 
an objective idea of the value of religion, rather than allowing individuals to determine 
what should be most binding as they could care about literally anything. Like Nussbaum, 
he allows for a broad array of beliefs to be potentially included under the broad category 
of religion as attempts to deal with the most fundamental questions. He also directly 
challenges the legacy of Welsh for conceding the priority of religion, preferring Seeger’s 
approach. 
This move is common in promoters of the distinctive view of religion, 
demonstrating a willingness to expand the category beyond just religious groups to 
include some nonreligious groups, but with the insistence that the newly created broader 
group remain under the banner of religion.  Such arguments demand that nonreligious 
claims demonstrate consistency with religion. They will accept as functionally 
equivalent neither religion restating itself in nonreligious terms, nor an emphasis on 
finding the underlying commonalities shared by both categories. Exemplars of this 
particular trend account for deep affinities between the logic of religious and 
nonreligious perspectives by maintaining the distinctive category of religion and 
expanding membership to select nonreligious beliefs and practices. 
This approach fails to acknowledge the gray area as a challenge to the claimed 
distinctiveness of religion.  It attempts to solve the problem by subsuming the anomalies 
into one category or other rather than recognizing that acknowledging that a continuum-
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like gradation poses a theoretical challenge to the dichotomy. Even within the bounds of 
specifically religious claims for exemptions, there are those that are more or less 
appropriate candidates for such exemptions. Both Nussbaum and Koppelman ignore the 
ways in which nonreligious and even antireligious perspectives can be inherently 
engaged in the same project as religion. These perspectives are fully self-sustaining and 
need not be framed in religious terms to deserve state attention. 
 
Implications for the Discussion 
 There is systematically insufficient evidence and argumentation within the 
current literature to justify placing religion in a category of its own for the purpose of 
exemptions. The literature arguing for distinctiveness within liberal democracy is 
consistently hasty in its urge to reify the concept of religion either into a talisman that 
immediately merits special protections or even occasionally as a bullseye to draw 
particular punishments. Arguments for the distinctiveness of religion have chronic 
problems of underestimating the complexity of this question and mislocating its source. 
While there may be a range of possible arguments for the distinctiveness of religion, 
they are rarely articulated. The object of the proceeding critiques is to redirect the focus 
of the discussion to terms that do not smuggle in presumptions that religion is in fact 
different in political kind and deserving of distinctive treatment. The tendency 
represented by the examples above, even employed to an array of ends, suggests a 
consistent lesson. Confidence in the claim that religion occupies a discrete political 
category inhibits theorists from making progress in convincing those to whom the 
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conceptual differences are not self-evident. Theoretical work is repeatedly hindered by 
these mistakes. There exists an impulse to create this political category called “religion”, 
but the literature making this argument has done little to get at what exactly it is that we 
are trying to protect when we invoke the category. Reifying it into a strict construct 
avoids articulating the substance of religion. The fear seems to be that disassembling the 
box and describing its constituent parts would too easily allow others to identify with the 
pieces and claim that perhaps it is not so unique after all. But the failure to engage the 
question on these terms leads to no progress in fleshing out our understanding of this 
vague, elusive, and perhaps even chimerical concept. 
 
IN DEFENSE OF NORMATIVITY AS THE DEFAULT MECHANISM FOR 
EXEMPTIONS 
The Alternative 
 Inasmuch as the project of defending religious exemptions qua religious claims 
has failed thus far, normativity, which requires treating religious beliefs by the same 
standards as other ethical beliefs, becomes the de facto standard for determining all 
ethical exemptions. Normativity uses as a standard of evaluating qualification for an 
ethical exemption norms that are obligatory and experienced as binding on the 
individual. What matters is that the individual experiences a moral dilemma and would 
be forced to choose between following the binding dictates of the moral prescriptions 
and complying with state policy. Normativity also requires potentially universalizable 
reasons. As observed, objections to normativity frequently revolve around both the 
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desire to ensure protection for a grouping of practices considered ‘most deserving’ of 
protection, and the accompanying fear that normativity would trigger the proliferation 
problem. But, as demonstrated above, questions of practical implementation are separate 
from questions of desirability, and the two must be handled separately. 
 I would confirm the fears of the aforementioned theorists: normativity does run 
the risk of the proliferation problem. Yet I would respond by suggesting that if in fact 
normativity proves too inclusive to be functional, if no line could be drawn that would 
allow for a sustainable number of exemptions to the law, then the project of exemptions 
would best be abandoned on grounds of practicality, rather than preserved through weak 
and inegalitarian categorical distinctions. If the field has failed to supply a justification 
of the distinctiveness of religion as evidenced in Part II, then the tendency to reject 
normativity on practical implementation groups suggests that a scholar has 
predetermined to privilege religion even in the absence of a theoretical defense. 
 While I am not concerned here to establish the practicality of the issue, it suffices 
for this project to argue that the legitimate threat of the proliferation problem does not 
justify falling back on makeshift categories that only serve to protect groups favored by 
particular scholars. If we cannot solve the puzzle of desirability, that is to say, if we 
cannot establish that religious groups are uniquely deserving of political privilege, then 
there remains no reason to reject the approach of normativity in a society that has 
already agreed upon the use of exemptions as a tool. Part III will attempt to demonstrate 
the potential for comparability of religious and nonreligious worldviews in terms of 
concerns of the state, and show how general approaches based on normativity or liberty 
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of conscience are appropriate mechanisms for granting exemptions. I am also not 
concerned at the present moment to establish the best particular version of normative 
exemptions; I am interested in promoting normativity generally, inasmuch as it 
represents the alternative to the discrete conception of religion by promoting consistent 
application. Part III will particularly respond to those who argue for the distinctiveness 
of religion on the grounds that normativity cannot account for differences between 
religious and nonreligious beliefs, building their case on the alleged insufficiencies of 
broadly ethical frameworks.  
 
On the Comparability of the Experience and Function of Ethical Beliefs 
 Some have argued that concepts like liberty of conscience are insufficient protect 
religion when applied by the same approaches used for nonreligious beliefs. Seglow, for 
example, in assessing various theoretical arguments for religious exemptions, finds that 
the liberty of conscience approach, as advocated by theorists like Gutmann,37 conflates 
processes of belief that in fact are not comparable enough to fall under the same 
umbrella. Seglow says:  
In particular, religious duties are not (or not in the first instance) owed to other 
people, but rather seem to be a mixture of duties owed to a supreme being and, 
possibly, duties owed to oneself, the latter insofar as people labour under a duty 
to be a good Christian, good Muslim and so on. Non-religious duties, by contrast, 
are owed to other people, or at least other living things which inhabit the earth. I 
                                                 
37 Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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suggest that this makes it harder for non-believers to appreciate their binding 
force.38  
Seglow argues that non-religious people cannot always understand the nature of the 
binding force of religious duties, although at times a measure of overlap of 
understanding may lead one to falsely conclude that the shared understanding is 
sufficient. But this argument fails, in my view, both to disestablish the continuity 
between religious and nonreligious ethical duties and to delegitimize liberty of 
conscience as an adequate category for religious protection.  
 I take issue with setting the standard for establishing the similarity or difference 
of religious and nonreligious commitments on the basis of how similar or different the 
experience of following those beliefs feels. First, Seglow's logic assumes that 
experiencing ethical commitments as more or less binding can in fact imply a difference 
in kind rather than a mere difference of degree. Even if religious duties were more likely 
to fall on the far end of Seglow’s presumed spectrum of binding feeling, this would not 
be evidence enough that they should be categorically separated, thereby universally 
excluding access. Secondly, even using his spectrum, a nonreligious person may 
experience a moral impulse that is binding in the same way that a religious person 
experiences, despite his unfounded assertion to the contrary. Removed of the support 
from his assertion of degree of feeling, the putative difference of direction of one’s 
duties either toward others or towards divinity would do little on its own to establish the 
                                                 
38 Jay Seglow, “Theories of Religious Exemptions,” in Diversity in Europe: Dilemmas of Differential 
Treatment in Theory and Practice, eds. Gideon Calder and Emanuela Ceva (London: Routledge, 2010): 
52-64, 58. 
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distinctiveness of religion to the degree required by this discussion.   
 The feature of “degree of binding” that Seglow wants to capture may be better 
accounted for as representing the degree of strength attached to these convictions.  If 
duties are experienced as more binding, this will likely increase the weight accorded to 
them when they undergo tests of sincerity and centrality, which are seen by many 
advocates of exemptions as important parts of the granting of exemptions, among other 
tests.39 It is possible that the difference in how binding duties feel may be empirically 
higher in religious citizens. But using a liberty of conscience approach that employs 
these tests would still manage to protect religious actors, while directing that protection 
specifically to those who exhibit the salient feature Seglow associates with religion.  
This approach has the added benefits both of screening out insincere religious observers, 
who might not experience their duties as binding, and of including those nonreligious 
duties that do occupy a similar place in the actor’s ethical framework. Even if one were 
to respond that the original considerations of religious exemptions already have a 
mechanism for evaluating the intensity of commitment, putting the religious and 
nonreligious commitments on the same scale has the advantage of removing an 
unnecessary step and selecting for evaluation specifically those features that are most 
relevant.  
 It is worth remembering that what are called nonreligious reasons here frequently 
would apply even to the religious citizenry, any time they act in an area about which 
their particular religious tradition is silent or leaves room for interpretation. Thus, the 
                                                 
39 See Courtois, “Conscientious Objection,” for a discussion of these tests.  
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mindless do-gooders from the initial example could easily be religious in their normal 
lives, but perhaps, for example, from a tradition that does not directly emphasize 
obligations to the poor and social justice. But even though this religious citizen does not 
act in that moment out of the dictates of religious commandments, there is no reason that 
the same degree of intensity, a religious-like fervor, could not be experienced in relation 
to other felt ethical or moral commitments.  
Many would also consider religious frameworks inherently distinct by virtue of 
their content. On a facial comparison, their substance indeed appears quite different. 
Consider the particularity of a moral choice informed by a relationship with a 
supernatural being, or a belief in a horrific afterlife for the unfaithful as determined by 
choices made in this life. The calculus of moral decision making under these restraints 
would differ drastically from one not so constrained. These specific types of content 
might suggest vast gaps between certain types of religious and nonreligious frameworks, 
perhaps enough to consider separate category. This is a classic position articulated by 
theorists like William Penn in early American defenses of religious liberty,40 though still 
echoed in the logic of religious freedom as not only historically but also logically prior 
or “first”.41 
 Focusing on these admittedly fundamental distinctions distracts, however, from a 
central commonality between religious and nonreligious perspectives that appears in the 
function that these wildly different beliefs ultimately serve for the citizen. From the 
perspective of the state under a normativity approach, the object of these exemptions 
                                                 
40 See William Penn, “The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience,” 82. Also see Chapter I of this project. 
41 For a discussion of these echoes, see Chapter III. 
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should be the ethical frameworks held by the liberal citizens rather than the substance of 
the content. What matters for the purpose of state consideration of its citizens is the 
place a belief holds in the believer’s ethical system. What matters is that citizens rely on 
the belief, be it of a religious or an ethical but nonreligious nature, to orient their lives. 
To distinguish religion on the basis of the nature of its content is to undermine severely 
the rational processes of nonreligious perspectives and the similarity of the role these 
determinations occupy in their lives, which amounts to a defense the Welsh approach 
discussed above. 
  That they may be further distinguished according to theistic or nontheistic 
approaches is a fact secondary to the similarity that they share in this fundamental role. 
It becomes relevant again here to consider the example of a religious person acting 
outside the bounds of his specific tradition. Apart from how intensely they may feel 
about an issue, there is a basic comparability in the act of moral reasoning performed. In 
our opening case, for example, the ethical issue is the importance placed on providing 
for the needy in one’s moral code. It matters most that both the “mindless do-gooder” 
and the citizen “impelled” by religious mandate perceive a binding duty to provide for 
the needy. Different beliefs may have led to the point of consideration, but from a 
political perspective, the conclusions are equally worthy of protection. While the two 
approaches may indeed yield drastically different views on morality and ethics, at least 
for the purpose of exemptions, it has not been demonstrated why the religious content 
ought to provide an altogether different material for political consideration. 
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On the Appropriateness of Instrumental Difference 
 The best case argument for disparate political treatment of religion is actually 
instrumental, performed on an individual rather than categorical basis. Justifying 
differential treatment on an instrumental account does not accord religion additional 
weight per se, but merely argues that in order to secure the same protections that 
motivate a state's interest in granting exemptions at all, religious adherents are 
sufficiently different that they often must be treated specially. This approach is common 
to those arguing with a particularly egalitarian emphasis, such as Bou-Habib, Boucher, 
Courtois, Mahoney, McGann, and Quong,42 although its application does not depend 
upon such a perspective.43 The purpose of exemptions policies, on this view, is that of 
mitigating unnecessary incidental burdens that create casualties in the pursuit of 
consistency and order. This is determined on the basis of individual needs, however, 
rather than by virtue of exhibiting religious claims.44 The goal of exemptions is to bring 
all to an equal playing field, insofar as burdens are incidentally created by the state. 
While at times religion may receive “special” treatment, it is only a result of any 
additional burdens incurred by particular moral beliefs clashing with state interests. 
                                                 
42 Paul Bou-Habib, “A Theory of Religious Accommodation,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23.1(2010): 
109-126; François Boucher, “Les Fondements Egalitaristes des Pratiques d’Accommodement de la 
Diversité Religieuse,” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 109.4(2011): 671-695; Courtois, “Conscientious 
Conviction; Jon Mahoney, “A Democratic Equality Approach to Religious Exemptions,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 42.3(2011): 305-320; Michael McGann, “Equal Treatment and Exemptions: Cultural 
Commitments and Expensive Tastes,” Social Theory and Practice 38.1(2012): 1-32; Jonathan Quong, 
“Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal Opportunities,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 
23.1(2006): 55-73. 
43 I am inclined, for example, to lean toward what Mahoney calls a framework of “liberal neutrality”, 
promoting religious liberty by scaling back the purview of state activity, rather than relying on an 
egalitarian defense. 
44 While this system may have a focus on individual claimants, it also can incorporate consideration of 
others affected by the belief, such as children of the religious adherent. 
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Such treatment would be available to any nonreligious citizens comparably situated, on a 
case-by-case rather than categorical basis. Thus, while the state may have pragmatic 
reasons for singling out religious adherents for special treatment, the justification for 
these and any exemptions refers only to the normativity and not to the religious nature of 
a given exemption-requiring belief.45 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The concept of religion is not the appropriate tool to use when it comes to 
granting exemptions from generally applicable laws.  As it stands, the presumption that 
religious belief merits special treatment remains under-theorized. Yet the discrete 
concept of religion holds sway not only in the scholarly literature but also among large 
segments of the public and politicians. In the United States, for example, Congress 
nearly unanimously46 passed the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act in an attempt 
to secure religious exemptions both nationally and at every state level, as Chapter IV 
will explore in detail. Although the language in the RFRA is not framed explicitly in 
terms of excluding nonreligious groups, suggesting that a court my invoke the logic of a 
case like Seeger and allow other perspectives to access this protection, it continues the 
recurring emphasis on the state’s interest in protecting religious practitioners and 
                                                 
45 For illustration purposes, we might understand this section in light of John Rawls’s difference principle, 
that inequalities must benefit the least well-off in society. See his Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), especially §1 of the first lecture. The fact that exemptions are still an 
allowable tool, available to the state to employ at its discretion gives the state resources with which to 
employ the difference principle. It can make the decision to allow citizens experiencing a conflict of the 
state to receive an exemption in order to allow them to participate more fully in life as a citizen, although 
this remains discretionary and is not required as religion does not demand exemption. Using exemptions 
in this way allows the state to communicate to its citizens that it recognizes that the necessity of creating 
universalizable laws may not always lead to maximum citizen wellbeing. 
46 Unanimously in the House of Representatives and 97-3 in the Senate.  
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expanding those protections to others only insofar as they can conform to the mold of 
religion. Yet, in spite of the pervasiveness of preference for religion, there remains little 
in the way of explaining just what it is about religion that we are protecting, and why the 
language of religion is most appropriate. 
Given that they are essentially requesting more of a good than what is being 
distributed to others, defenders of religious practices would do best to protect these ends 
by arguing on instrumental grounds that a greater needs exists in certain areas of law for 
religious practitioners to receive special treatment, but only to the end of allowing them 
to achieve the same goals as everyone else and by means to that end available to 
everyone as well. Thus, all actions and beliefs, whether religious or nonreligious, can be 
evaluated by the same standards of ethical treatment.   
If anything, the Welsh model ought to be applied to all religious guarantees and 
vice versa, though going a step further to avoid the language of religion altogether. As 
Mansbridge argues, absent a clear justification for distinctive treatment, the default must 
be equality for religious and nonreligious ethical beliefs. Although the respect that a 
society has for religion is frequently cited in legislative circles as sufficient impetus to 
justify distinctive treatment,47 religious observers would do the most to preserve their 
protections by embedding them in sound theoretical arguments rather than depending on 
public opinion that fluctuates over time. To guarantee protections over the long term, the 
tendency to use the concept of religion as a simple proxy for whatever underlying value 
                                                 
47 Lanie Freedman Ross and Timothy J. Aspinwall, “Religious Exemptions to the Immunization Statutes: 
Balancing Public Health and Religious Freedom,” The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 
25.2&3(1997): 202-209. 
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we are most attempting to protect must end, thereby restoring equality as the overriding 
value. 
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CHAPTER III 
RELIGIOUS PRIORITY: AMERICAN RHETORIC AND FIRST FREEDOMS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter II, I focused on claims regarding the distinctiveness of religion, as 
commonly applied to the subject of exemptions. Arguments for religious distinctiveness 
are frequently paired with arguments for religious priority. However, neither requires the 
other to craft a complete argument; it is possible to claim either one without the other. 
For example, as discussed above, an argument like Bedi’s for religious distinctiveness 
does not require the state to rank the interests of religious citizens above those of 
nonreligious citizens; it argues only that we recognize the needs of religious believers as 
categorically distinct.  
Likewise, there is another brand of argument focused specifically on arguing that 
protecting the interests of religious believers is the primary obligation of the state. They 
do not necessarily focus on trying to demonstrate that religion is fundamentally different 
from every other type of interest but nonetheless call for its privilege. This chapter 
examines the tendency to invoke religious superiority, paying particular attention to 
attempts to label religion as the “first freedom”, which is especially common in US 
political rhetoric.48 Whereas in the first chapter I focused on theoretical defenses of 
                                                 
48 While the focus of this chapter is in some ways broader in that not everyone invoking this phrase is 
arguing from a context of liberal democratic theory, my interest remains primarily with those who make 
arguments that have application in a liberal democratic context. There are numerous communitarian or 
republican arguments for invoking religious priority, for example. Or, for further illustration, I am clearly 
avoiding arguments rooted in theocracy. My scope, therefore, is limited to those positions that can apply to 
liberal democracy; see the analysis of Proposition (3) in Part II of this chapter for more on this point.  
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religious distinctiveness, in the case of religious priority I will focus on claims made in 
American political discourse. As alluded to in the introduction, these claims spring most 
frequently from a discourse influenced by a particular historical development. I am 
particularly interested in the way the category of religion is used as a strategic grab for 
political power. I will ultimately argue that the “first freedom” concept, when intended 
to invoke religious priority, is an inappropriate and misleading political tool. 
 
Motivating Concerns and Outline 
During the 2012 vice presidential debate, moderator Martha Raddatz asked the 
two candidates, incumbent Vice President Joe Biden and Congressman Paul Ryan, both 
Catholics, to talk about the relationship between their faith and their political positions 
on the issue of abortion. After stating that his personal position was pro-life, Ryan 
indicated that Governor Mitt Romney’s presidential administration would likewise 
promote pro-life policies. He continued: 
What troubles me more is how this administration has handled all of these issues. 
Look at what they’re doing through “Obamacare” with respect to assaulting the 
religious liberties of this country. They’re infringing upon our first freedom, the 
freedom of religion, by infringing on Catholic charities, Catholic churches, 
Catholic hospitals. Our church should not have to sue our federal government to 
maintain their religious liberties.49  
                                                 
49 Paul Ryan, “2012 Vice Presidential Debate,” Washington, D.C., National Public Radio, 11 October 
2012, http://www.npr.org. 
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In the debate, Ryan placed a careful, deliberate stress on the phrase “first freedom” in his 
answer, underscoring the conceptual foundation of his policy position. Both Ryan and 
his presidential running mate Romney invoked the phrase repeatedly in their 2012 
campaign. The idea behind the phrase, however, is not unique to the conservative 
movement. As will be discussed in the coming sections, the phrase has appeared in 
speeches by previous presidents and many vocal advocates of religious liberty in the 
public sphere, yet its significance remains ambiguous. Designating any freedom as the 
“first freedom” could imply any one of the following claims, or any combination of 
them:  
Proposition (1), sequential: It refers merely to sequence, the fact that an idea 
appears first in a given list. In this case, the religion clauses together appear first 
among all guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 
Proposition (2), historical: It invokes priority placed on a concept by a tradition. 
In this case, it may refer to the high valuing of religious liberty specific to US 
history. 
Proposition (3), conceptual: It suggests a theoretical priority of one interest over 
others. In this case, religion by its very nature is of primary significance among 
state concerns.  
The phrase as applied to religion is frequently used in a manner that overlaps more than 
one of these propositions, with no attempt to distinguish or to clarify the sense in which 
the term is used. Yet the ideas communicated by each sense of the term differ radically 
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from each other. To further complicate issues, the status of religious liberty as the “first” 
freedom has long faced challenges from other freedoms vying for the position. 
This chapter unpacks the different implications of this concept and ultimately 
argues that its usage asserts the priority of religious interests without adequate 
theoretical foundation. In Part I, I trace the development of attempts to establish what 
constitutes the first freedom in US political and legal rhetoric. This section will illustrate 
that the phrase “first freedom” has not always implied conceptual priority and that it has 
not always applied to religion, challenging the self-evident status of this claim with 
respect to either Proposition (2) or (3). In Part II, I will respond to each proposition and 
argue that none of them makes a sufficient case for religion as the first freedom with any 
meaningful policy implications. In particular, I will suggest that attempts to appropriate 
the American tradition to support such claims prove problematic and that arguments 
about the political priority of religious interests misconstrue the significance of religion 
in relation to other ethical beliefs. The case for the theoretical priority of religion 
benefits from the ambiguity of its multiple potential meanings to promote particular 
interests. I conclude that the phrase “first freedom,” as currently employed, is misleading 
in public discourse and relies on faulty implicit assumptions. I suggest that the phrase as 
currently applied to religion should be abandoned. 
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PART I: HISTORY OF THE “FIRST FREEDOM” LABEL 
Origins 
On 6 January, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave his State of the Union 
address to the 77th Congress. The world was engaged in early stages of World War II. 
Though the attack on Pearl Harbor that would not draw the United States into the war for 
another ten months, the tension in the country stemming from world events was 
palpable. In response, Roosevelt gave his famous “Four Freedoms” speech, detailing the 
US plan for foreign policy. He painted a vision of a world characterized by “four 
essential human freedoms”:   
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—
everywhere in the world. 
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, 
means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy 
peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. 
The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, 
means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a 
thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical 
aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.50 
                                                 
50 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address (Four Freedoms),” speech, Charlottesville, VA, the 
Miller Center at the University of Virginia, 6 January 1941, 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3320. 
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Although there was no implication of any rank ordering of those freedoms, to suggest for 
example that the second was any more important than the third or fourth, the ordering 
became iconic, and the number of each freedom was often used in popular culture as a 
tag of sorts. For example, it became commonplace to discuss the role of teachers in 
supporting the “first freedom,” free speech, by helping students to express themselves. In 
such an exhortation to teachers, Professor E.B. Dike even refers to the interrelatedness of 
the “first” and “fourth” freedoms, the latter freedom from fear, and how they mutually 
support each other.51 
The actual phrase “first freedom” as a stand-alone concept was popularized 
widely by a 1946 volume by Morris Ernst, a lawyer, co-founder of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and high profile advocate for journalists’ rights. 52 He wrote a book 
entitled The First Freedom,53 detailing the right to expression in the form of the printed 
word, followed by an authorized second volume of the same title by Bryce Rucker in 
1968.54 Freedom of the press represents for Ernst the most typical expression of the 
freedom of speech. Written just a few years later, it does not even bother with a 
reference to the “Four Freedoms” speech, reflecting how quickly the phrase became a 
part of the US lexicon.  
The designation of speech as the “first freedom” was not universally employed, 
however. Though the phrase commonly referred to Roosevelt’s speech, there were 
                                                 
51 E.B. Dike, “The First Freedom and Its Implications for Teachers and Learners,” College English 
6.1(1944): 34-38. 
52 Norman Rosenberg, "The 'Popular First Amendment' and Classical Hollywood, 1930-1960: Film Noir 
and 'Speech Theory for the Millions,'" in Freeing the First Amendment: Critical Perspectives on Freedom 
of Expression, eds. David S. Allen and Robert Jensen (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 160. 
53 Morris L. Ernst, The First Freedom, (New York: Macmillan, 1946). 
54 Bryce W. Rucker, The First Freedom (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1968). 
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occasional references to the Establishment Clause for its sequential ordering. Many have 
suggested that issues of establishment and religious liberty, the latter represented by the 
Free Exercise Clause, are highly interrelated. Due to these two dimensions, religion is 
often referred to as “a coin with two sides,” 55 as Clinton among others has referred to it. 
However, they are also “frequently in tension”56 and are most commonly addressed 
separately. In the first decade after its introduction, the phrase was occasionally 
reappropriated from its use as associated with Roosevelt and imbued with this religious 
connotation. In such cases, authors would often make explicit reference to the sequential 
ordering of the guarantees of the First Amendment. Note, though, that even in this 
context the phrase is used primarily as a part of challenges to strong separationist claims 
made regarding the establishment clause. For instance, Wilfrid Parsons57 in 1948 and 
Milton Konvitz58 in 1949 invoked the “first freedom” phrase to challenge the highly 
separationist decision of Everson v. Board of Education59 decision of 1947. This use of 
the phrase did not catch on to the same degree of popularity as its use in reference to free 
speech, however, especially since the "Four Freedoms" ideals were publicly enshrined 
throughout the rest of the 1940s in various institutional capacities.   
                                                 
55 Bill Clinton, “Religious Liberty in America,” speech, Vienna, VA, U.S. Society & Values 2.1(12 July 
1995): 5-9. 
56 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
57 Wilfrid Parsons, The First Freedom: Considerations on Church and State in the United States (New 
York: Declan X. McMullen Co., Inc, 1948). 
58 Milton R. Konvitz, "Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom," Law and Contemporary 
Problems 14.1(1949): 44-60. 
59 330 U.S. 1. (1947). In upholding the constitutionality of a New Jersey school district covering the cost 
of transportation for students to parochial schools, Everson actually set out highly separationist rhetoric. 
Both the court majority and the dissenting voices called for a wide gap between religious and state actors. 
This case introduced Jefferson’s phrase “wall of separation between church and state” to US case law.  
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It is important to notice, however, that in this first decade, the use of the phrase 
could easily support this flexible usage because in either sense it was clearly associated 
in such instances with sequential ordering, with respect either to the Bill of Rights or the 
First Freedom Speech. There is no explicit reference and very little, if any, subtle 
implication of the phrase referring to logical priority. Unlike in its present day usage, it 
was merely used as an epithet without placing heavy conceptual significance on the fact 
of its being “first.”  The designation “first”, at this time and within the specific contexts 
to which it typically applied, can be understood as merely reflecting the fact that 
whatever freedom it was used to referred to appeared first sequentially on some list, 
whether the Bill of Rights or the “Four Freedoms” speech. Note that no advocates of 
religious liberty seized upon Roosevelt's phrase “the second freedom” as a rallying cry. 
 
Other Applications 
Over time, some authors began to replace free speech with whatever dimension 
of liberty they thought made possible all others. “First” became a label for whichever 
freedom was the sine qua non of liberty within a state, that which is logically prior to the 
existence of any other. In consideration of the plight of blacks in the nineteenth century, 
Kolchin identified the emancipation as the “first freedom.”60 It makes no sense to speak 
of the right to express one's opinions if one is excluded from the political sphere entirely. 
Without recognition as a full political being, rather than three fifths of one but without 
any political standing, one has no ground from which to invoke any other freedom. Thus, 
                                                 
60 Peter Kolchin, First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972). 
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in terms of logical priority, Kolchin argued that the freedom from slavery and inclusion 
in the political system together represent the first freedom. 
Using the same logic to radically different ends, Charlton Heston once argued, 
before the National Press Club in 1997, in defense of the National Rifle Association that 
the Second Amendment was, in fact, “more essential” than the First Amendment: 
It is time [young Americans] found out that the politically correct doctrine of 
today has misled them. And that when they reach legal age, if they do not break 
our laws, they have a right to choose to own a gun—a handgun, a long gun, a 
small gun, a large gun, a black gun, a purple gun, a pretty gun, an ugly gun—and 
to use that gun to defend themselves and their loved ones or to engage in any 
lawful purpose they desire without apology or explanation to anyone, ever. This 
is their first freedom.61 
Following the same rhetorical format as Kolchin, Heston implies that religion and 
speech are meaningless if one’s safety is threatened. A protected platform is a 
prerequisite for speech. Therefore, in terms of pure conceptual priority, the right to bear 
arms must precede the others. However, in important contrast to modern usage of the 
phrase, and in opposition to its use as applied to the Establishment Clause, the 
implication here was one of clear intent: “first” exclusively refers to the conceptual 
priority of the subject. No alternate senses of the phrase obscure the idea communicated 
by its employment.  
                                                 
61 Peter Manseau, "Is Religious Freedom Really Primary?" web, Campaign Stops: Strong Opinions on the 
2012 Election, New York Times, 26 October 2012. 
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A comparable phenomenon appears in early- to mid-twentieth century American 
jurisprudence in the form of the preferred freedoms doctrine. Edward White observes:  
The preferred position cases decided by the Supreme Court, beginning in 1937, 
reveal intuitions by several Justices, with Brandeis, that First Amendment rights 
were in a different category from other constitutional liberties and deserved 
greater constitutional protection than police power analysis afforded them. Those 
Justices intuitively concluded that the reason for this enhanced protection for 
First Amendment rights lay not only in the close connections between free 
speech and democratic theory, but in the enhanced significance of democratic 
theory itself as a defining aspirational feature of American civilization.”62  
This idea of “preferred freedoms”, that certain ideas demand special attention by the 
state, seeped into other areas of law and influenced the development of heightened 
scrutiny.63 Legal theorists like Meiklejohn64 continued this tradition of placing freedom 
in the sense of self-expression at the center of democratic society. As conflicts over 
speech topics like hate speech rose in the public awareness and sparked national 
discussions about the place of free speech in society, speech became more and more of a 
                                                 
62 G. Edward White, “The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-
Century America,” Michigan Law Review 95.2(1996): 299-392, 329. 
63 By default, US laws are evaluated under a rational basis test, which is deferential to the state and 
requires proof that a policy reasonably achieves a legitimate, non-arbitrary interest. In certain cases, 
however, the court raises the level of scrutiny and places the burden of proof on the state, requiring that it 
do more to prove the essentialness of its course of action. Bill of Rights guarantees, for example, typically 
receive a strict scrutiny treatment. See also: Howard Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive 
Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence,” Political Research 
Quarterly 47.3(1994): 623-653. 
64 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper and Row, 
1948). 
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central issue. In the wake of the public conversation, speech came to be viewed as 
“indispensible to the functioning of democratic politics.”65  
The preferred freedom doctrine treated religion as a subset of speech, included 
under the broader category of related First Amendment guarantees. Religion was 
considered one value among many that citizens have a right to express, fulfilling a 
similar role within democratic society as expressions of political belief or social 
activism.66 Religion becomes, like other instances of speech, part of the discussion about 
the ideal nature of a society. It is the discussion writ-large about society that drew the 
attention of the preferred freedoms advocates, not religion specifically.  
 
US Presidents and “First Freedom” Rhetoric 
Although, as discussed, the phrase “first freedom” has been attached to a number 
of different rights over past decades, attempts to identify the singular, central freedom 
and uses of the phrase itself have shifted almost exclusively toward religious liberty. 
Journalist Peter Manseau has indicated that the last few presidents have all employed 
this rhetorical ploy to similar effect. After alluding to comments made by Obama on the 
subject (to be discussed in the next section), Manseau observes, “Hardly the first 
president to make such a declaration, Mr. Obama was just putting his own spin on a 
statement that now seems practically a requirement of the office.”67 However, in reality, 
the implication of the use of this concept varies significantly from one president to the 
                                                 
65 White, “The First Amendment Comes of Age,” 342. 
66 See also Reinhart Koselleck’s discussion of the resurgence of emancipation theory in the 1960s. “The 
Limits of Emancipation: A Conceptual-Historical Sketch,” in The Practice of Conceptual History, eds. 
Reinhart Koselleck and Todd Presner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 254. 
67 Manseau, “Is Religious Freedom Really Primary?”  
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next, especially when one considers the different senses which I represent with the 
aforementioned sequential, historical, and conceptual propositions, that may be implied 
by the concept.  
In 1995, Bill Clinton gave a speech in defense of the recently passed Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, part of which would soon be deemed unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in 1997. “Religious freedom is literally our first freedom. It is the first 
thing mentioned in the Bill of Rights.”68 He relies explicitly on the sequential 
Proposition (1), relying on the simple fact of its presence to suggest its importance 
without trying to elevate it. He later states, “The First Amendment keeps us all on 
common ground. We are allowed to believe and worship as we choose without the 
government telling any of us what we can and cannot do.” Clinton employs the concept 
to create a perceived neutrality, where one is neither forced toward nor prohibited from 
engaging in religious activity. 
Clinton’s successor to the office, however, invoked the “first freedom” concept 
in a decidedly different way. In a speech to the American Jewish Committee, George W. 
Bush said, “It is not an accident that freedom of religion is one of the central freedoms in 
our Bill of Rights. It is the first freedom of the human soul—the right to speak the words 
that God places in our mouths.”69 His remarks reflect his administration’s general 
tendency toward the conceptual Proposition (3).  
                                                 
68 Clinton, “Religious Liberty in America.” 
69 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the American Jewish Committee,” speech, Washington 
D.C., the White House, 3 May 2001, georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 
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This emphasis most clearly appears in a major undertaking of the final years of 
the Bush administration. In 2007 before an executive assembly of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales unveiled the administration’s First 
Freedom Project. The project entailed a number of provisions, including a Department-
of-Justice-wide Religious Freedom Task Force, regular public education events to 
inform religious leaders of their rights and how to address violations, distribution of 
information, and even a website: firstfreedom.gov.  
In explaining the rationale behind the project to the gathering of Southern Baptist 
leaders, Gonzales stated:  
When we talk about religious freedom, we often refer to it as the First Freedom. 
It is a fundamental part of our Nation’s history, and one of our core principles. In 
the First Amendment to the Constitution, at the top of the Bill of Rights, the 
Founders declared that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Before free speech, before 
freedom of the press, before all of these other crucial rights, we put freedom of 
religion.70  
Note here the emphasis on sequence as in Proposition (1), but also the clear 
interpretation of this fact as evidence of support for the conceptual priority of 
Proposition (3). Gonzales explained further:  
                                                 
70 Alberto R. Gonzales, “Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the Southern Baptist Convention,” speech, Nashville, TN, Department of Justice, 
20 February 2007, http://www.justice.gov/. 
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You know, and I know, that this great Nation of ours is the most diverse and 
tolerant in the history of the world. We have an unrestrained confidence in the 
promise of man, strengthened by our trust in a higher power. Our Founders were 
men of faith. They understood that, even before their time, this land was settled 
by pilgrims seeking religious freedom. They understood the importance of a 
government that respected and protected the “First Freedom.” As James Madison 
wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments: “The 
Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”71 
This is an interesting interpretation of this passage of Madison’s, especially since 
Madison was arguing in that instance for removing religious presence from aspects of 
public government.72 Gonzales, however, points to the negative right indicated here as 
evidence of a corresponding positive right of heightened interest by the state. Critics 
have charged that although this religious liberties division claims to protect the interests 
of all religious groups, as expressed in Gonzales’s remarks, it has in fact primarily 
directed its attentions to Christian groups, especially fundamentalists.73 This speech was 
widely circulated by religious groups online as evidence of the Bush administration’s 
support for religious interests.  
                                                 
71 Ibid.  
72 For further discussion of Madison, see the follow-up to the discussion of Proposition (3) in Part II of this 
chapter. 
73 Jeremy Leaming, “First Freedom FRAUD: Bush Administration’s Religious Liberty Project Draws Fire 
from Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Leaders,” Church & State 60.4(2007): 4-6. 
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In the years since the launch of this project, however, there has been little to no 
visible activity resulting from the First Freedom Project.74 The project appears to have 
subsided in subsequent years. The Special Counsel for Religious Discrimination, an 
employee of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and a regular 
newsletter detailing the Civil Rights Division’s advocacy for religious interests appear to 
be the only remaining public products of the former Attorney General’s promise. 
Consolidation of efforts appears to be a strong statement even for what occurred. While 
the project may not have resulted in a substantial change for the structure of the 
Department of Justice or the face of religious liberty in government affairs, the project 
and the publicity served as a powerful public statement of the Bush administration’s 
position on the priority of religious interests, adding to the charged atmosphere that 
would manifest most clearly in the last election cycle.  
 
The 2012 Election 
In most recent history, the phrase was employed to great lengths as a central 
theme of the Romney campaign for the 2012 election. Mitt Romney made repeated use 
of the phrase on the campaign trail. On 3 February, 2012, he wrote an op-ed for the 
Washington Examiner entitled “President Obama Versus Religious Liberty,” in which he 
stated: 
                                                 
74 The project has received almost no media attention since its inception, and the www.firstfreedom.gov 
website reports no regular activity separate from the Civil Rights Division as a whole. Despite what one 
might expect from Gonzales’s speech, the project has not served to visibly raise the status of religion in 
the public sphere.  
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Religious liberty is at the heart of the American experiment. As a nation founded 
in part by religious dissenters, we enshrined it as the first freedom in our Bill of 
Rights…James Madison put the moral principle behind the amendment 
succinctly: “Conscience is the most sacred of all property.” And accompanying 
the moral principle came the social principle that only religious liberty could 
ensure tranquility in a new land composed of men and women of differing 
faiths…religious liberty and freedom of conscience flow from the common 
conviction that it is freedom not coercion that exalts the individuals, just as it 
raises up the nation.75 
The next day, in his victory speech in Nevada after the state primary, he listed a number 
of alleged failures of the Obama presidency followed by his alternative strategy. Among 
these he noted, in response to the controversy over the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act,76 “President Obama orders religious organizations to violate their conscience; 
I will defend religious liberty and overturn regulations that trample on our first 
freedom.”77  
On May 12, 2012, Romney gave the graduation speech at Liberty University, in 
which he stated:  
The protection of religious freedom has also become a matter of debate. It strikes 
me as odd that the free exercise of religious faith is sometimes treated as a 
problem, something America is stuck with instead of blessed with. Perhaps 
                                                 
75 Mitt Romney, "President Obama Versus Religious Liberty," Washington Examiner, web, 3 February 
2012, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 
76 See Chapter VI for more discussion surrounding this controversy.  
77 Mitt Romney, “Victory Speech after 2012 Nevada Primary,” speech, Reno, NV, Fox News, 4 February 
2012, http://foxnewsinsider.com. 
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religious conscience upsets the designs of those who feel that the highest wisdom 
and authority comes from government. But from the beginning, this nation 
trusted in God, not man. Religious liberty is the first freedom in our 
Constitution.78  
In the last sentence of this passage in particular, there is a strong stress placed on the 
connection between the historical priority of religious liberty and the sequential 
placement of the guarantee. Its location at the beginning of the document is stressed. 
While he values religion as central for other reasons, here he cites the authority of the 
framers of the Constitution for support, offering as evidence their location of this claim.  
In October 2012, closer to the election, the Romney campaign produced an 
advertisement starring Ryan, targeted explicitly at the Catholic network, stated:  
In America, we consider religious liberty our first freedom.  That’s because there 
is no constitutional guarantee more precious than our right to the free exercise of 
religion. As Catholics,79 we see our faith as more than an individual right. We see 
it as a vital part of our community. We celebrate the unique role our church plays 
in caring for Americans of all faiths, or of no faith at all. Catholic charities and 
hospitals offer services that hold our society together. But president Obama has 
                                                 
78 Mitt Romney, “Commencement Address at Liberty University,” speech, Lynchburg, VA, CNN, 12 May 
2012, http://religion.blogs.cnn.com. 
79 See the statement released by the United States Council of Catholic Bishops for the Church’s official 
statement about the priority of religion. “Our First, Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious 
Liberty,” 12 April 2012, www.USCCB.org/. 
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attacked these essential institutions since virtually the first moment he took 
office.80  
The advertisement glosses over the fact that all of the examples he cites are related to 
state funding of religious institutions, which is more of an establishment issue. He 
concludes that these represent a violation of individual rights, a move supported on 
expansion of religious liberty as a “God-given” community, rather than individual, right. 
And as mentioned, Paul Ryan made a very public invocation of the phrase in the vice 
presidential debate. 
In spite of the fact that the Romney campaign portrayed Obama’s actions as 
brutally damaging to the interests of religious liberty, Obama’s own statements in fact 
express a similar sympathy. While they may not agree on implementation, the two share 
the view that religion takes a special priority among state concerns. At the Iftar Dinner, a 
celebration of Ramadan, at the White House on 10 August, 2012, Obama began his 
remarks to guests stating:  
Of all the freedoms we cherish as Americans, of all the rights that we hold 
sacred, foremost among them is freedom of religion, the right to worship as we 
choose. It’s enshrined in the First Amendment of our Constitution—the law of 
the land, always and forever. It beats in our heart—in the soul of the people who 
know that our liberty and our equality is endowed by our Creator. And it runs 
                                                 
80 Paul Ryan, “Our First Freedom,” Mitt Romney YouTube Channel, 13 October 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com. 
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through the history of this house, a place where Americans of many faiths can 
come together and celebrate their holiest of days—and that includes Ramadan.81  
In this context, Obama actually seems to make an appeal exclusively to Proposition (2) 
regarding centrality to the tradition, without resting strongly on conceptual superiority 
against other concerns. On the one hand, in this instance his comments may come across 
as weaker than Romney’s, as he is not referring to a direct conflict of interest over state 
policy.  However, he is speaking in the wake of a number of hostilities perpetrated on 
Muslim Americans. He is reassuring the Muslim community that the government stands 
beside it and pledges protection. He is also far more inclusive in terms of which religions 
he specifically addresses. Romney, on the other hand, tended to follow such comments 
with references exclusively to the Christian community. Yet the language Obama uses 
suggests a conceptual similarity in its emphasis on religious liberty as the highest 
priority.  
 
PART II: ANALYSIS 
Arguments about the prioritizing of religious liberty are significant for the fact 
that they would potentially place the interests of a certain type of citizen at the forefront 
of state attention. This attention might be leveraged to garner greater shares of social 
goods, special exemptions, and a host of other privileges. But most importantly from 
theoretical and especially rhetorical perspectives, the debates about prioritization have 
the potential to signal to citizens with other pressing needs that their interests are less 
                                                 
81 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Iftar Dinner,” speech, Washington, D.C., Office of the 
Press Secretary, 10 August 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov. 
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significant in the eyes of the state.82 We turn now to consider the implications of each of 
the propositions.  
 
The Sequential Proposition (1)  
The sequential Proposition (1) points to the position of the religious guarantees 
as first in the Bill of Rights as evidence of their heightened significance. However, a 
guarantee’s position within an unranked, non-ordinal sequence alone cannot have any 
significant rhetorical impact on its own. If a particular liberty were ranked first 
alphabetically, perhaps the right to “arms”, for example, we would not take that fact as 
any indication of its philosophical priority. Likewise, it would be meaningless to state 
with any pride that the right to “petition the government for a redress of grievances” 
appears sixth in line. It would function as an epithet, an identifying marker with no 
substantive significance and only rhetorical flourish. The Bill of Rights, for example, has 
not been understood to list rights in order of their priority. Referring to religious liberty 
as our “first freedom” by virtue of the fact that the religion clauses appear first in the Bill 
of Rights would be insignificant in terms of meaning if it did not suggest historical 
and/or conceptual priority in addition.  
We have witnessed above an example of numerical designations serving purely 
as epithets. Shortly after Roosevelt’s speech, the majority of uses of the “first freedom” 
or “fourth freedom” were references to the ordering in the speech. They serve simply as 
                                                 
82 Ultimately, it might best be argued that such discussions of prioritizations of liberty are ultimately false 
dilemmas. Consider Ronald Dworkin’s argument for unity of value, that the idea of values competing with 
each other and existing in tension is simply an artifact of our attempt to stratify and typologize. Debates 
about which is more important, for example, liberty or equality, is simply not a legitimate question. Justice 
for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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nicknames, serve identification and allusion purposes only. With a few exceptions like 
Clinton’s speech above, the context in which the phrase is used the majority of the time 
in contemporary US politics belies such an intention.  
Furthermore, the original placement of the religion clauses at the beginning of 
the Bill of Rights was not by intention. Madison originally wanted the guarantee built 
into Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, rather than in a separate list, as McConnell 
points out.83 In the original proposed ordering, what we now know as the “First 
Amendment” was third of the list of twelve. Preceding it were an article specifying how 
many constituents a member of the House could represent and another, which later 
became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, stating that changes in compensation could 
not go into effect until the session after their enactment. The “First Amendment” moved 
up to its current position only after the first two failed ratification, shortening the list 
from twelve to ten and moving each guarantee up the list by two spots. The states had no 
influence on the ordering of the guarantees beyond the denial of their ratification. Thus, 
Proposition (1) cannot constitute the entirety of its significance given the typical context 
of its use, and referring to its position so as to ambiguously imply a ranked ordering is 
all the more misleading. 
 
The Historical Proposition (2)  
Proposition (2) makes a historical appeal to tradition, arguing in this case that 
religion should be given priority because traditionally it has been given such a privileged 
                                                 
83 McConnell, “Believers as Equal Citizens,” 1243. 
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status in this country. While stating that a liberty has held prominence in the past would 
indeed strike a chord with a significant portion of a US audience, it is neither 
uncontested nor clear what the implications of that would be. Religious liberty is not 
explicitly given priority over other interests in the Constitution; therefore, its priority 
must use a much more extensive claim about historical context in order to hold weight.  
While tradition may in fact hold substantial weight in political argumentation, it 
is a less direct argument than it appears on its face. Arguments from tradition rely on an 
ongoing consensus about both what constitutes the tradition and the importance of 
following the tradition. It is a claim that has embedded in it a number of other implied 
claims about what a political legacy means for the contemporary era. Proposition (2) 
makes at least the following set of assumptions, that: (a) the United States has 
traditionally held a certain value, (b) the value continues to be relevant to contemporary 
politics, and (c) application of the value would require a particular set of present-day 
policy outcomes.  
Recent scholarship challenges common beliefs about just what the early values of 
the American republic were. This work complicates the translation of these traditional 
values into the contemporary prioritization of religion in the sense implied by the phrase 
“first freedom.” Anthony Gill demonstrates, relying heavily on an analysis of early US 
history, that respect for individual liberties of the sort suggested by the phrase varies 
drastically according to the interests of legislators rather than according to ideology. He 
observes, “[P]oliticians take into account their own political survival (i.e., the ability to 
get reelected or stave off a coup), the need to raise government revenue, and the ability 
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to grow the economy when writing laws pertaining to religious freedom.”84 He bases this 
claim on a comparative analysis of several regions, but his exploration of the colonies 
and early states yield the same results: when political interests are threatened by 
powerful enough forces, religious freedom remains high. Without these pressures, 
religious liberty appears severely limited. The expression of value for religion may not 
translate into practical respect for religious interests that lack a strong voice in or 
influence over society. Minority religious groups in the early United States did not 
experience the full benefits of religious liberty until they crossed a threshold of power. 
Political interests and threats to those interests, he finds, serve as superior predictors of 
the degree of religious liberty than a region’s ideological stance toward the status of 
politically disadvantaged religious minorities. In spite of any ideological declaration of 
respect for minority religious beliefs, we see in practice that the conferral of respect for 
specific religious groups and practices in fact was more of a recognition of the ability of 
those groups to cause trouble if their demands were denied. Power dynamics explain 
religious liberty better than a deep-seated respect for religion.  
Likewise, David Sehat challenges two interpretations of US history common in 
the public sphere: (a) as conservatives tend to argue, that the early republic placed high 
value on individual religious liberty in apposition to politically dominant religious 
interests, and (b) as liberals tend to argue, that the early republic placed high value on 
                                                 
84 Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 9. This project is especially interesting for its unique application of a rational choice model to the 
historical development of religious liberty. By paying particular attention to the flow of interests, he is able 
to track consistencies in the direction of growth such as those suggested in this passage. He challenges 
ideational and structural accounts of the development of religious liberty. See Chapter IV for an analysis 
of these issues in the United States in the twentieth century. 
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religious neutrality of the state toward religion.85 His findings complement Gill’s as he 
demonstrates that throughout more than the first half of US national history, minority 
religious positions were consistently oppressed and that the majority religion of a region 
was often used to isolate the less powerful. Those who expressed unpopular religious 
positions, and especially those found guilty of the charge of “blasphemy” against the 
religious views of the majority, were frequently jailed for their dissent. Contemporary 
audiences tend to read their own biases into early American discussions of freedom, 
going in either direction, regarding the significance of guarantees of religious liberty. In 
practice, he confirms, those who possessed the full freedom to practice their religion 
were those with clout substantial enough to infiltrate the majority position.  
These works suggest that that the implication of the United States’ historically 
high value placed on religion is at best indeterminate with respect to the policies in 
defense of which it is often invoked. Even if the legitimacy of the theoretical value 
placed on religious liberty could be considered, the darker practice of religious liberty in 
US history challenges attempts to bring the past to bear on present circumstances as 
often invoked by such projects. 
Perhaps most importantly, in particular regarding attempts to combine 
Propositions (1) and (2), those who would point to the First Amendment as evidence of 
the traditional weight of religious liberty among the priority of the framers ignore a 
crucial issue: incorporation. As explicitly written, the First Amendment only applies to 
the federal government: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
                                                 
85 David Sehat, The Myth of American Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” It was not until the mid-twentieth 
century, 1947 and 1940 respectively, that the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise 
Clause became binding on the states. The Bill of Rights was originally a guarantee that 
certain issues would be left to the states, a compromise with the Antifederalists. But to 
say that the federal government could not establish a national religion in no way implied 
that the state governments could not establish an official state religion. Massachusetts, 
the last state government to disestablish its state church, did not do so until 1833. 
Correspondingly, the Free Exercise Clause conferred no such individual protection of 
belief in the way commonly understood today. Whatever the perspective on religious 
liberty at the time, the First Amendment was not enforcing religious freedom in the 
sense that the phrase would convey in a contemporary usage. Clearly, a high value was 
placed on religion in some sense in the early American republic, but equating the 
relationship between the United States and its first citizens in regards to religious liberty 
with its relationship to its current citizens grossly conflates historical contexts.  
Part of the consideration at play involves what to make of the tradition for the 
modern era. Religion was clearly a central priority for many of the founders. But what 
does that imply for the modern era? What are we to make of that? Which of the possible 
policy consequences could that suggest? Ultimately, this chapter deals with a question of 
how we are to understand ourselves in relation to the past and what the past means for us 
today. Even if we accept that tradition and custom are acceptable means of justification 
within a liberal democratic theory, it is exceptionally unclear as to what those values 
would mean in the politics of the present. What the past means for us today is by no 
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means answerable by simply positing that at some point in the past our forbearers held a 
certain value.  
 
The Conceptual Proposition (3)  
 Proposition (3) implies that there is something inherent in religion that makes it 
central to the interests of the state, irrespective either of its priority having been codified 
or of its central value to the tradition. It posits that religion per se is of heightened 
importance. 
 There are multiple ways to argue for the priority of religion. Theocratic theories 
of state, for example, provide the most obvious instances of explicit elevation of 
religion. Additionally, republican or communitarian theories provide a possible base 
from which one might argue that the state has a particular, vested interest in promoting 
religion within a society and privileging the interests of the religious over others. 
Whenever the collective interest has the potential to trump individuals, there exists the 
potential for advocating religion as a crucial binding agent for society. It can moor 
society with the morals it teaches. It can create a base for culture. It can serve many 
functions that would be useful to a state actor interested in actively steering the ship of 
the state and the people within it. I do not mean to claim that religion has no value 
beyond instrumentality, but rather that it has the potential to fit neatly within a number 
of political-theoretical frameworks. I argue, however, that elevation of religious interests 
cannot fit neatly with a liberal democratic framework. The interests of religious groups 
cannot be front and center without transgressing the liberal democratic ideal.  
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To be clear, some have argued that liberal democracies need not necessarily 
eschew religion altogether. Speaking specifically to a subset of such theories, namely 
political liberalism, Cécile Laborde argues that “political liberalism, as a theory of 
justice, is inconclusive about the public place of religion.” 86 She suggests that it is 
possible for a state to be either mildly separationist or even mildly accommodationst 
(having a mild degree of establishment) without necessarily violating the values of 
liberty and equality for any of its citizens. As long as a state is not aggressively 
separationist or militantly established, and as long as the state adequately respects 
religious freedom, there is a range of possible dispositions toward religion that still 
might ensure that a political theory remain within the ambit of political liberalism (or 
more broadly, liberal democracy).  
My case does not hinge upon the success of Laborde’s claim.87 But her 
contribution is important for the following reason: even if there existed a liberal 
democratic state that was only mildly religious and fit Laborde’s prescription, she would 
still not consider that state to be authorized by the principles of liberal democracy to 
confer privileges upon its religious citizens. The mildly established state would be 
                                                 
86 Cécile Laborde, “Political Liberalism and Religion: On Separation and Establishment,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy, early view online, viewed 24 July 2011, 1. See also Cécile Laborde, “Secular 
Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools,” Journal of Political Philosophy 13(2005): 305–329. For 
a contrasting position, see Amy Gutmann, “Religion and State in the United States: A Defense of Two-
Way Protection,” in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: 
Religious Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
87 Although ultimately I find her argument weak, given that my strongly content-free version of liberal 
democracy would disagree with even a non-privileging endorsement, following the market place of ideas 
approach instead.  
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justified in promoting religion broadly,88 perhaps engaging in mild, non-coercive public 
religious exercises, and in acknowledging the relationship between the church and the 
state. But it would never be allowed to promote religion in any way that deprived 
nonbelievers of benefits or that decreased opportunities.89  
So even if one were able to justify a religious institution that was also a liberal 
democracy, it would still not justify the rhetoric employed by advocates of Proposition 
(3) to claim that the interests of religious citizens were more important to the state than 
those of nonreligious citizens. Thus, in order for Proposition (3) successfully to achieve 
its aim of defending religious priority, it would have to refer to a theoretical foundation 
other than liberal democracy, one that allows for the explicit privileging of a particular 
set of interests such as religious interests.  
If one were to intend the latter position, however, then using the phrase “first 
freedom” would be an inappropriate or at least misleading means of doing so. The way 
that the phrase “first freedom” is used in the present day US context tends to imply 
particularly individual rights, following a particularly liberal democratic framework. 
                                                 
88 Such a liberal democratic, mildly religious state could promote either its particular state religion or 
religion in general, but it could not do so to the exclusion of the nonreligious or of religions other than the 
state religion.  
89 Just as it would not be allowed to deprive individuals of benefits, it would also not be able to deprive 
them of the right to participate as citizens, including, for example, gays in the military (as in the US 
dispute over the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy) or Sikhs as members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(see the 1990 dispute over Baltei Singh Dhillon’s challenge exclusion). Note, however, that these policies 
are at times argued the basis of otherwise legitimate state interests, such as the safety and wellbeing of 
members of the military or the military’s interest in uniformity. See the discussion in Chapter II under the 
section “On the Appropriateness of Instrumental Difference” for more on how exemptions might be a 
legitimate means of protecting this right. However, again, given the need for a balance of interests, the 
right to participate does not automatically in itself necessitate exemptions. For a strong statement about the 
right of civic participation, see especially Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics 
for a New Age (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided in Politics, and What Should Be 
Done About It (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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Consider Justice Clark’s opinion in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 
which ended daily, ritual reading of the Bible in public schools, which stated, “While the 
Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free 
exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the 
State to practice its beliefs.”90 Although the Court has become increasingly sympathetic 
to religion in decades since, this perspective of Free Exercise as an individual as opposed 
to group right endures in current legal precedent, contrary to the perspective expressed 
above by Ryan. This echoes a theme in US jurisprudence referring to rights as primarily 
conferred on an individual basis, regardless of whatever the state of values may have 
been at the beginning of the United States government. Thus, when we observe the 
phrase “first freedom” employed in American public discourse to imply the conceptual 
Proposition (3), it tends to do so in a way that is highly problematic and that also 
severely exploits the ambiguity inherent in the phrase.  
 
Theoretical Arguments for Priority 
In this section I will examine arguments for the uniqueness of the substance of 
religion. I focus on two authors in particular, John Finnis and Michael McConnell, 
because, although neither of them would be considered liberal democratic theorists, they 
both make freestanding normative arguments that tend to suggest the priority of religion 
without linking it to a specific theory. By making such arguments detached from any 
theoretical framework which they might hold in other contexts, they make the clear 
                                                 
90 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  
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suggestion that religion deserves priority irrespective of the theoretical foundation. They 
make their arguments in such a way that they might apply even with a conventional, 
explicitly liberal democratic framework, and both invoke the historical authority of the 
Founders, in particular Madison. Accordingly, these approaches could challenge the 
claim I made in the preceding section about the inconsistency of the phrase “first 
freedom” with liberal democracy.  
Michael McConnell makes the case both for religious priority91 and exemptions in 
his different works.92 He defends the former in his article “Religion and Constitutional 
Rights: Why Is Religious Liberty the ‘First Freedom’?”93 He builds his defense on a 
combination of Propositions (2) and (3), as he hopes to defend it “both in chronological 
and logical priority.”94 He points to arguments made by early American thinkers, 
locating in their work what he considers arguments for religious priority. He says:  
Madison’s view of the grounding of religious freedom… was not a deduction from 
the personal autonomy of the individual, but an inference from the sovereignty of 
God and the duty of human beings to obey God as they understand Him. Religious 
exercise, under this view, is an inalienable right because it follows from the duties 
owed to God by His creatures. Indeed, religion is defined in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights as “the duty which we owe to our Creator.” Men have no 
                                                 
91 Michael W. McConnell, “Religion and Constitutional Rights: Why Is Religious Liberty the ‘First 
Freedom’?” Cardozo Law Review 21(2000): 1243-1265. 
92 Michael W. McConnell, “Accommodation of Religion,” Supreme Court Review (1986): 1–59; “Origins 
and Historical Understandings of the Free Exercise of Religion,” Harvard Law Review 103(1990): 1409–
1517; “Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to Critics,” George Washington Law 
Review 60(1992): 685–742. 
93 McConnell, “Religion and Constitutional Rights.” 
94 Ibid., 1244.  
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right to consent to civil government that would stand in the way of their duties of 
the Universal Sovereign.95 
In his exclusion of other ethical frameworks, he implies the uniqueness of arguments 
inspired by relation to divinity. He suggests here with this invocation that the content of 
such beliefs, by virtue of their coming from God, is inherently superior by virtue of its 
source. Yet employing Madison’s statement in an attempt to elevate religious over 
nonreligious interests drastically takes the ideas out of their context. 
Similarly, in his article “Does Free Exercise of Religion Deserve Constitutional 
Mention?” Finnis defends the importance of maintaining religion as a discrete guarantee 
in a liberal democracy.96 He identifies the hypothesis he considers “lethal to religion”: 
“that religion is just one deep and passionate commitment amongst others.”97 He 
attempts to distinguish religion from mere preference or “expressions of distaste or 
disapproval.”98 He argues, “Religion deserves constitutional mention, not because it is a 
passionate or deep commitment, but because it is the practical expression of, or response 
to, truths about human society, about the persons who are a political community’s 
members, and about the world in which any such community must take its place and find 
its way and means.”99 While he does not use the explicit language of first freedom, his 
rationale repeatedly labels religion the most beneficial of all ethical frameworks and 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 1246. 
96 See John Finnis, “Does Free Exercise of Religion Deserve Constitutional Mention?” American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 54(2009): 41-66, 65. Though Finnis does not fully endorse here the liberal democratic 
approach, he frames his response so as to apply even to liberal democracies and particularly to the US 
Constitution.  
97 Ibid., 44.  
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., 56.  
 78 
 
 
therefore of greatest interest to the state in terms of protection, functionally creating the 
same effect. Interestingly enough, however, Finnis does not advocate religious 
exemptions as a means of applying the priority placed on religion, as do many 
proponents of multiculturalism and religion in particular. He takes the approach not of 
carving out accommodations on an individual basis but of directing the entire machinery 
of the state toward the interests of the religious. Because he believes the content of 
religion to be of great significance, he argues that its priority demands an explicit place 
in constitutional documents in order to codify its place of privilege.  
In contrast to Finnis, some like Bedi100 argue that religion is so unique in its 
features that the needs of religious citizens cannot adequately be addressed without 
special categorization. This approach emphasizes the distinctiveness of religion without 
explicitly demanding priority status. One could easily hold both positions, that religion is 
prior and that it demands unique treatment, but the two positions do not necessarily go 
together. Read broadly, one might extract from Finnis’s argument the milder claim, 
similar to Bedi’s, that religion, if not of greater importance, is at least a special enough 
case to demand distinctive consideration, though the tone of the piece strongly suggests 
otherwise.  
Again, whatever Finnis’s larger framework, he is explicitly inserting himself into a 
discussion that at least includes liberal democratic theory in engaging the question of 
whether religion is distinctive in some crucial way. He says further, “Much more clearly 
than ‘thought’ and ‘conscience,’ the term ‘religion’ connotes activities which extend 
                                                 
100 Bedi, “Debate: What Is So Special About Religion?” See Chapter II of this project. 
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from the individual to the associative and social, and from the private to the public.”101 If 
this is the case, then it is functionally indistinguishable from culture. Religion would not 
itself be a distinctive value but would be subsumed under multiculturalist approaches to 
respecting diversity. But this claim of Finnis’s also violates the principles of liberal 
democracy, to which he implies that his arguments may be applied. For the state to make 
a declaration that a particular set of ideas constitutes the best life for its citizens, 
produces the best version of community, would be to allow the state to declare what 
shall be considered orthodox.102 It would require the state to violate the principles of the 
market place of ideas by declaring which ways of life are superior, which beliefs most 
valuable, rather than allowing the public to do so.  
He ignores the following point made by Madison in the Memorial: “Because 
finally, ‘the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to 
the dictates of conscience’ is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we 
recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it cannot be 
less dear to us.” Madison actually emphasizes the parity of claims of conscience with 
natural reason, which counteracts an interpretation based on an imbalance. Likewise, he 
says in the same document, “Such a Government will be best supported by protecting 
every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects 
his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor 
suffering any Sect to invade those of another.” All rights here seem to be guaranteed by 
                                                 
101 Finnis, “Does Free Exercise of Religion Deserve Constitutional Mention,” 61. 
102 See the discussion of state orthodoxy in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943), in Chapter V. 
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a similar provision against government invasion. These principles are actually perhaps 
better accounted for by some of Finnis’ stated ideological nemeses. In discussing the 
inspiration for his piece, Finnis targets a recent volume by Christopher Eisgruber and 
Lawrence Sager that directly argues that religion is no more valuable than other forms of 
belief. 103 Though this position does not demote religion since all beliefs are held in high 
regard, it does demote religion from a position of privilege to a status on par with all 
other forms of ethical belief. Eisgruber and Sager argue for a principle they call “equal 
liberty” which does not segregate liberty by substantive area but instead provides 
principles that can govern all applications. Those who would make arguments about 
religious priority in a way that can successfully extend to liberal democracy, or be self-
evident and applicable across systems as they most commonly appear to make 
arguments must actually be more explicit about engaging the beliefs of such systems, 
rather than presuming their principles to be readily translatable.  
 
CONCLUSION: BELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN ORIGIN 
NARRATIVE 
From where does this impulse to assume the self-evident priority of religion stem? 
What is it about religious beliefs that distinguishes them from other values? Perhaps part 
of the confusion stems from the fact that people forget that religious belief is not the 
only type of belief protected by the state. Historically, religion has been the source of a 
significant amount of turmoil, and many have been oppressed on the grounds of 
                                                 
103 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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religious belief. Even within the United States, members of minority religions have long 
experienced severe forms of discrimination on the basis of their belief.104 As is part of 
the common narrative, many settlers who came to the United States came in search of 
religious freedom due to the historical oppression in their homelands. Moments in time 
such as the Spanish Inquisition or the political mistreatment of Catholics in the British 
Isles, for example, are permanently etched into the memory of the collective American 
conscience. Thus, the fact that many who participated in the construction of the early 
American republic were explicitly motivated by a desire to ensure religious protection 
has become emblematic of the purpose of government for many Americans. The 
narrative has also been passed down through a land that has placed a high priority on the 
centrality of religion to society, increasing the prevalence of arguments for elevated 
status in the present day.  
It may be defensible to argue that religious liberty ranked highly among the 
priorities of the founders, though the exact form of religious liberty may not match 
exactly the form it commonly takes today in public discourse. But this sequencing of 
priorities could also be explained as a response primed by the religious oppression 
familiar to or experienced by many settlers in Europe during the sixteenth through 
eighteenth centuries, with the sequence reflecting germaneness rather than absolute 
conceptual priority. Political thinkers acting in the wake of such chaos might very well 
be highly interested in shaping the state so as to avoid a similar situation. They may very 
                                                 
104 See Sehat, The Myth of American Religious Freedom. 
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well have placed religion at the forefront of their concerns. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that this stands as an argument for the priority of religion at all time.  
There are grounds for portraying the liberty as we see it applied to religious groups 
as consistent with its application elsewhere. As is highlighted by the liberty of 
conscience theorists such as John Locke, there are innumerable dimensions on which the 
state cannot force belief. A liberal democratic state could not force a citizen to declare a 
faith in Jesus Christ or Mohammed. But also note that no matter which party is in power, 
it cannot demand declarations of faith in the party platforms. The state could not force 
citizens to sign a radically populist statement that they believe that the rich do not 
deserve what they have and are obligated to give everything to the poor, whether by 
choice or forced through taxation. Neither can it force a radically capitalist declaration 
that the poor are worthless because they have proven themselves weak, thereby 
disavowing any facets of a welfare state. Liberty of conscience is the backdrop for 
religious liberty. The essence of liberty of conscience is that it protects the individual 
from the intrusion of the state into the citadel of the mind. The state is expected to 
respect the ideas belonging to each individual. Belief is in general entirely protected, 
with the possible exception of those minimal conditions required for a society to 
function, which include at least the barest form of toleration and respect for the rules of 
operating in a plural system.105  
It is not self-evident why the interests of religious believers would be any more 
deserving of attention by the state than any other form of belief. The obligation of the 
                                                 
105 Although, see Chapter V for further discussion of the controversy surrounding this claim.  
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state to avoid imposing on belief directly is not unique to religion. Unless otherwise 
justified, all citizens have equal moral grounding. To operate otherwise, without 
sufficient justification, generates an inegalitarian system. 
Another reason for the unique attention placed on religion may be a product of the 
textual structure of the US Constitution. As the oldest functioning written constitution, 
the US document has had the longest history of case law stemming from it. As it is also 
among the shortest of such documents, small phrases or clauses are often the ground for 
numerous cases. Justices are constantly called on to provide guidelines for applying 
guarantees that may consist of only a few words to a few cases. In order to invoke 
judicial review, the justices must invoke a specific portion of the Constitution that is 
alleged to be in conflict with a state law, and often the justices will point to a specific 
clause. Thus, in spite of those statements that frequently refer to a measure of unity 
among the clauses, in practice we have relatively distinct lines of cases addressing the 
guarantees of free exercise, establishment,106 speech, press,107 assembly, and petition. 
Yet in contrast, consider again the preferred freedoms approach. It treats the individual 
First Amendment guarantees as united by their treatment of expression. Though discrete 
areas of law have arisen to address the needs unique to each area of application, there are 
ultimately no fundamental distinctions among them in that their purpose is to prevent the 
state from restricting belief from imposing it upon its citizens. One could imagine 
another phrasing of the text employing the preferred freedoms model that read: 
                                                 
106 Free exercise and establishment principles are often labeled two sides of the same coin, and as such 
many cases invoke both. Yet there are also numerous cases that clearly fall under only one or the other.  
107 Press is also commonly lumped with speech, although cases such as Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972), where the Court debated whether to grant unique protections to members of the press and declined, 
show that it at least has the potential to raise its own concerns.  
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“Congress shall respect the liberty of its citizens, as, for example, in the cases of 
religious exercise, speech, press…” 
But whatever the origin of this impulse, in practice we observe advocates of 
religious priority consistently exploiting the ambiguity surrounding the phrase “first 
freedom” to elide the fact that they do not have a clear, straightforward argument for 
their case. While there is clearly room for a theoretical argument for religious priority, 
these are not the types of arguments that get invoked in practice. If there were any hope 
for such an argument within a liberal democratic framework, paying direct attention to 
the type of argument employed in public discourse would be a crucial first step.  
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CHAPTER IV 
LAW AND RELIGION: FREE EXERCISE IN U.S. JURISPRUDENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that the issues of religious 
distinctiveness and religious priority have remained severely underdeveloped. 
Arguments invoking such privilege have been employed carelessly in political discourse 
in a way that obscures productive discussion, and academic literature has largely ignored 
this particular dimension of analysis. Courts, however, are often obligated to weigh in on 
these issues, as, for example, when determining how to interpret the Free Exercise 
Clause.  
But the US Supreme Court in particular finds itself in unique positions precisely 
because the justices are not released to engage in full normative debate over the issues. 
They are at least bound to justify their interpretations in some form of interpretive 
framework and expressing a way of relating to the document of the Constitution.  
Considering that the status of the political category of religion is itself mired and 
confused, and given the additional challenging factor that the Court faces in mooring its 
positions in the Constitution and its history of jurisprudence, there is a need to assess 
systematically US free exercise jurisprudence in terms of its relation to religion as a 
political category. 
This chapter presents an assessment of how the United States judiciary has 
addressed this question in practice, bound as it is by its founding document and barred 
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from a free normative debate over such a category. Its purpose is to put the larger 
theoretical debate discussed thus far into relief by exploring how a set of key decision-
makers respond to the question. The story of the Court’s evolution on free exercise 
issues is already extensively documented in the legal literature.108 Since these cases have 
all been deeply analyzed along numerous other dimensions, this chapter will contribute a 
crucially missing layer, which has been brought to light by the preceding chapters, by 
focusing on questions such as: Does the Court make use of religion as a political 
category to assign special treatment? How does the US court's position on the issue over 
time stand in relation to the framework I have set up? What does the court think religion 
as a concept is? Does the court treat religion as a category of belief separate from other 
forms? In what ways? What justifications are used? What features of a religious ethical 
framework are highlighted as distinct? These issues are most relevant in the debate over 
whether or not the Free Exercise Clause mandates that the state carve out exemptions for 
religious believers. But again, I will not be so much concerned with answering the 
interpretive question of whether or not exemptions are a necessary extension of the 
clause. My aim here is one of classifying how the Court has given weight to religion as a 
political category at different times, for the purpose of understanding the Court’s place 
within the larger theoretical discussion addressed in the preceding chapters. 
                                                 
108 See, e.g.:  Philip Hamburger, “A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective,” George Washington Law Review 60(1992): 915–948; McConnell, “Origins and Historical 
Understandings” and “Accommodation of Religion”; Vincent Phillip Muñoz, “The Original Meaning of 
the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 31.3(2008): 1083-1120; Steven C. Seeger, “Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation 
Test and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,” Michigan Law Review 95.5(1997): 1472-151; Ellis M. 
West, “The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors 
to Conscription,” Journal of Law and Religion 10.2(1993): 367-401; Symposium: Twenty Years After 
Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twentieth Century’s Landmark Case On the Free Exercise 
of Religion and How It Changed History, a special issue of the Cardozo Law Review 32(2011). 
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In order to accomplish this task, I will consider three “moments” or phases of the 
Court’s relationship to the category of religion. First, I will focus on the earliest free 
exercise cases, dominated by the belief-action dichotomy, which influence nearly a 
century of precedent. Second, I will address the thickening of the Free Exercise Clause, 
shifting interpretation of it to require governments to carve out exemptions for religious 
believers as a result of an understanding of religion as deserving of unique protections. 
And third, I will examine the Supreme Court’s reversal of this policy and a return to a 
belief-action distinction approach to free exercise.109 I have not attempted to be 
comprehensive in my analysis, but rather to focus on those cases which I have found to 
provide the most leverage in highlighting those features most directly related to my 
interest in religion as a political category. 
 
EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGION: 1878-1963 
The US Supreme Court did not deal with a Free Exercise Clause case until nearly a 
century after the First Amendment's passage. Thus, there existed no authoritative 
statement on how the nation understood the status of religion and the extent of religious 
protections in the Constitution until the 1878 case Reynolds v. United States.110 
In 1862, the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act created a federal ban on multiple marriages, 
which directly affected the Mormon church through its practice of polygamy. The 
Mormon church set up a test case to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under 
                                                 
109 These three sections are divided essentially by the eras before, during, and after the Court interpreted 
the Free Exercise Clause to require religious exemptions, which is a common way of designating periods 
in this literature.  
110 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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the First Amendment and arranged for George Reynolds, a secretary to Brigham Young, 
to go to court over the issue.111 This case represented the first time the court had to 
consider the question: “whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an 
overt act made criminal by the law of the land.”112 The Mormon church, however, 
ultimately lost the case at all levels of the federal courts. 
Reynolds asked that the jury be given instructions to excuse him of guilt if the 
defendant can be proven to have acted under the requirements of his religious belief. 
Reynolds was essentially asking the Court to view the guarantee of religious protection 
to excuse the individual from punishment under any law that conflicted with a religious 
motivation. The trial court denied this request and, in response to Reynolds’s invocation 
of religious motivation, held that: 
…there must have been a criminal intent, but that if the defendant, under the 
influence of a religious belief that it was right,—under an inspiration, if you please, 
that it was right,—deliberately married a second time, having a first wife living, the 
want of consciousness of evil intent—the want of understanding on his part that he 
was committing a crime—did not excuse him; but the law inexorably in such case 
implies the criminal intent.113 
The trial court here declared that if a law exists banning a particular activity, then the 
choice to engage in the banned activity infuses the decision with a criminal intent that 
overrides any other religious element, however dominant it may have been in the 
                                                 
111 Leonard J. Arrington and Davis Bitton, The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-Day Saints 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 180. 
112 Reynolds v. United States.  
113 As cited in the Supreme Court majority opinion.  
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decision. The law, then, defines the acceptable contours of citizen activity; constitutional 
rights do not constitute an absolute sphere of protection around the citizen. The 
appropriate space for religion exists between the heavy lines drawn by the law.  
The Supreme Court, in turn, employed a similar approach, invoking the support of 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson about the appropriate range of legislative power: 
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to 
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." This 
divide over time became known as the belief-action distinction, which is reminiscent of 
classic works such as Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration114 that tended to relegate the 
appropriate domain of belief to one’s private thoughts. Under this approach, any time 
citizens’ religious beliefs lead them to engage in actions that the state chooses to 
regulate, the state need only demonstrate the presence of some legitimate interest in 
order to justify the burden it places on the believers. As long as the state’s interest is 
limited to regulating that activity, the strength of the stated interest need only be 
demonstrated to a relatively low degree. 
The Court continued, “The only defence of the accused in this case is his belief that 
the law ought not to have been enacted. It matters not that his belief was a part of his 
professed religion: it was still belief, and belief only.” The state, then, is given freedom 
to consider its own needs without limiting its regulations to avoid trampling upon 
individual rights of citizens. There would still, of course, be one natural check: that the 
representatives making laws would have the interests of their constituents in mind when 
                                                 
114 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 
 90 
 
 
crafting or voting on legislation, at least to the point of pursuing reelection. There is not, 
however, a constitutionally mandated requirement that the state absolutely must seek to 
avoid unintentionally restricting religious belief in the pursuit of an appropriate interest.  
The Court then turns to the question of what interest in particular the state has in 
regulating the activity of polygamy. The opinion states:  
From that day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been a time in 
any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society, 
cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity…An 
exceptional colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may sometimes 
exist for a time without appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who 
surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of 
constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil 
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of 
social life under its dominion. 
The opinion here, then, is intimately tied to the perceived danger that polygamy would 
have on the fabric of society. The primary interest motivating the law is the preservation 
of social order; thus, the burden placed upon religious observers is only accidental in 
nature. It is not the intended purpose of the state to restrict religion per se. The broader 
state interests trump any incidental inconvenience to religious adherents. The Court 
invoked what they considered to be an original intent logic, saying, “The word ‘religion’ 
is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its 
meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in 
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the midst of which the provision was adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is 
the religious freedom which has been guaranteed.” By their assessment of this concept, 
the nature of religious guarantees at the time of the framing of the First Amendment 
would suggest a general order to states not to single out specific religious groups, but not 
necessarily grant any privileges or available remedies unique to religion. Clearly this is a 
minimal view of the category of religion. Its is basically a nonissue. The Court cannot 
target a specific belief qua religious belief through legislation. So, for example, polgamy 
could not be banned exclusively when engaged in by those acting upon their convictions 
as members of the Mormon faith; if polygamy is to be banned, it must be banned for all 
citizens regardless of motivation. But this grants no additional protection to religion than 
is already given to expression generally in the Constitution by the First Amendment as a 
whole.  
The Court thus far has clearly addressed a first question regarding the state's 
obligation under the clause to craft its legislation so as to avoid any incidental burden to 
religious belief. But the Court acknowledges that another question remains unanswered 
at this point: if the law itself cannot be invalidated on account of the incidental burden to 
religion, then does the clause demand that religious believers be individually exempted 
from compliance with the law? The Court assesses the fallout from such a policy as 
such: “If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief 
may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. 
This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
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opinions, they may with practices.” In a famous phrase that would reappear throughout 
later religion legislation, “To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such 
circumstances.” Here the Court switches (whether for illustration or as a separate but 
corroborating argument) to a pragmatic position, arguing that the cost of such an 
interpretation would render the policy meaningless.  
What is religion according to this case? In terms of what actually receives 
protection, religion is purely private, opinions held in the mind. In one sense, religion in 
this scenario is considered equal with all other beliefs. So religion is certainly not seen as 
special here.  But at the same time, this is because rights of conscience have very little 
sway beyond certain establishment guarantees, such as not requiring public officials to 
ascribe to a particular set of doctrines.  
It was conflicts like these over distinctiveness that over time inspired the rise of a 
discussion of religious priority. Legislation is okay if it touches only upon actions “in 
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” The amendment provided 
protection against legislating opinion. It is safe to say that for more than a century, the 
right protected by the Free Exercise Clause was not actually one of the exercise but of 
belief. Note the irony of this phrase: one common interpretation of “exercise” implies 
conduct or practice. Exercise is an explicitly different point from belief, and yet the 
guarantee is read almost explicitly to the contrary. Common religious practices were 
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clearly insulated from state intervention by the political power of the majority that 
practiced them, but that protection did not stem from a constitutional right. 
 The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act at issue in Reynolds was very explicit that it only 
withheld political rights from those actively engaged in polygamy. Subsequent laws, 
however, amended this act and expanded its scope. The Edmunds Act of 1882 and the 
Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887 added statutes that required oaths disavowing polygamy 
before voting, for example. The latter added that a voter must promise that he “will also 
obey this act in respect of the crimes in said act defined and forbidden, and that he will 
not, directly or indirectly, aid or abet, counsel or advise, any other person to commit any 
of said crimes.”115 Technically, even this provision would not necessarily become an 
unconstitutional regulation of belief any more than the original act did. These cases 
occur, after all, long before the days where abstract advocacy of an activity, as opposed 
to a direct order to perpetrate it, becomes an explicitly protected form of speech, as it 
firmly is at least by the currently ruling standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio.116 
 However, in practice, this amendment was used to exclude large numbers of 
Mormons from voting, and numerous Mormons who never engaged in the practice were 
affected by the law. Mormons were: disqualified from serving on juries, excluded from 
public office, barred from voting, denied the protection of inheritance laws, and thwarted 
in immigration and the path to citizenship, in addition to being the subject of an 
                                                 
115 §24, Edmunds-Tucker Act of 3 March, 1887. See William MacDonald, ed. Select Statutes and Other 
Documents Illustrative of the History of the United States 1861-1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1903).  
116 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
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infamous extermination order by the governor of Missouri.117 
 A similar law at the state level was challenged in the 1890 case Davis v. 
Beason.118 Samuel Davis and several conspirators attempted to become election 
officials, which required them to swear an oath disavowing any involvement in or 
promotion of polygamy. Part of the criminal code for the territory of Idaho read:    
No person who is a bigamist or polygamist, or who teaches, advises, counsels or 
encourages any person or persona to become bigamists or polygamists or to 
commit any other crime defined by law, or to enter into what is known as plural 
or celestial marriage, or who is a member of any order, organization, or 
association which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its members or 
devotees or any other persons to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or 
any other crime defined by law, either as a rite or ceremony of such order, 
organization or association or otherwise, is permitted to vote at any election, or to 
hold any position or office of honor, trust or profit within this territory.119 
Davis was convicted not for the act of polygamy but for his membership in an 
organization that advocates such activity. He challenged this deprivation of his rights. 
The position held by the court in Davis is largely an extension of Reynolds, pointing to 
the need to remove sources of activity harmful to society.  
 Where this approach becomes interesting for our purposes is in the elaboration 
on the issue of religion. The court says, “To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to 
                                                 
117 For a recounting of the Mormon extermination order issued by the governor of Missouri Daniel 
Dunklin, see Edwin B. Firmage, "Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century America: The Mormon 
Cases," Journal of Law and Religion 7.2(1989): 281-313, 299. 
118 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
119 §501, Rev.Stats.Idaho, as cited in Davis v. Beason. 
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offend the common sense of mankind. If they are crimes, then to teach, advise, and 
counsel their practice is to aid in their commission, and such teaching and counseling are 
themselves criminal, and proper subjects of punishment, as aiding and abetting crime are 
in all other cases.” Here the court is explicitly commenting on the nature of what is 
appropriate content of religion. Not only is religion as a political category not given 
special weight at this point, but only certain ideas are given even the bare protection of 
the belief-action distinction declared in Reynolds. Certain ideas, generated by a group 
commonly identified as a “religion,” are labeled offensive to the very idea of religion.  
 This position adds clarity to another point made earlier in Reynolds, where the 
Court acknowledged: “The word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution. We must 
go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we 
think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted.” 
The language surrounding this passage gives little confirmation as to the intended 
direction of this application. The previous passage from Davis, however, suggests a 
similar intellectual milieu, one in which what counts as a religion is limited to those 
beliefs dominant among the citizenry at the time. These beliefs bear the seal of public 
approval and therefore legitimacy.  
 The Court in Davis continues, “The term ‘religion’ has reference to one's views 
of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his 
being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded with the cultus 
or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.” Religion 
here has been defined, even more directly than in Reynolds, as no more than opinion, 
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and perhaps only a subset within that. Reynolds declared that belief was beyond the 
reach of the law. But here in Davis, the Court has refused to even acknowledge certain 
ideas as meriting this basic protection. Only those ideas deemed within the bounds of 
acceptable religion, that is to say conducive to public order and the state, are protected 
against state intrusion to root them out. Even taking into account that general advocacy 
not directed at anyone specific or at a specific moment was treated at the time as a form 
of conduct rather than pure speech, it becomes unclear what work the Free Exercise 
Clause is accomplishing as a reference separate from speech, as its discrete substantive 
guarantee is minimal.120  
 The ambiguity of the clause increases in Davis with statements such as the 
following: 
With man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, 
and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on 
those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of 
society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, 
are not interfered with. However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be 
subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions 
regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation. 
                                                 
120 Firmage makes a similar point: “The free speech clause of the first amendment fully protects the 
freedom of belief. Thus, unless the free exercise clause protects at least some practices that are offensive 
to the majority, that provision is devoid of any practical content. Yet, the Reynolds decision forecloses 
such an application of the first amendment.” Firmage, “Free Exercise of Religion,” 289. However, he 
makes the argument in a contemporary polygamy policy context; I am arguing that even under the 
approach to speech, religion, and expression appropriate at the time, the content of the Free Exercise 
Clause seems to dwindle rapidly as jurisprudence on the text develops, especially as I focus on the 
contribution of Davis here. My claim becomes all the more clear in the next case discussed, Holy Trinity v. 
United States. 
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These statements seem to be almost a redundancy. What does it mean to say that religion 
is protected as long as it is within the bounds of the law? There is such an absolute 
deference to the law as proving the presence of a state interest. Whatever has managed to 
triumph in the political process inherently defines the boundaries of acceptable belief. 
Religious belief must exist entirely within the realm of what the law has left untouched.  
I do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to include a religious guarantee 
without implying a discrete category. As I suggest in Chapter III, one reading of the First 
Amendment sequence of rights or any similar list of guarantees would be that it offers a 
set of examples, aiming at the larger concept of expression. I would argue that explicit 
guarantees of religious liberty are appropriate without, as I have argued, suggesting the 
appropriateness of a special category. But the Court at this moment in history seems 
caught between these two positions. It seems to legitimately believe that it is preserving 
a discrete right to religion, and repeatedly insists upon its complete respect for religion 
without actually filling that right with any substance. 
 The underlying motivation behind this ambiguity becomes much clearer with a 
decision handed down just two years later in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States.121 A church was convicted of violating the Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 
when it attempted to hire an English minister from the Church of England. The law 
restricted Americans from bringing over citizens of other countries for the purpose of 
employment. The Court, however, decided that this could not have been meant to apply 
to the case of preventing a church from hiring a minister, based on the nature of the 
                                                 
121 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  
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relationship of the framers to religion.  
 There is little discussion of either of the religion clauses. Rather, the Court uses a 
strong original intent interpretation of Congress's presumed intention in passing the law. 
The court famously holds that although the case at hand may fall within the letter of the 
law, the spirit of the law was not intended to apply to a situation like that of hiring a 
minister. The Court justifies excluding this case from the intended scope of the law on 
the grounds of the implied significance of religion for the nation. He explains that “no 
purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, 
because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From the discovery of this 
continent to the present hour, there is a single voice making this affirmation.” The 
concept of religion is narrowed further and further as the religion of this specific people. 
Religion is intimately tied to cultural expression. Protections of “religion” refer to the 
religion of the American people.  
 Perhaps the most iconic line from this case comes from the following passage on 
the relationship of the nation to the Christian religion:  
These [public statements displaying a connection to religion], and many other 
matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the 
mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation.122 In the face of all 
these, shall it be believed that a Congress of the United States intended to make it 
a misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services of a 
Christian minister residing in another nation? 
                                                 
122 Emphasis added. 
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In this opinion, the religion clauses are read as being statements about the nation's 
relationship to Christianity specifically. This underlying logic seems to explain the 
awkward relationship to “religion” evoked by Reynolds and Davis: whatever the explicit 
logic used, they were never meant to apply to the religion of the individual, but rather to 
religion as it was deemed appropriate by the majority.123 The idea of reading laws as 
presuming built-in “common sense” exemptions was not original to this case. The Court 
in Holy Trinity cited a case treating not religion but rather the operation of the post office 
stating, “All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so 
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd 
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended 
exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character.”124 Clearly in its 
current application, however, the Court uses this logic, when matched with the logic 
discussed above, as means to further cement the ad hoc dominance of the majority 
religion.  
Furthermore, this originalist reading had the impact of limiting the scope of 
religious exercise to Christian exercise. It is important to remember this fact, that for 
many decades, the right to “religious exercise” had nothing to do with what that phrase 
means to us in a modern setting. The only thing protected was the power of adherents of 
                                                 
123 Contrast this statement with the passage cited from Abington v. Schempp in Chapter III regarding the 
ability of the majority to use the machinery of the state to engage in religious exercises.  
124 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868). In this case, the Court considered an Act of Congress of 3 
March, 1825 stating, “That if any person shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of 
the mail or of any driver or carrier or of any horse or carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction, 
for every such offense pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.” The police had detained a mail 
carrier on charges of murder. The Court decided that the police were not guilty of obstructing the mail 
based on the logic cited above.  
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mainstream Christianity to practice their religion. It would make more sense for a 
modern audience to refer to the Free Exercise Clause's guarantee of the right to practice 
the Christian religion.125 
The Court in Holy Trinity concludes with the observation: “Every constitution of 
every one of the forty-four States contains language which either directly or by clear 
implication recognizes a profound reverence for religion and an assumption that its 
influence in all human affairs is essential to the well being of the community.” This 
return to the language of the term “religion,” which might appear more general to a 
modern audience, after the previous discussion highlights the fact that religion here 
serves a very narrow purpose.       
The Free Exercise Clause underwent a significant expansion when Cantwell v. 
Connecticut126 incorporated it in 1940, deciding that states, in addition to Congress, were 
barred from “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Though many have since referred to 
Cantwell as creating a “valid secular policy” test, the logic is essentially that of 
Reynolds, with the exception that we finally begin to see in its application more victories 
by individual claimants. Thus, the Reynolds approach to free exercise rights dominated 
until the arrival of the Warren Court. Action or conduct was considered wholly subject 
to regulation, and while belief was nominally protected, loose connections between 
belief and social order could occasionally justify suppression, especially in the early 
years of free exercise jurisprudence. 
                                                 
125 For a discussion of how the Court systematically favored Christian religious claimants, even well into 
the twentieth century, see Stephen Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History 
of the Separation of Church and State (New York: NYU Press, 1997). 
126 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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THE ERA OF EXEMPTIONS AND A THICK CATEGORY: 1963-1990 
The Warren Court, which lasted from 1953 until 1969, oversaw a series of 
radical transformations of the rights guaranteed by the Constitutional amendments.127 
Guarantees which once implied a mild or moderate level of protection were expanded 
significantly. Many clauses transitioned from granting negative rights to citizens, 
requiring that the government not intrude upon their liberty to act in certain ways, to 
positive rights, requiring the government to play a more active role in securing the 
citizen’s access to a right rather than merely staying out of the way. For example, the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel originally meant only that courts could not bar 
defendants in criminal prosecutions from bringing whatever legal counsel they could 
acquire into the trial with them. It was not until Gideon v. Wainwright128 in 1963 that the 
Court ruled that in all criminal trials the government must provide a lawyer to those who 
cannot afford their own. Likewise, Miranda v. Arizona,129 the case which gave us the 
famous “Miranda rights,” transformed the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against self-
incrimination from meaning simply that defendants cannot be forced to testify against 
themselves during a trial to requiring that police forces take special precautions to 
inform the defendants of their right to remain silent and to extend this protection even to 
the pre-trial stage of arrest. Additionally, in 1954, the Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education (I)130 rejected the Plessy v. Ferguson131 interpretation of the Fourteenth 
                                                 
127 See Mark Tushnet, ed, The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective (Charlottesville, VA: 
University Press of Virginia, 1993), especially Chapter 1.  
128 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
129 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
130 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
131 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
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Amendment’s “equal protection of the laws” as permitting “separate but equal” 
treatment in the area of education.132  
The category of religion underwent a comparable transformation in Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence in the case of Sherbert v. Verner.133 Adell Sherbert was a 
practicing member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and therefore did not believe in 
working on the Saturday Sabbath. Her employer began requiring all employees to work 
on Saturdays, and though Sherbert continued to come to work Monday through Friday, 
she never started coming in on Saturdays. When she was eventually fired, she found that 
the state of South Carolina would not give her unemployment benefits, as she was 
considered to have become unemployed by rejecting available work. She sued for the 
benefits, and when the case reached the Supreme Court, it found in her favor by 
considerably reworking its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.  
Although the Court is still highly interested in potential damage to state interests 
and public order,134 it also demonstrates in this case, which is deemed less threatening, a 
heightened interest in the pain caused to the individual claimants:  
Here, not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits 
derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to 
forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, 
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the 
                                                 
132 For further discussion of this particular transformation, see Judith A. Baer, Equality Under the 
Constitution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 80-81; 113-118. 
133 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
134 “The conduct or actions so regulated [in cases like Reynolds and Davis] have invariably posed some 
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” 
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other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of 
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against 
appellant for her Saturday worship. 
The Court rules that in order to justify the dilemma in which the state places Sherbert, 
the state would have to carve out exemptions specifically for her, and by association for 
others like her.  
 The Court continues by raising the stakes of what the state must prove in order to 
be compliant:  
If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand 
appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification 
as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional 
rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of 
appellant's religion may be justified by a “compelling state interest in the 
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate. . . .” 
The Court does not engage in language that would seem to change explicitly the nature 
of the category of religion, but the direction in which the category is applied represents a 
substantial shift. Traditionally, the focus is placed on the state’s interest in passing a 
policy. But here, the scrutiny is directed toward the incidental burden. The Court ruled 
that the state had to justify not only its general interest in its unemployment benefit 
policy but also its interest specifically in excluding this claimant. Thus, the Sherbert test 
applied strict scrutiny to even incidental burdens on religious practice, requiring a 
demonstration of a compelling state interest in the policy effecting the burden and that 
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the least restrictive means possible was used.  
While the Warren Court engaged in numerous massive expansions of 
constitutional liberties, the Burger Court of 1969 to 1986 undercut a number of its 
expansions.135 For example, the Warren Court produced a highly liberal obscenity 
standard that allowed for an enormous range of speech to qualify for free speech 
protection, as put forth in Roth v. United States136 and expanded further by Jacobellis v. 
Ohio137 and Memoirs v. Massachusetts.138 The Burger Court, however issued a more 
restrained test in Miller v. California.139 This test changed obscenity law from consistent 
national standards of what constitutes obscenity to community-specific standards, 
thereby allowing communities greater discretion in prohibiting offensive speech. It also 
switched from allowing any trace of artistic, scientific, or political value anywhere in the 
work to invoke protection to requiring the predominant theme of the entire work to 
display such themes as a precondition of protection. Likewise, the Burger Court 
undercut the Warren Court’s declaration in Mapp v. Ohio140 that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be used in trials by declaring in Leon v. 
Gates141 that this exclusionary rules was merely a judicially created remedy and not a 
necessary corollary of search and seizure rights. Thus, the Burger Court frequently 
scaled back some of the dramatic expansions of the Warren Court.   
                                                 
135 See Charles M. Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern, eds., The Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), especially Chapter I.  
136 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
137 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
138 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
139 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
140 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
141 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  
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In the case of religious liberties, however, the Burger Court's brand of 
conservatism remained highly sympathetic. Among the most notable of the Burger 
Court’s statements of religious liberty is the case Wisconsin v. Yoder.142 The state of 
Wisconsin required that children attend school until age sixteen. The Amish 
communities in the state, however, believed that traditional models of education instill 
values counter to their own religious beliefs, such as self-reliance, competition, and 
pride. As such, the state educational institutions run the risk of destroying the Amish 
religion, which is intimately tied to a seclusive way of life. Several families refused to 
send their children to school and challenged their subsequent charges under Free 
Exercise Grounds. 143 The Court sided with the Amish families, using the Sherbert test to 
demand a special exemption to mandatory school attendance in the case of the Amish 
religion.144 
In evaluating those claims, we must be careful to determine whether the Amish 
religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and 
interdependent. A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be 
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on 
purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the 
claims must be rooted in religious belief.  
                                                 
142 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
143 For an in-depth discussion of the Amish challenge to the state’s education policy and the state’s attempt 
to strike a balance, see Shawn Francis Peters, The Yoder Case: Religious Freedom, Education, and 
Parental Rights (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003).   
144 Note that there is a dispute in Employment Division v. Smith, discussed below, between Justices Scalia 
and O’Connor about whether or not this case extended the Sherbert test to a criminal charge. Scalia argues 
that such an extension never occurred, while O’Connor maintains that it occurred here.  
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Contrast this with the expansion taking place under the Warren Court in the Seeger and 
Welsh cases; the Burger Court seems to imply a scaling back of this concept. They want 
to emphasize that religion is absolutely distinct from other forms of ethical belief. They 
continue:  
Although a determination of what is a “religious” belief or practice entitled to 
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept 
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on 
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if 
the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and 
rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as 
Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden 
Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was 
philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to 
the demands of the Religion Clauses. 
It matters to the Court that these beliefs of the Amish were rooted in the Bible. These 
liberties are reserved specifically to those of religious persuasion. Religion, then, under 
the Burger Court's interpretation, clearly occupies a discrete category, a type of 
guarantee altogether different from other forms of expression listed in the First 
Amendment. Without ever getting into what, the Court authoritatively delimits the 
sphere of these guarantees uniquely to religion.145  
                                                 
145 For a discussion of the status of nonbelievers in relation to free exercise claims, see Nelson Tebbe, 
“Nonbelievers,” Virginia Law Review 97(2011): 1111-1180. Also Norman Dorsen, “The Religion Clauses 
and Nonbelievers,” William and Mary Law Review 27(1986): 863-873. 
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But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad 
police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected 
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and thus beyond the power 
of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability…This 
case, therefore, does not become easier because respondents were convicted for 
their “actions” in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this 
context, belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. 
This is a very different interpretation from early era of Free Exercise interpretation. 
There are certain dimensions of conduct that might actually need to be protected. The 
belief-action dichotomy in its early era largely left conduct completely open to 
regulation by the state with few exceptions (such as the hiring exemption granted to 
Christian ministers), and as I have argued perhaps even part of belief might be subject to 
some interest of the state if “advocacy” is involved. Here, in contrast, belief is strictly 
protected, and there is the clear statement that legislatures may not have total access to 
conduct.  
 Most importantly, perhaps, the Court further underscores the degree to which it 
has transitioned from a focus on general state interest to the marginal interest involving 
the one additional person. The Court in Yoder states, “...nor is there any basis in the 
record to warrant a finding that an additional one or two years of formal school 
education beyond the eighth grade would serve to eliminate any such problem that might 
exist.” Whereas Wisconsin had countered by focusing on the fact that it has a compelling 
interest in providing a certain level of education for its youths, the Court forces them to 
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pass this strict standard of the Sherbert test as applied to the difference between a 
formal, state education between the ages of fourteen and sixteen and the “vocational” 
style education afforded by the Amish experience across the same delimited time 
span.146  
As a point of contrast, consider a case from the realm of free speech: In United 
States v. O’Brien147 in 1968, the Court dealt with a question of whether enforcement of a 
portion of the Selective Service Act, which forbade the burning of draft cards, ran afoul 
of the First Amendment when it was applied against men who publicly burned their draft 
cards in protest of Vietnam. The Court held that the burden of proof placed on the state 
depended entirely upon its interest: if the interest was strictly in regulating the 
noncommunicative aspect of the speech act, or the conduct alone, then the Court would 
be held to a less stringent standard, whereas if the state was found to be interested in 
regulating the ideas expressed,148 then it would have to satisfy the strictest scrutiny. The 
Court identified a number of interests the state had in such a regulation that had nothing 
to do with suppressing dissent, such as: it serves as proof of a man’s having registered; it 
facilitates communication between the citizens and the state; it provides valuable 
information about keeping the draft board aware of one’s location; and it helps prevent 
manipulation and forgery of these documents, which in a pre-digital era were a crucial 
                                                 
146 This case should perhaps be contrasted, though, with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), 
where the Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not give a Jewish man in the military the right to 
wear a yarmulke on account of the special interests at play with the military and national security, 
although by anything close to the Yoder level of scrutiny toward the marginal state interest it seems 
difficult to justify such an exclusion.  
147 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
148 As the Court ruled to be the case in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the famous flag burning 
case in which Texas’ flag desecration law was ruled to be targeting the ideas expressed by the act of 
burning a flag, rather than purely in the conduct. Johnson used the line drawn in O’Brien, but ruled that 
the facts merited the stricter standard.  
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means of maintaining order. The Court disagreed with O'Brien that the purpose of 
Congress in passing the relevant 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act that 
covered draft card burning was to inhibit speech and therefore applied the less stringent 
standard to the federal law and upheld the conviction. In contrast to Sherbert and Yoder, 
however, the Court does not ask the government to justify itself in relation to its 
incidental burden on O’Brien specifically. It is enough to prove a general interest. This is 
a severe contrast from the emphasis placed upon case specific justifications, especially 
as demonstrated in Yoder. Thus, as this contrast highlights, religion is treated as a unique 
form of expression, requiring even more exacting exemptions than forms of speech or 
press.149 
 In the cases examined in Part I of this chapter, the Court makes it abundantly 
clear that religion must be within the bounds of both the law and public order generally 
to gain “protection,” and perhaps even to merit the label “religion.” Religion must follow 
the contours of the law. In this second major wave of cases, however, the law must in 
part adjust its contours in order to fit the space cut out by religion. Although the law 
need not entirely be constructed around every religion providing that its motivation is 
still secular, it must still make ad hoc adjustments around those religions burdened.  
The significance of the introduction of religious exemptions to Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence, for the purposes of this project, is that it represents an inversion of 
the roles of religion and state in relating to each other. Although the language regarding 
the status of religion does not change drastically, the change in use represents a 
                                                 
149 Consider that the Burger Court declined to create such an analogous exemption for the press in 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  
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fundamental transformation. Free exercise has been transformed, similar to many other 
rights in the Warren Court, and sustained in this unique instance, by the Burger Court, 
from a negative right to a positive right requiring a far more active role for the 
government in ensuring access to constitutional guarantees. The political category of 
religion reached its thickest point during the Warren and Burger eras.  
 
A REINSTATEMENT OF THE BELIEF-ACTION DISTINCTION: 1990-
PRESENT 
The era of mandated exemptions was not nearly as expansive as it could have 
been. There was not the eruption of exemptions demands that one might expect from the 
strong language of the Court in the Sherbert-Yoder line of cases. Early in the Rehnquist 
era, the Court reversed course on the place of exemptions. In Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,150 several men brought an exercise 
claim similar to that in Sherbert. The men were fired from their jobs in a private drug 
rehabilitation center for ingesting the cactus-derived hallucinogen peyote as part of a 
religious ceremony of the Native American Church, as they were both long-time 
members. Similar to Sherbert, they were denied unemployment benefits by the state of 
Oregon. They challenged their denial of benefits, invoking the same logic applied in 
previous exemptions cases. The Court, however, denied the claim. A five person 
majority held that the Sherbert precedent was not meant to apply to cases involving 
criminal acts, and that it consequently was likely only ever useful in an extremely 
                                                 
150 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
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narrow domain of cases.151 They effectively gutted the precedent and implemented a 
standard inspired by the rhetoric of Reynolds.   
Smith invokes the belief-action distinction model. It highlights that conduct may 
be regulated, although it may not be regulated exclusively when it is engaged in for 
religious purposes. This, Scalia’s opinion of the Court suggests, has always been the 
case. He claims that the present case, though, differs: 
Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of 
"prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" one large step further. They contend 
that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a 
criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is 
concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons. 
They assert, in other words, that “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” 
includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that 
requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or 
requires)… Our decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct one. We 
have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance 
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. 
                                                 
151 Even O’Connor, who argued vociferously about the decision to undermine the Sherbert test, in her 
concurrence agreed that Oregon had met the difficult burden imposed upon it by the First Amendment, as 
it has a compelling interest in regulating the use of narcotics. Despite disagreement as to how the standard 
applied to these specific facts at hand, O’Connor largely shares the logic of the three dissenters, who join 
with her in the part of her opinion related to the appropriate precedent to apply. Thus, although the actual 
outcome of the case was 6-3 in favor of the state’s right to deny benefits, the Court was actually split 5-4 
over the question of whether or not to apply Sherbert.  
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This essentially returns the Court to the Reynolds standard.152 Law dictates the sphere 
within which religion is free to act; the existence of a criminal regulation implies the 
inappropriateness of the conduct. It also connects the exemptions interpretation to the 
Reynolds concern about allowing every man “to become a law unto himself.” In lieu of 
the Sherbert prongs, Smith allowed that a law that is neutral and of general applicability 
can satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment.  
As is true of Scalia’s interpretive approach generally, this position reflects a high 
level of faith in the democratic process, in opposition to entrusting the judiciary with the 
protection of rights, as a means of validly expressing state interest, as is aptly expressed 
in his dissent in the recent Defense of Marriage Act case United States v. Windsor.153 
The Smith opinion makes the trust in this process explicit, whereas the relationship in 
Reynolds could be inferred from the relationship of the various parts of the argument. 
The concurrence and dissent in Smith, however, rejoin that one cannot always assume 
that because there is a law against something that it is therefore inherently so inimical to 
the state that there could be no interest in preserving free exercise rights in that area.154 
                                                 
152 As mentioned previously, the narrative that I use to reconstruct the development of Free Exercise 
Clause cases is common, in which Sherbert challenges the tradition of Reynolds and Smith in turn 
challenges Sherbert and returns back to Reynolds. While this is clearly the dominant narrative in the legal 
field, it is at least worth noting formidable detractors. See Marci A. Hamilton, “Employment Division v. 
Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse,” Cardozo Law 
Review 32.5(2011): 1671-1699. She acknowledges that this story is so prevalent that it is “treated by many 
within and outside the field as obvious truth” (1671-1672). But she argues that Smith is actually far more 
consistent with tradition than the dominant narrative would admit and that the dominant narrative relies to 
heavily on the Sherbert-Yoder tradition to the exclusion of a significant number of other cases. I side with 
the dominant narrative, however, as Hamilton’s account overplays the continuity of the case law across 
multiple courts.  
153 570 U.S. ___ (2013).  
154 Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne has even argued that the belief-action distinction of Smith, when applied 
back to the original problem of polygamy, actually has the potential to change beliefs, putting it in danger 
of violating its own principles. “Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of 
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But beyond this debate about precedent, there is almost no discussion of religion as a 
category. Most of the significance of this decision in relation to our category of interest 
actually lies in what it rejects.  
In another case that appeared shortly thereafter, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah,155 the Court had an opportunity that, it argued, demonstrated the ability 
of the Smith standard to provide some weight to free exercise protections. The city 
council of Hialeah, Florida enacted health code regulations of the slaughter of animals. 
As evidenced by records of the city council meetings, many participants indicated that 
the motivation for the regulation was to shut down the ritual sacrifice of animals taking 
place in a Santeria church.156 The ordinances were struck down on account of the clear 
statements of intent and the fact that while facially neutral in that they did not mention 
the religion by name, there were enough exceptions written into the text that the law 
effectively applied only to the Santeria church, thereby violating general applicability. 
This case, then, provides an illustration of the function of the Free Exercise Clause for 
those who ascribe to it a minimal role. It is important to notice, of course, that this form 
of protection is akin to the other protections of expression like free speech and does not 
categorically afford religion any special status.  
US religious communities were highly incensed at the Court’s decision to 
remove the special protection afforded by Sherbert, so much so that in 1993 Congress 
                                                                                                                                                
Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction,” Stanford Law Review 
50.4(1998): 1295-1347.  
155 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
156 Many explicitly stated their own religious motivations for doing so. The admissibility of intent into 
such considerations creates a point of contention between Kennedy’s opinion of the Court and Scalia’s 
concurrence.  
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passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Act demanded that the Court re-
implement the compelling interest standard of Sherbert and Yoder. It passed 
unanimously in the House of Representatives and 97-3 in the Senate. But the Court ruled 
in City of Boerne v. Flores157 that Congress violated separation of powers in telling the 
Court how to interpret the Constitution. It therefore struck down the portions of the act 
that related to the Supreme Court. Congress is free to determine how federal proceedings 
will take place, and the Court has upheld the applicability of the RFRA in applying 
compelling interest to religious claimants with regards to federal laws in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficenteuniao do Vegetal in 2006.158 But it cannot use the judiciary 
as a tool to force all states to implement a similar policy. With this series of events, the 
Court left it to the states to thicken the political category of religion; it ruled that the Free 
Exercise Clause itself does little more than protect religions from direct targeting, 
although this is in itself does carry some substance as evidenced by Lukumi.  
The category of religion, then, remains thin on a national, constitutional scale. It does 
not give additional protections to religion that are not afforded to other groups, as was 
clearly the case in the Sherbert-Yoder era. It leaves the addressing of incidental burdens 
to the political process and sets a minimal threshold of the belief-action distinction, 
allowing case-by-case decisions to afford additional protections. 
                                                 
157 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
158 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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CHAPTER V 
ON TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICAL LIBERALISM’S MODEL OF 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: A POLITICAL THEORY CASE STUDY OF 
DEFENDING RELIGIOUS INTERESTS WITHOUT A PRIVILEGED 
CATEGORY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to the arguments that I have put forward in this project, particularly 
in Chapters II and III, claiming that religion does not occupy a special political category 
apart from other belief systems, advocates of religious priority might fear that religious 
interests would be automatically wide open to attack from the state. Without a 
customized means of protection, what is to stop the state from excessively burdening 
religion? 
I have argued that religion is not inherently any more susceptible to the 
possibility of incidental cost than any other belief, of the sort that is unintended by 
policy but a result nonetheless. As discussed in previous chapters, exemptions exist as 
one tool, among others, that the state has at its disposal to counter the possibility of an 
excessive incidental burden upon ethical beliefs. I would also argue here, however, that 
there are already extensive conceptual resources that can be used to protect religion from 
intentional attack from within the liberal democratic framework without resorting to this 
special status. 
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In this chapter I offer a political theory case study to demonstrate that it is still 
possible to advocate for religious interests without resorting to the special category. I 
show that it is possible to defend the religious believer using generalizable conceptual 
tools that are already employed to protect the beliefs of all citizens. To this end, I 
examine the case of transformative political liberalism’s model of religious liberty. The 
transformative political liberals make a similar argument to mine concerning the special 
status of religion, considering it an unjustified reification of the category.159 However, 
they go a step further than I do in arguing that it is therefore open to direct attack. 
According to this model, the state has a stake in the beliefs of its citizens and therefore in 
using its non-coercive powers to transform their beliefs and shape illiberal beliefs into 
those more beneficial to the liberal state. 
I make two claims in this chapter. First, I argue that the transformative political 
liberals fail to maintain their status as political liberals while introducing a 
transformative element to state activity. And second, I argue that, when it comes to 
maintaining the project of political liberalism, any transformation of citizens that does 
occur in a liberal state should be evaluated by whether or not the state was actively 
targeting the beliefs of its citizens, rather than the less stringent standard of whether or 
not it used coercive means. 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 Consider, for example, Corey Brettschneider, "A Transformative Theory of Religious Freedom: 
Promoting the Reasons for Rights," Political Theory 38.2(2010): 187-213, 188. 
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Motivating Concerns 
In the canonical tradition, liberal theorists pursue a form of statecraft that takes 
individuals as a starting point or unit of analysis. Society, and ultimately the state, is 
made up of a mass of individuals with particular interests. A priority of the liberal 
theorist, then, is to cultivate citizens who are capable of self-direction, who understand 
their own interests. This individualism manifests itself in terms such as, for example, a 
Kantian sense of majority, the Millian sense of understanding, articulating and 
maximizing one's personal utility, or a Lockean sense of reasoning.160 In modern 
examples of such discourse, this may appear in terms of self-determination, free speech, 
or the marketplace of ideas.  
Rawls famously labeled this form of liberalism a “comprehensive” one, as it 
provides a thick picture of what that moral and rational being should look like. 161 In 
response to the challenges of pluralism, Rawls pursued a project that avoided 
predetermining the substance of citizens’ souls. As one of the most significant theorists 
of the twentieth century, Rawls has become a touchstone by which others, both friend 
and foe, orient themselves. The degree to which he is successful in accomplishing this 
project is contested. But one of Rawls’ great contributions is the articulation of the 
                                                 
160 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” in Practical Philosophy, ed. 
Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. 
George Sher (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2001);  John Locke. Of the Conduct of 
the Understanding, eds. Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1996). 
161 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
14(Summer 1985): 223-252; Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Justice 
as Fairness: a Restatement (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001). My 
interest in this project is specifically with the transformative liberals. My interest is not in what ways or to 
what degree they get Rawls right but rather in the degree to which they achieve the project they set out to 
accomplish. They find the inspiration for their project in Rawls, but I argue they can be taken on their own 
terms given their particular interests.  
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project of pursuing a system that is “political not metaphysical,” the expression of the 
idea that one might imagine a state that minimizes the substantive content that defines its 
citizens.  
In either the comprehensive or the political form of liberalism, however, there is 
the underlying assumption that at the core of the citizen lies the capacity for 
independence and that this capacity must be treated as central to the project of politics. 
Liberalism represents, at least on its face, a trust in the potential of the individuals to 
know their interests. It desires citizens who can articulate and pursue their own interests, 
to varying levels of success. 
Yet no matter how much faith one has in individuals, there remains some point at 
which the system as a whole takes on collective interests. There exists at the same time 
an intractable tension between a state’s interest in protecting the space of its individual 
members with the fact that a state's essential function remains monopolizing force and 
ensuring order. Clashes between these two interests are inevitable, as reflected by the 
perpetual struggle between collectivist and individualist approaches to political theory.  
  Balancing these interests is complicated. In order to overrule the rights of the 
individuals, the state must assert an interest that is more important in the instance. Even 
if slightly amorphous and hard to pin down, concepts like public safety and preservation 
of order allow for at least an ideal yardstick by which to judge the ability of the state to 
intervene. For the clearest cases, at the very least, the state can justify its position in 
stopping massive riots or trespassers on a number of publicly accessible grounds. Room 
for debate may exist over how to assess and defend the scope of the state's interest in a 
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particular clash, or over the appropriateness of ethical exemptions to generalizable 
attempts to maintain order, as a means to further allow for said space. But at least the 
general contours of the discussion are clear, relatively speaking, when it comes to state 
regulation of action: the state tolerates individual citizen action to the point where it 
begins to infringe upon the safety and wellbeing of the citizenry at large.162 
  In the case of public safety, then, the scope of the debate is relatively clear, even 
if the outcomes of specific clashes between individuals and states remain contestable. 
The scope becomes extremely obtuse, however, when it comes to articulating the ability 
of the state to regulate beliefs, the source, or perhaps a product, of that liberal space. 
Most forms of liberalism at least purport to aspire to maximizing this space for citizen 
independence and self-articulation or discovery of thought. Although the relationship of 
liberal states to illiberal beliefs has long been disputed, there remains at the very least a 
strain of resistance in liberal thought to a state’s outright, forceful imposition of a system 
of belief or values upon its citizens.163  
                                                 
162 As illustrated by concepts such as the harm principle of John Stuart Mill, a classic comprehensive 
liberal. See his On Liberty (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978).  Though, of course, the 
circular challenge again becomes, who gets to define what that interest is or where the line gets drawn. But 
this formulation, I suggest, at least represents what the state is attempting to accomplish, as often 
expressed explicitly in constitutional law as a balance between state interests and citizen rights. For a 
classic, explicit expression of this position, see Justice Blackmun’s opinion of the court in Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 13 (1973). 
163 Even Thomas Hobbes, as an oft-alleged “protoliberal”, strikes something of a balance here. Though he 
demands an absolute transfer of power to the state and promotes a form of religion that is continuous with 
the interests of the state, there is still an acknowledgement of a small realm of a private sphere. Of the 
comprehensive liberals discussed above, Hobbes’ version of individualism comes closest to Locke’s, 
though Hobbes’s reason is perhaps more instrumentally rational, calculated to achieve the satisfaction of 
passions. Where we find an analogue of this strain of liberalism in Hobbes is in his position that the 
content of the passions is irrelevant and that what matters is the shared experience of trying to fill some 
desire. The use of our reason matters more than the object of its focus. Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
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In some sense, liberalism likes to imagine itself as leaving the citadel of the mind 
untouched. It aims at the chimerical ground of “neutrality” with respect to expression, 
opinion, and belief. Some criticisms of liberalism, such as found in the feminist 
approach among others, may be seen as challenging that vision, calling for more 
intervention in the area of illiberal beliefs, leaving open a critical debate concerning just 
how far the state is able to go in promoting the values that underpin it. The question 
remains: how much, if at all, may the state assert itself when it comes to intervening, to 
any degree, in the minds of its people?  
Scholars such as Mark Button have argued that even the earlier, comprehensive 
liberalism had a transformative element to it: the state had an interest in shaping its 
citizens into the type of individuals capable of running a popular government.164 While 
liberal theorists such as Hobbes and Locke begin with individual citizens coming 
together to create a contract to further their interests, Button argues that there is also a 
crucially and frequently forgotten dimension of their work whereby the contract, in turn, 
shapes the citizens. The state has to ensure the character of the people is such that the 
political society will endure. The scope of this interest is far smaller than in the case of 
communitarian or collectivist theories. Nonetheless, the degree to which comprehensive 
                                                 
164 Mark Button, Contract, Culture, and Citizenship: Transformative Liberalism from Hobbes to Rawls 
(University Park, PN: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). Although the majority of the work 
focuses on the canonical comprehensive liberals, Chapter V titled “John Rawls, Public Reason, and 
Transformative Liberalism Today” does address what he calls the traditional “transformative ethos” in 
contemporary liberalism. However, he largely treats Rawls as a great among contemporary liberals 
without taking seriously his attempt to distance himself from traditional liberalism. For Button, all of 
liberalism is equally transformative. In contrast, for those in the category I will focus on are obsessed with 
maintaining their position as political as opposed to comprehensive liberals while still maintaining the 
possibility of transformation, a project at I which, I argue, they fail.  
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forms of liberalism allow the states to take an interest in the thoughts, habits, and 
character of its citizens is significant.  
The pairing of liberalism’s respect for the individual with the state’s interest in 
shaping them is not wholly inconsistent. For the comprehensive liberal theory to work, 
citizens must exhibit certain qualities. But the perpetual tension over balancing the 
interests of states and individuals plays out accordingly, maximizing individual liberty 
and minimizing state involvement while recognizing the necessity of some significant 
threshold of the latter. The rest of this chapter, then, will focus on the question of to what 
degree transformation is appropriate to political liberalism. If political liberalism has at 
least attempted to remove the metaphysical element of comprehensive liberalism, is the 
state unequivocally prohibited from attempting to alter its citizens?  
  
TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
One case in particular in recent United States legal history serves as a touchstone 
of this question as it relates to our interest in religious liberty and has inspired responses 
invoking a move toward the transformative ideal. In 1988, several religiously 
conservative, fundamentalist Christian families in Tennessee requested the right to 
remove their children from a certain portion of the educational material required by their 
schools, as they believed it provided too many examples of religious traditions outside of 
their own belief system in a way that would prove harmful to their children’s 
development. They argued that the excessive exposure to alternative religious traditions 
would damage their rights to the free exercise of religion and stunt their children's 
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religious development. The case made its way to the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit under the name Mozert v. Hawkins.165  
The Mozert case arrived on the legal scene at a critical juncture in the 
development of US free exercise jurisprudence. The case occurred at the end of an era of 
court imposed religious accommodation. In Sherbert v. Verner,166 the court suggested an 
openness on the Supreme Court to interpreting the Free Exercise Clause as requiring 
exemptions for religious practitioners.167 But Mozert arrived just two years before the 
Court effectively reversed this trend in Employment Division v. Smith,168 and the Mozert 
decision reflects the growing resistance to and impending demise of the religious 
exemptions project.  
The Mozert petitioners were denied their claims and told they had to send their 
children through the school's educational program in its entirety. As Judge Lively wrote 
for the court, a burden is only considered unconstitutional when it consists of 
“compulsion either to do an act that violated the plaintiff's religious convictions or 
communicate an acceptance of a particular idea or affirm a belief. No similar 
compulsion exists in the present case.” Merely requiring exposure to the belief could not 
be considered sufficient evidence of a violation of free exercise. A number of theorists 
saw in this case, however, the need for further theoretical underpinning, sparking the 
                                                 
165 Mozert v. Hawkins City Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (1987). 
166 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
167 While the case examples addressed in this piece stem from US case law, the principles and debates 
surrounding them are of general theoretical interest, appealing to liberal theory beyond the specific 
cultural/legal history that precedes them. 
168 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 123 
 
 
response of several pieces giving additional justification to the court’s decision. Why is 
the state justified in overriding the mother’s concern about her child’s education? 
In framing his response to the Mozert case, Stephen Macedo says, “The basic 
question of principle is, Do families have a moral right to opt out of reasonable measures 
designed to educate children toward very basic liberal virtues because those measures 
make it harder for parents to pass along their particular religious beliefs? Surely not. To 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the fundamentalist complaint as a matter of basic 
principle would overthrow reasonable efforts to inculcate core liberal values.”169 Macedo 
argues that giving religious fundamentalists a means of insulating their children from the 
influence of a reasonable pluralism would counteract the goals of liberalism. A liberal 
civic education cannot avoid favoring certain religious traditions over others, as those 
that are already most consistent with liberal values will inherently require less of the 
attention of the state.  
The burdens and intended alterations to such religious traditions are not 
peripheral consequences of state activity but central components of the purpose of the 
state. “Assimilation is an inescapable and legitimate object of liberal policy: it all 
depends on the justifiability of the values toward which institutions assimilate and the 
reasonableness of the means. Liberal diversity is diversity shaped and managed by 
political institutions.”170 On these grounds, he dismisses the parents’ concern that the 
very fact of exposure could be detrimental to religious education. The state may not 
                                                 
169 Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John 
Rawls?" Ethics 105(April 1995): 468-496, 485.  
170 Ibid., 470. 
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proclaim the priority of one particular religion, but it can, in fact, promote the vision that 
no single religion has priority politically. 
Central to Macedo’s approach is his deliberate identification with a political over 
a comprehensive liberalism. The former seeks only to manage pluralism, rather than to 
instill a fundamental appreciation of the values held by others.  Although Macedo 
distances himself from the stronger, comprehensive version of liberalism, he also 
criticizes theorists who attempt to construct an extreme opposite to comprehensive 
liberalism by arguing that liberalism stands for nothing. He rejects the portrayal of the 
system of thought as a vacuum meant entirely to promote the liberty of its people. He 
says that liberalism does stand for something, a basic value system regarding the value 
and political weight of individual citizens.  
  The demands made, to such ends, by political liberalism on its citizens are 
minimal, he contends, and do not place a special burden on religion.  “Political 
liberalism asks of fundamentalists only what it asks of others, including proponents of 
secular ideals, such as Dewey's humanism: to put reasonably contestable comprehensive 
ideals to one side in the political realm and to focus on values such as peace and freedom 
that can be shared by reasonable people.”171 In this sense, the burdens placed on 
religious practitioners are not radically different from those placed on others.  All are 
asked to respect the political process and those who participate in it by the same 
standards.  
                                                 
171 Ibid., 480. 
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And yet, Macedo fully acknowledges that, in terms of the consequent burden 
resulting from this requirement, his system inevitably places a stronger burden on those 
who would instill a particular religious vision that involves exclusion and avoidance 
even of the mere knowledge of the beliefs and practices of other groups, despite being 
universally consistent in its application. However, “…we must remember that the source 
of the apparent ‘unfairness,’ the cause of the ‘disparate impact’ here, is a reasonable 
attempt to inculcate core liberal values. The state is within the limits of its rightful 
authority. The bedrock liberal insistence on toleration is a constraint on the range of 
religious practices that can be tolerated. It is hard to see how schools could fulfill the 
core liberal civic mission of inculcating toleration and other basic civic virtues without 
running afoul of complaints about ‘exposure to diversity.’”172 If this exposure is 
necessary for the inculcation of these virtues, then no fundamental right can allow one to 
be exempt from the educational lesson. On this basis, Macedo affirms the court’s denial 
of the request for exemption on religious grounds. Macedo argues that every institution 
and state practice has an educative function, and that political liberals “are prepared fully 
and openly to justify the transformative institutions and practices they support, and that 
is sufficient.”173  For Macedo, this forced encounter with material that the religious 
practitioners deem counter to the very core of their beliefs is part of the necessary 
reminder that the state must send to its citizens of the cost each member of society must 
take on, that of tolerating opposing beliefs, in order to secure the pluralism that makes 
their peaceful existence possible. It is only by suffering this cost that they are kept free 
                                                 
172 Ibid., 485. 
173 Ibid., 495. 
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from even more intrusive measures sanctioned by other theories of state. And in fact, 
this function is central to the liberal state. He states elsewhere that “a liberal 
constitutional order is a pervasively educative order.”174 The function of transformation 
ultimately becomes an all encompassing purpose of the state.  
Explicitly inspired by Macedo’s approach, Brettschneider takes Macedo’s 
transformative ideals a step further, arguing for a more active, albeit still prudent, 
transformative role for the state. He is also particularly concerned to respond to 
arguments about religious freedom that place religious doctrine into a “static” category 
beyond the reach of state concern and active involvement. He says, “I argue that any 
robust conception of religious freedom will find itself at odds with some existing 
religious beliefs and that defenders of religious freedom should favor a role for the state 
in seeking to change some religious beliefs.”175 He advocates a vision of transformative 
liberalism mediated by the following provisions: (1) the state is only to seek to transform 
“those beliefs that are fundamentally at odds with the shared reasons for rights”; and (2) 
the state should only ever “pursue transformation through its expressive, rather than its 
coercive, capacities.”176   
  Brettschneider further limits the scope of this transformative endeavor, saying “it 
is not the belief in the superiority of one's religion per se that transformation should 
                                                 
174 Stephen Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the Moderate 
Hegemony of Liberalism,” Political Theory 26.1(1998): 56-80, 56-57.  
175 Corey Brettschneider, “A Transformative Theory of Religious Freedom,” 188. 
176 For further articulation of Brettschneider’s vision of state involvement, see: “The Politics of the 
Personal: A Liberal Approach,” American Political Science Review 101.1(2007): 19-31; “When the State 
Speaks, What Should It Say? The Dilemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion,” 
Perspectives on Politics 8.4(2010): 1005- 1019; When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How 
Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2012). 
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target…Rather, it is those beliefs, religious and otherwise, that are openly hostile to or 
implausibly consistent with the values of equal citizenship that the state should seek to 
transform.”177  Brettschneider tries to distance himself from theorists like Okin whom he 
considers to be more excessively transformative in her liberalism. He wants to portray 
his project as one that can withstand concerns about over-involvement of the state in the 
personal affairs of its people.178 He considers Okin’s work in particular to transgress the 
line of the private. In contrast, he turns to Macedo for inspiration in crafting a theory that 
allows for the state to engage in purifying transformation while still maximizing respect 
for individual privacy.  
Brettschneider seeks to establish his project as minimally invasive, infringing 
exclusively upon those aspects of religious identity that pose a direct threat, rather than 
holistically reforming the belief of these citizens. He observes, “The standard of 
legitimacy thus may require the transformation of identity, but it does not demand the 
replacement of one identity with another. Again, the model here is not all-or-nothing but 
dialectical.”179 The state in this scenario only treats those beliefs deemed antithetical to 
the necessary functions of the state. On this view, a “static” vision of religious liberty 
would confound a central function of the state in moving the attentions of citizens in 
directions more favorable to liberalism. At one point, Brettschneider admits to his 
system’s being “quasi-coercive”, although he again wants to maintain the distinctiveness 
                                                 
177 Brettschneider, “A Transformative Theory,” 195. 
178 See for example: Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
179 Brettschneider, “A Transformative Theory,” 200. 
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of his project from, we might presume, the comprehensive liberals who Macedo says 
have no qualms about directly shaping citizens into ideal inhabitants of their polity. 
  To maintain the vision of this presumably noninvasive form of transformation, 
Brettschneider even affirms the right of citizens to actively defy attempts by the 
government to transform them. He says, “I therefore stress…there exists a right for 
groups or individuals to resist transformation. This exit option is the complement to my 
claim that the state should limit its pursuit of transformation to reasoning and financial 
inducement.”180 He concludes, however, that nothing about religion erects a 
metaphorical wall that shields religious private values from any and all intrusions on the 
basis of public values.181   
In a direct critique of Brettschneider’s position, Jeff Spinner-Halev challenges a 
number of the core assumptions of the former’s stronger version of transformative 
political liberalism. He suggests in its stead a modified version, less expansive even than 
Macedo’s original articulation, in which transformation is even less targeted at reshaping 
but rather more directed at protecting the rights of others. He says, “The indirect route of 
transformation that I support is only likely to happen when the government is clear that 
its policies and funds support equal citizenship.”182 This indirect transformation can only 
occur when justified by a corresponding claim from other citizens. For example, he uses 
this logic to argue that that divesting Catholic Charities of state funding given the refusal 
to allow gays to adopt is an appropriate use of transformation. Such funding would 
                                                 
180 Ibid., 206.  
181 Ibid., 207. 
182 Jeff Spinner-Halev, “A Restrained View of Transformation,” Political Theory 39.6(2011): 777-784, 
782. See also Brettschneider’s response: “Free and Equal Citizenship and Non-profit Status: A Reply to 
Spinner-Halev,” Political Theory 39.6(2011): 785-792. 
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involve the state in distributing goods which certain demographics have no chance even 
of requesting, which would deprive them of equal liberty.  
He disagrees, however, with Brettschneider’s approval of using features like tax-
exempt status as a means of creating incentives that have the effect of transforming 
religious groups through economic motivation, as will be revisited below. He suggests, 
rightfully so I would claim, that there are alternative purposes of tax-exempt status other 
than merely existing as a tool for a state sponsored transformative agenda realized 
through selective tax breaks. He counters, “One important argument for non-profit status 
is to encourage and support a rich associational life, and one that can shift with people's 
views and preferences.”183 Spinner-Halev’s opposing statement of purpose highlights the 
degree to which Brettschneider’s work has infused a considerable number of additional 
elements of state activity with tinges of active transformation, even beyond what may be 
a minimally appropriate ascription. He proposes, in contrast, a more restrained view 
where the state limits its transformative involvement to direct intervention on behalf of 
others whose rights of equal citizenship would be violated by the activity, rather than 
expanding the involvement to any illiberal statement regardless of whether it intrudes 
upon another or not. The Mozert case, then, provides a perfect example for him. The 
refusal to give an exemption can be justified, in addition to the state’s interest in 
ensuring that the claimant’s daughter can function in a pluralist society, on the grounds 
of the state’s right to teach equal respect for all citizens at least within the political 
sphere. The state can justify incorporating citizens of all religious beliefs in its education 
                                                 
183 Spinner-Halev, “A Restrained View of Transformation,” 778. 
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as an acknowledgement of their protected place in the society and its politics, without 
having to invoke the justification that it is forcing students to accept the moral validity of 
the religious beliefs. 
   
CHALLENGING THE TRANSFORMATIVE IDEAL 
I argue that the transformative political liberals utterly fail at their project of 
making liberalism transformative while remaining on the political side of the 
political/comprehensive divide. Although the version they defend may seem milder than 
others, it places the liberal state in conflict with one of its central values, protecting the 
product (e.g., actions, decisions) of whatever version of independence it seeks for them 
(individualism, autonomy, reason, etc.). I propose that the litmus test be whether or not a 
state is actively targeting the beliefs of its citizens. Macedo is right that the state 
fundamentally transforms citizens as a natural consequence of its regular activity.184 
However, the fact that transformation occurs incidentally is unavoidable and does not 
constitute a sanctioning of the state to actively and deliberately pursue this effect. 
Liberalism can pursue transformation, but it cannot do so while maintaining that degree 
of neutrality that is at the heart of the project of political liberalism.185 
We must be clear on the fact that when we engage in transformation, the impact 
of our activity is not limited to the specific acts. The second we imbue one act with the 
                                                 
184 Consider, for example, Rousseau’s statement on how deeply the state itself fundamentally alters and 
affects its inhabitants from Book I, Chapter VIII of the Social Contract: “The passage from the state of 
nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in 
his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked.” G.D.H. Cole, trans., The Social 
Contract and Discourses (Clinton, MA: The Colonial Press Inc., 1950), 18.  
185 To any extent one might argue that Rawls himself permits or encourages active transformation, I would 
suggest he accordingly fails at his own project of being political rather than metaphysical.  
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purpose of transformation, all activities are suddenly co-opted under that same mission. 
Every action by the state has become targeted at its citizens. This is violating the 
underlying principle of individualism that motivates liberalism. I do not imagine, in 
contrast, that the state should pursue as an alternative an abstract form of neutrality. A 
pure neutrality is impossible within a liberal democratic framework, because the system 
at least minimally imports assumptions and values about citizens having a role in the 
formation of politics.186 The priority placed on public safety and public health and the 
general respect for the individual citizen’s right to a maximum level of self-
determination are themselves clear non-neutral values. The spirit of the project of 
neutrality, however, is directed to this task of minimizing state intervention in the realm 
of ideas to the extent possible while still maintaining the structure (safety, health, order, 
etc.) necessary for citizens to exercise that determination. The fact that the precise 
character of that structure, or where exactly that line is to be drawn, remains intractably 
contestable does not negate the fact that this is the aim of liberal politics.  
Transformative political liberalism rejects, as does comprehensive liberalism 
generally, outright imposition and force-feeding of beliefs by the state.187 But it 
                                                 
186 See Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,” Ethics 99.4(1989): 883-905. 
Kymlicka points out that while liberal neutrality has intractable problems and cannot be achieved to the 
dogmatic extent to which it is praised by many liberals, as an abstract goal it is still preferable to 
communitarian rankings of the value of different visions of the good life (See in particular 899-905). We 
do share a position that the intended project of neutrality, the balance that it aims to achieve remains 
central, maximizing deference to individuals in determining their conception of the good life to the extent 
that this is possible. However, he is ultimately more pessimistic about many of the particulars of this 
project and ultimately gives much more discretion to the state and a more expansive role than I do. I 
dispute his inference that the intractable challenges, such as prioritizing particular languages for state 
purposes or respecting the needs of minority groups, require the heightened role of state intervention that 
he imputes to them.  
187 I use the term belief more broadly here, including positions on the world including but not limited to 
the religious. 
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represents a significant statement about directing the state’s attention toward certain 
beliefs held by its citizens. Even acknowledging that it advocates only a minimal role for 
the state’s involvement in beliefs, the fact that it allows the state to turn its attention to 
the minds of its people at all signals a strong departure from minimalist ideals. 
Liberalism cannot be expanded to include the possibility of transformation and 
simultaneously avoid moving outside the bounds of its core values. I seek primarily to 
suggest that the move played by the transformative political liberals has implications far 
greater than acknowledged, to the detriment of their project. 
If we justify the actions taken by the state in Mozert in relation to their taking 
part in an attempt at “transformation,” then there is no way to avoid infusing everything 
done by the state with transformative potential. Transformative political liberals must 
abandon the claim to a middle way between comprehensive and non-transformative 
political liberalism. While their application of such tools may be minimal in relation to 
clearer examples of comprehensive liberalism, they are nonetheless the tools of 
comprehensive liberalism being employed, even if they are used in a blunted or muted 
fashion. While perhaps less readily identifiable as comprehensive, they are nonetheless 
operating under the same fundamental assumptions from which they attempt to distance 
themselves. As a point of contrast to illustrate the distinctiveness of the transformative 
approach, consider the belief-action distinction from US Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
perhaps one of the clearest and most important articulations of the ideal of a nonexistent 
role for the state in concerning itself with the beliefs of its citizens. In United States v. 
Reynolds, the Court said that although the state “cannot interfere with mere religious 
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beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.” 188  In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the court 
reiterated that the Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts—freedom to believe 
and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot 
be.”189  This principle assumes as foundational that the state is barred from invading the 
minds of its citizens with an interest in reshaping the raw materials of their potentially 
illiberal beliefs.  Even if transformative liberalism avoids the direct targeting that was of 
immediate interest in the framing of the First Amendment, the violation of ideals 
remains in the fact that transformative liberalism opens up what even the belief-action 
distinction takes for granted as closed off to state concern, the citadel of the human 
mind. The belief-action distinction states that conduct can be regulated when it serves, 
for example, a “valid secular policy” as in Cantwell, but that beliefs are off limits as 
targets of state activity. But here, the state can make not only the conduct but the belief 
itself a target of the state.  
The comparison above is especially useful in locating the transformative liberals 
along the particular dimension of degree of permitted state interest in citizens’ beliefs, 
because on this end the belief-action approach is considered among the least 
accommodating within the US tradition.  Its logic was invoked repeatedly in Smith’s 
famous gutting of the Sherbert-Yoder line of cases that promoted mandatory 
accommodations for religious practitioners.190  Even in its least accommodating 
articulation of free exercise, the US court at least took for granted the inviolability of 
                                                 
188 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
189 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
190 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
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belief and the immunity of belief from state attention.  The comparison highlights the 
degree to which the transformative project is unique in relation to certain articulations of 
liberalism. 
The belief-action distinction has been met with numerous critics of its own, many 
arguing that the state cannot pretend that limiting attention to actions can remove the 
state of any responsibility it might incur from the concurrent burden placed on beliefs.191 
But what makes it an interesting contrast for our purposes is how it highlights the unique 
function of transformative liberalism. Both the belief-action distinction approach and 
transformative liberalism position themselves against the pro-exemptions argument 
made in cases like Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder. They both pursue a consistency of 
application across individuals. But the former has explicitly defined itself in reference to 
a complete lack of concern for the beliefs of the citizens. I reiterate this point to highlight 
the significance of transformative liberalism’s attention to belief, illustrating the 
centrality of this feature to the transformative political liberal project. What makes it of 
interest for our purposes is that it has allowed the state to turn its eyes to the inner 
thoughts of the people. It has opened for consideration what holds the status of near 
sacredness for a number of other articulations of liberalism. 
 As evidenced by this critique, transformative liberalism, even in the weaker 
form proffered by Macedo, cannot ignore the potentially necessary extensions and even 
radical implications of its transformation. Even reducing this role to as minimalist a role 
as possible does not negate the fact that what has been allowed places this brand of 
                                                 
191 The belief-action approach admittedly has its own challenges to contend with. Consider, for example, 
Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, “Once a Peculiar People.” 
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liberalism into a category completely separate from those that bar such interaction 
altogether.  
The attempt to make the influence indirect cannot overcome the fact that 
transformative liberalism gives the state a stake in the beliefs of its citizens, religious or 
otherwise. Macedo even admits, “…it must be allowed that political liberalism may not 
be the best ideal along every conceivable dimension.”192 Macedo’s position infuses a 
spirit of fallibilism into the state’s relationship with value statements, which should 
provide all the more reason that the state should not attempt to persuade its people that 
the tradeoffs it has chosen are the most appropriate. If the means and ends of political 
liberalism are themselves subject to legitimate dispute, then the state can only be 
portrayed as inherently biased in favor of an uncritically conservative project of 
promoting its current manifestation over and above potentially beneficial 
transformations.   
Spinner-Halev makes what I consider a dramatic step forward in promoting a 
more appropriate vision of state activity, with Brettschneider representing the opposite 
extreme along the continuum. But I would take Spinner-Halev’s project even a step 
further away from Macedo and all the more so from Brettschneider, to say that even 
indirect transformation is an inappropriate goal, under any circumstance. 
Transformation, given the crucial transition that it enables of reimagining citizens as 
intellectual objects to be reshaped in the image dreamed up by the state, should not be 
included among the functions of the state.  
                                                 
192 Macedo, “Liberal Civic Education,” 492. 
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Rather than indirect transformation, I argue that only “incidental” transformation 
should be acceptable to political liberalism, that is, transformation that was in no way 
envisioned as an end of state activity.193 For state-caused transformation to be 
acceptable, it must have been nowhere on the state’s radar as an additional motivation to 
engage in the action that led to the transformation. As discussed later, there is room for 
debate as to whether it might be considered in the case where the state wants to avoid 
this potential harm, but it should certainly not enter into considerations where the 
possibility of transformation adds to the attractiveness of any particular option. A liberal 
state, as acknowledged by all transformative theorists, should hope to minimize 
opportunities that require it to stipulate to citizens what they ought to be. I think it fair to 
say that all of the aforementioned theories would accept as a starting place the 
preference that the state not need to interfere at all in citizen beliefs, given their 
preference for increasing the space for pluralism and thus diversity. Intrusion, then, 
should be justified only if the threat proves substantial enough to necessitate a state 
response.194  
Liberalism has to walk the balance of protecting the individual space to thrive 
and develop while at the same time creating an orderly, self-sustaining society. Yet the 
transformative vision is problematic because it accomplishes this end only by crossing 
                                                 
193 See the following section for a discussion of this issue with regards to state education.  
194 Note that this approach does not negate hate crime legislation. See the Court’s reasoning in Wisconsin 
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). It argues that hate crime legislation is not justified by distaste for the 
belief that other races are lesser and deserving of aggression but rather by the increased effect on the 
communities of racially motivated aggression. Such acts have the observed tendency of increasing division 
and hostility between racial communities, leading to escalation and additional acts of violence, much more 
so than results from non-racial aggression. The difference in the harm done justifies the increased 
penalties, not a statement of belief. Compare this case with R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992), which struck down hate speech legislation that was motivated by distaste for the message, 
according to the Court.  
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the line beyond which it no longer allows individual intellectual breathing space. In 
particular cases such as Mozert my perspective and the transformative perspective may 
agree on the appropriate outcome: Mozert loses the case. However, the difference in 
theoretical justifications has an enormous impact on other cases. As I argue, the logic of 
transformation categorically opens up all activities of government to be weapons of the 
state, leading to the state taking up an active agenda of targeting its own people and 
massive campaigns undermining individualism.  
To invoke an assumption imported from West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette, a case cited frequently as critical in the Mozert opinion but curiously absent 
from the transformative conversation, Justice Jackson held in his opinion of the court, “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion...or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”195 
Any shaping that happens should be done through the effects of the incentives we put in 
place. But this should be a secondary effect, rather than the result of actively structuring 
said incentives in such a way that they will encourage citizen formation in a particular 
way. Admittedly, state actions will inevitably create some degree of influence. Creating 
tax structures, spending money in one area rather than another, focusing scarce attention, 
staff, and resources on some problems rather than on others can very possibly affect how 
the citizenry understands itself and the values it prioritizes, if by no other reason than the 
priming of those beliefs and bringing them to the forefront of the minds of the citizens.  
                                                 
195 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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I propose, in lieu of Brettschneider’s coercive/expressive distinction which 
amounts to a direct/indirect divide where both are still targeting individuals, an 
evaluation tool based on active/inactive transformation. This approach is analgous to the 
belief-action distinction, but it makes explicit the fact that it is the stance of the state 
towards citizens’ beliefs that matters, directly shutting down the possibility of 
transformative motivations. If the transformation occurs as the consequential product of 
normal state enforcement of liberal ideals, that is, not as a result of active attempts to 
manipulate citizen beliefs, then the transformation is appropriate.  Whereas Spinner-
Halev’s focus on “indirect” transformation sets the onus of evaluation upon the impact 
on the citizens, I propose to base the evaluation upon the intention and activities of the 
state.   
The state should not make the potential influence of these actions the tools with 
which it structures society. This would be tempting and immediately possible, yes. But I 
argue that there is no way to introduce this function of the state without radically 
augmenting the active role of the state. Even directed toward benevolent ends, this 
allows for such extreme participation and oversight by the state that it goes beyond the 
bounds of what lies at the heart of liberalism. Citizens would inevitably become targets 
of the state in the pursuit of creating a society where liberal values are held dogmatically 
by each individual member of the society.  
I argue that, to maintain the status of political liberalism, actions that exclude 
people socially should be dealt with on the social sphere, and that only when we can 
indicate a measure of political violation can we call in the state. The grievance must be 
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framed in terms of alienation and exclusion from either goods and services distributed by 
the state or the ability to participate and be heard. Apart from such a showing, political 
force and influence cannot be brought in to address a situation that does not result in 
such direct deprivation by a citizen. Outside of this realm, the state has no justifiable 
interest in further interference with citizen belief systems. In Mozert, the state is justified 
in forcing the students to attend this portion of the educational curriculum by its more 
general interest in creating an educated citizenry. As long as the school is merely trying 
to expose the student to a variety of lifestyles for the purpose of awareness of activities 
in the society around them, then activity of the state can be articulated in terms that have 
no need for reference to transformation of the belief that motivates the distaste for this 
piece of knowledge. Likewise, public accommodation laws can still be justified in the 
sense that they are exclusively motivated by a concern with the public sphere and 
making equal access to public facilities available to all. As long as additional regulations 
are not introduced with the purpose of targeting beliefs, then the state is free to fulfill its 
function of administration and keeping society running smoothly.  
The greatest problem with transformative political liberalism is that it opens the 
door for every action to be transformative and immediately becomes all-
encompassing.196 Using the terms of transformative liberalism, we could redescribe a 
number of state actions in terms of the state shaping its people. There is no clear reason 
to consider actions in the field of education to be transformative, but not in granting tax-
exempt status, for example.  Consider the case of Bob Jones University v. United States, 
                                                 
196 As evidenced by Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism.”  
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in which the government removed the tax-exempt status of a private university for its 
prohibition of interracial dating.197  Brettschneider in particular applauds this decision as 
an example of the state using its power to actively transform an illiberal body, without of 
course resorting to force.  
However, there should be a safe space allowed, as Spinner-Halev suggests, that 
allows for a space for free association. Tax exempt status exists as a means to promote 
individual or community-specific pursuits in life.198 To allow for people to create the 
sort of life that they want; to promote values and lifestyles that they find beneficial to 
themselves and/or society at large. Conflict should arise only when it comes to active 
subsidizing through means like state funding of programs, for example. Even the 
principle of public accommodation has its limits here. Even if an illiberal university 
were to exclude certain demographics of the citizenry, as long as they are fulfilling this 
expressive mission, their activity should be immune from state interference. They are 
promoting a way of life, a vision for how they think the world should operate. There 
may potentially be other benefits of which an illiberal institution might be deprived, as 
mentioned, but these must all be framed in relation to the interest of allowing the general 
citizenry to have equal access to and availability of a government provided good or 
                                                 
197 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
198 While tax-exempt status to non-profit organizations may be equated in with active subsidizing in the 
form of granting funds in certain contexts, they are extremely different in terms of their purpose. See, for 
example, the U.S. case law on the freedom of association, in both intimate and expressive forms, as a state 
motivation for granting rights for an example of a logic that applies to tax-exempt status, e.g.: Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 487 
U.S. 1 (1988); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Such rights are available to all groups, 
regardless of whether the state approves of the message or not. In contrast, the state has far more discretion 
when it comes to giving its seal of approval in the form of giving funds.  
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service. It cannot be justified merely on the basis of a presumed right to be included or 
for the sake of receiving validation from the offending group.   
To label the action of removing tax exempt status as a form of state action aimed 
at changing the way the people inside the institution think about it is to take a broad step. 
The problem with Brettschneider’s perspective is that he ties the receipt of tax-exempt 
status to the satisfaction of a list of liberal values kept by the state, at the top of which is 
the requirement that organizations not hold any belief considered intolerant. This 
removes a significant amount of freedom of expression and drastically impinges the 
ability of certain members of the state to benefit from the state subsidization of 
associational life due to their disqualified beliefs. Here it becomes evident that the label 
assigned to actions in the case of Mozert matters; when translated onto other scenarios, it 
would call for increased action, regulation, and participation by the state, to the point of 
stepping beyond mere enforcement or protection of citizens from other illiberal citizens.  
   Framing this activity of education as the state actively involved in transforming 
its people ignores the fact that nearly every action would take on this increased 
significance. Suddenly the budget is not just about providing for the general welfare of 
the citizenry in an egalitarian manner. Suddenly the budget becomes an act of 
strategically placing resources in such a way that they become tools for articulating the 
state’s paradigm of citizen formation. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION THEORY  
   My concern for the moment lies in articulating the contours of liberalism. Yet, 
though I am more concerned within the bounds of this project about the values of 
liberalism than the specifics of education, a few words on the subject are necessary and 
appropriate, at least to suggest the realm within which debates over education theory 
may take place under this approach. Theories concerning the goals of the state in the 
education of its people in particular must be embedded in a larger theory of what the 
purpose and sphere of influence of the state is. 
My incidentally transformative view of liberalism suggests that exposure to such 
material should be justified along the lines of exposure to the practical operations of 
society. In order to facilitate a peaceful order, knowledge about the practices and even 
beliefs of other groups may hopefully increase the likelihood of smooth interaction 
across groups. The distinction is key, though, that the effect of transformation is entirely 
secondary and should not be included in the calculus of state activity.199 The justification 
of the decision in Mozert, then, should not at all concern itself with the desire to impose 
or, more importantly, to root out certain values present in the populace. Any impact on 
values should be incidental and secondary, not the aim of state interaction. 
As my interest is particularly in the appropriate form of state involvement in 
education, I underscore that this form of education very well may not be the best form of 
education overall, for the whole person. Rather, I argue that, if we take a view of the 
state as wanting to avoid imposing itself upon the will of the people, then state education 
                                                 
199 Contrast my approach with one that creates a strong role for the state in shaping citizens, for example: 
Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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must limit itself in a way that mirrors the attempt of the state to avoid promoting a 
particular vision of its citizens. The state may take as its model religious studies 
programs, including the variety at issue in Mozert which is taken for granted as an 
acceptable model by all versions of transformative theorists discussed. In Mozert, for 
example, and in state sponsored university departments, attempts to systematically study 
religion are made without an attempt, at least in theory, to propagate a particular view as 
to the superiority of any one religion. Assuming that any statement concerning the 
highest ends of human activity can have profound impacts on the temporal, and 
conceivably even the eternal, wellbeing of those participating in the study, one might 
argue that this system of education fails the students for its inability to yield them 
directly applicable lessons on the subject matter. But theology is not the subject matter 
of religious studies; rather, the structures of religion as social phenomena are.  
Comparably, a system of education embracing only incidental transformation may 
appropriately educate students on how to function within a pluralist society, without 
mandating any particular brand, be it of political liberalism or otherwise. There exists, 
then, a model of education whereby the state can see itself as justified in mandating 
exposure without requiring an interest in rooting out the belief which causes the 
opposition in the first place. 
Many argue that any attempt at exposure may be seen as normalizing and 
therefore inherently transformative. Consider, for example, debates over whether 
deliberately to insert into elementary curriculum stories and historical examples of racial 
minorities or GLBT characters and families. Yet if we fear that mere exposure to ideas 
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will lead to perceptions of state approbation of a practice, discussions of the institution 
of slavery would similarly have to be expunged from the instructional record. In order to 
instill the skill of navigation through a social and political system, there must be a basic 
level of understanding of the actors within the system.  It is possible to deny parents’ 
rights to insulate their children from certain material without resorting to the 
transformative ideal. 
Although this idea may run contrary to the expectations of many regarding the 
function of education, I argue that a state education in keeping with the values of 
political liberalism must focusing on instructing students in operation of the mechanics 
of the state, teach them how to work through a pluralist system, rather than focus on 
instilling values in them. If we are going to have a pluralist state, then students must be 
aware of the fact of pluralism and understand how to function within such a system. 
While a private education may quite deliberately focus on providing a transformative 
education, the state cannot do so without declaring what shall be orthodox. But this fact 
need not destroy the possibility of the education itself serving a transformative function 
for the student. In this model, the instructor becomes the equipper, providing students 
with the tools they will need to form opinions of their own and into engage in an 
independent journey. Instructors can point students to the questions, discuss the 
surrounding debate, analyze arguments on all sides, and model this process of deep 
critical thinking without having a preordained conclusion in mind for them. It remains 
completely possible to have a vibrant form of education where students are guided 
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toward introspection and self-development without the state manipulating the system to 
its own benefit.  
Language instruction could still be justified on the grounds of operation within 
the state. I do not believe that my project can settle the question of whether or not it is 
appropriate for language groups to isolate themselves. The legitimacy of such an 
arrangement would still be debatable within my framework based on whether or not one 
considers this central to the needs of the state. As regards the inculcation of patriotism, 
however, I am not sure that this would be considered central to the state in the way that I 
have framed the issue. If the political liberal state can be expected to trust its citizens 
with freedom of speech, which they may abuse, then it is not clear to me that the state 
cannot also be expected to entrust the fostering of attachment to the state to the people. 
The market place of ideas approach must be respected. Consider Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s seminal opinion in dissent of Gitlow v. New York200: “If, in the long run, the 
beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant 
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given 
their chance and have their way.” Such values require the possibility that the citizens 
might want to change the nature of the state. While not all patriotic events need to be 
banned from a school and celebrations might be appropriate, what matters here as 
elsewhere is the stance of the state toward the students: the state interest cannot be in 
shaping them into patriotic automatons for the purpose of its own self-perpetuation.  
                                                 
200 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
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   Upon the conclusion of this discussion, one might pose once again the original 
exemption question from Mozert, though in new terms: Why, since so much effort has 
been poured into maximizing the liberty and freedom to choose of the individuals, might 
they not choose not to expose themselves to certain material? Insofar as the state has an 
interest at all in educating the youth and requiring that they be exposed to a decade's 
worth of knowledge and skills, the state is accordingly justified in requiring attendance 
to state sponsored education. The state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its 
citizens are capable operators of the machinery of the state, without forcibly inculcating 
citizens with the values that underlie said machinery. 
   As I do not attempt to fully articulate that logic in this project, there may still be 
room for debate concerning the possibility of requesting an exemption from certain 
material. I am only concerned to establish that the state justification for either granting or 
denying said exemption ought not to be an interest in shaping the beliefs of the citizen, 
illustrated clearly here as that would in this case require the direct challenging of a 
religious belief. I seek merely to suggest that the state should avoid the use of such 
rhetoric in the justification of its actions. It is the self-understanding of the state as 
regards the purpose of its activity, of any and every variety, that matters most here. 
 
CONCLUSION  
A belief-action distinction should represent the minimal starting place for a 
limitation upon state activity. The state should, at the very least, limit itself to regulating 
actions and forego concern for the beliefs of its citizens. Beyond that, the state may 
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choose to regulate less overall. With this as the baseline, there is still room for debate as 
to where to draw the line practically. But my primary concern is to argue that political 
liberalism cannot successfully stretch itself beyond what is necessary to achieve its end 
of the preservation of order within society. A political liberal state education cannot 
consistently have any form of indoctrination at the core of its interests. Allowing even 
minor approaches to transformation represents a shift of theoretical categories with few 
limits on the potential scope of activity that would immediately be framed and redirected 
in terms of state interest. A non-transformative political liberalism allows for further 
respect of the independent thought of the citizenry without abandoning the interests of 
the state. 
This chapter has demonstrated in one theory case study, then, that it is entirely 
possible to build a case for respecting religious beliefs without resorting to a special 
category. The aim is to demonstrate that the special category is not the only way to 
protect religious interests, that there are tools available for defense within the liberal 
democratic tradition. Demands for religious priority, then, often misunderstand the 
political landscape and the nature of the resources available to religious adherents. In the 
concluding chapter, I will turn to concrete examples of how such demands are often 
rooted in fundamental misunderstandings of the facts at hand.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The problem surrounding arguments for the political specialness of religion is 
one of perspective. The problems arise when one begins with the assumption that 
religion is unique before consideration of politics even takes place, rather than 
considering first how religion fits into the larger system and relates to other parts. In the 
former case, religion is recognized as something of value without reference to any other 
group within the system and accordingly translated into a special category. Especially in 
the applied context, these arguments tend to revolve around a misunderstanding about 
how law works. Beyond the significant challenges posed to the creation of regular law 
and policy, this approach also presumes without critical reflection that a special category 
is indeed the best form of protection for religion, whereas the isolated identification has 
the potential to harm religion in the long run. Religion fits best into liberal democratic 
theory when approached broadly from a system-wide perspective, from which it 
becomes apparent that the citizen acting out of religious belief has more in common with 
a citizen acting out of nonreligious ethical belief than is often suggested.  
 As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, advocates of religious 
distinctiveness often misunderstand the nature of religion. However, the lack of 
understanding regarding conceptual categories is just as often paired with a complete 
misunderstanding regarding the policy area under consideration. In the case of 
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exemptions, for example, in practice there is often a complete lack of understanding 
about the implications of the demands made regarding religion.  
 In the conclusion, I offer to two recent examples, one national and one local, of 
how the limited perspective of religious priority leads to chaotic messes of political 
arguments. First, I consider demands for religious exemptions in response to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. Secondly, I examine a proposed Texas A&M 
University policy, which functions as a perfect microcosm of the same issues that appear 
on the national scale writ small. 
 While both of these events ultimately share the same deep-seated theoretical 
issues that characterize all of the examples used throughout this project, the two 
examples in this concluding chapter illustrate the practical challenges that commonly 
plague demands for religious exemptions. Beyond complications stemming from 
normative issues raised by these demands, uncritical beliefs in religious priority often 
lead religious claimants to make demands that would not be sustainable in practice even 
if a government entity desired to implement them. The idea of religious uniqueness leads 
to demands that are not functional in practice.  
 While these examples can easily be explained away as arguments for religious 
distinctiveness done poorly, I suggest that, in practice, their positions represent the type 
of logic typically employed in the public sphere when demanding distinctive treatment.  
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A NATIONAL EXAMPLE: EXEMPTIONS FROM HEALTH CARE 
REQUIREMENTS 
 The Green family of Oklahoma started, privately owns, and continues to run two 
highly successful business chains: the arts and crafts store Hobby Lobby and the 
Christian bookstore Mardel. As a devout Christian family, the Greens attempt to run 
their businesses under the influence of their faith. The Tenth Circuit Court observes that 
the family engages in the exercise of religion in the following ways, among others: 
“Their beliefs are exercised through the businesses in numerous, concrete, and public 
ways. They make chaplains available to employees, give millions from profits to fund 
ministries, and buy hundreds of religious ads every Christmas and Easter. They monitor 
merchandise and avoid allowing their property to support activities they believe to be 
immoral.”201 There are thus pervasive and well-established attempts to ensure that the 
business reflects the religious values of the owners and operators of the establishments.  
 In the wake of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, however, 
the companies are required to provide their employees with specific types of health care: 
“employment-based group health plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) must provide certain types of preventive health services. See 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13; 29 U.S.C. § 1185d.”202 The Green family was concerned that among 
those preventative services they were now required to cover are drugs that they consider 
to induce abortions, and their religious beliefs prevent them from contributing to what 
                                                 
201 Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, Appellants’ Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, 10th Cir. 12-6294 
(2012). 
202 Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, Court’s Response to Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, 10th Cir. 
12-6294 (2012). 
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they consider the taking of a life. The court notes, “The FDA has approved twenty such 
methods, ranging from oral contraceptives to surgical sterilization. Four of the twenty 
approved methods—two types of intrauterine devices (IUDs) and the emergency 
contraceptives commonly known as Plan B and Ella—can function by preventing the 
implantation of a fertilized egg. The remaining methods function by preventing 
fertilization.”203 This legislation, they argue, would require them to violate their religion, 
as failure to comply could result in their incurring millions of dollars a day in punitive 
fines. Thus, in their capacity as leaders and owners of the companies Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel, the Greens are currently engaged in the process of suing the federal government 
over its application of the PPACA, citing the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause 
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.204 On 27 June, 2013, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Greens an injunction from the enormous fees that 
would be incurred by the family as they continue with their suit.205  
 The court also used language that was strongly indicative of support for the 
case’s future. The court stated:  
Because Hobby Lobby and Mardel express themselves for religious purposes, the 
First Amendment logic of Citizens United,206 where the Supreme Court has 
recognized a First Amendment right of for-profit corporations to express 
                                                 
203 Ibid.  
204 It is important to remember, the RFRA still stands with respect to federal proceedings. Boerne v. Flores 
primarily targeted those portions of the law that attempted to tell the Supreme Court how to interpret the 
First Amendment, demanding that it be read under the Sherbert v. Verner interpretation rather than the 
Employment Division v. Smith interpretation.  
205 Kristen Wyatt, “Hobby Lobby Won’t Have to Pay Millions in Fines as It Challenges Obamacare Birth 
Control Mandate,” web, Huffington Post, 27 June 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com. 
206 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
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themselves for political purposes, applies as well. We see no reason the Supreme 
Court would recognize constitutional protection for a corporation’s political 
expression but not its religious expression.207 
The majority of this court believes that under the Citizens United standard, the Green 
family businesses ought to be able to invoke other forms of First Amendment protections 
such as free exercise rights, although the minority opinions, Briscoe’s in particular, 
remain skeptical about this application.  
 I would argue, however, that, by the normative framework established in the 
preceding chapters, i.e. irrespective of appropriate precedent, a nationally established 
health standard in a specific case like this ought to trump free exercise of this sort. We 
have to think of the type of beliefs that could be placed into a similar class. For example, 
one has to consider the full range of procedures that would have to be exemptible. 
Jehovah's witnesses, for example, do not believe in blood transfusions. Scientologists 
object to the use of pharmacological substances, and Christian Scientists reject medicine 
altogether in favor of prayer.208 While the focus of the debate has centered around the 
drugs that many Christians in particular believe end a life, many such as Catholics are 
also officially against contraception altogether. These are good examples because they 
are things that many people, though clearly not all, would consider essential to some 
standard of health care. To allow all of them would both undermine the adopted standard 
of health by preventing access for employees of the exempted and also by risking the 
                                                 
207 Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, Court’s Response to Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, 12-6294 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
208 Even if one engaged in a debate about the status of these beliefs as “religions,” they would still count 
under the approach established by this project as a strong ethical system. 
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proliferation problem familiar from Chapter II. 
 To the extent that you can mandate any standard of health at all, you have to 
preserve it. By its nature, a minimum health care standard is something to which a 
government thinks its citizens ought to have access. Accordingly, it is difficult to pull it 
apart piece by piece. Whatever has been put into it is at least conceptually the state's 
standard of what services should be readily available to everyone. Rather than 
demanding exemptions in this case, then, the appropriate course of action for those who 
do not wish to pay for specific portions of a health care plan would be to persuade the 
nation through democratic deliberation that a standard of care ought not to include drugs 
they consider abortion-inducing.  
 Obviously I am not relying on an objective standard of health care so much as a 
procedural one, which itself leaves room for a host of normative challenges. However, I 
rely on the fact that it is through the procedure of the democratic process that a nation 
ultimately determines what constitutes a national standard of health and wellbeing, 
however high or low that standard may be. The issue upon which I am directing my 
attention here is not a normative one about what should or should not be counted as 
health care but about how we make those decisions.  
 The Court has already ruled constitutional Congress’s ability to establish a 
minimal level of health care when it upheld challenges to the PPACA.209 Therefore, by 
the framework I have suggested, we can conclude that the appropriate arena for such a 
discussion would be in the public sphere and by representatives in the legislature. I argue 
                                                 
209 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
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that health does not lend itself to carving out exceptions, unlike conscientious objection 
to participating in warfare, for example. While this example leaves considerable room 
for debate regarding application of current precedent and normative standards of health, 
the next example provides a clearer case where the request made would be barely 
functional, if functional at all, were it granted.  
 
A LOCAL EXAMPLE: EXEMPTIONS FROM UNIVERSITY STUDENT FEES 
 The second example demonstrates the same phenomenon as the health care 
example but on a smaller, local scale. In March of 2013, a member of the Texas A&M 
Student Senate finance committee introduced The GLBT Funding Opt-Out Bill, which 
was described in the document’s summary text as, “A bill requesting that students who 
object to funding the GLBT Resource Center through their student fees and tuition for 
religious reasons be allowed to opt out from funding same.” The legislation read as 
follows: 
Whereas(1): Texas A&M University is a public institution, and as such, has an 
obligation to spend students’ money in ways that reflect the values of the 
students who pay that money; and, 
Whereas(2): Many students disagree with the use of student fee and tuition 
money to pay for a Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered (GLBT) 
Resource Center for religious reasons; and, 
Whereas(3): While it can be argued that the GLBT Resource Center is a 
worthy use of funds in order to provide a welcoming environment for vulnerable 
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populations at Texas A&M, it is reasonable for students to object to a use of their 
own money that is in direct opposition to their own religious values; and, 
Whereas(4): Students should be informed as well as possible about how their 
money is used. 
Therefore let it be Enacted(1):   
That the Texas A&M Student Government Association shall support allowing 
students who object, for religious purposes, to the use of their student fees and 
tuition to fund this center to opt out of paying an amount equal to their share of 
the Center’s funding from their fee and tuition bills…210 
This version yields one immediate problem: such a policy would be blatantly 
unconstitutional if implemented. The bill in this form violates the First Amendment 
principle of viewpoint neutrality. Public universities are classified as limited public 
forums, meaning they are allowed certain restrictions in areas designated for speech, 
such as limiting access to students, and they can have certain control over content as far 
as designating or restricting topics. They cannot, however, treat specific viewpoints 
differently. For policies that affect speech in a limited public forum, a state must prove 
that its regulation is both a reasonable means to achieve its aim and a viewpoint neutral 
policy.211 The latter prong bars the state from singling out one particular belief, whether 
to benefit or to harm it.  
                                                 
210 The Student Senate set up a page on their official website that contained the full text of both versions of 
the bill, the official declaration of the Student Body President’s veto, and a link to video footage of the 
floor debate. However, they have since removed the version of the bill as it was originally submitted from 
their website. This text was taken from the version of the bill posted as a PDF to this same website before 
its removal. http://senate.tamu.edu/node/1029. 
211 See Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  
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 The problem here lies in its giving a special protection to only one religious 
belief: the potential to control the assignation of one's fees in accordance with religious 
beliefs applies only to those whose religion would condemn both the embracing of 
LGBTQ status and also contributing resources to those who do identify as such. No 
other religious belief is allowed to designate its fees accordingly. This constitutes 
singling out a single belief for protection and thus violates viewpoint neutrality. 
 The mistake was recognized, and a new version of the bill listing four additional 
sponsors left the finance committee the night before the vote.  The new version, re-titled 
the Religious Funding Exemption Bill, displayed the following broader language:  
Whereas (1):  Texas A&M University is a public institution, and as such, has an 
obligation to spend students’ money in ways that does not infringe upon their 
religious conscience; and, 
Whereas (2):  Many students disagree with the use of student fee and tuition 
money to pay for a number of services funded through those fees, for religious 
reasons; and, 
Whereas (3):  While it can be argued that many services are a worthy use of 
funds in order to provide an opportunity for academic success at Texas A&M, it 
is reasonable for students to object to a use of their own money that they feel 
violates their religious conscience; and, 
Whereas (4):  Students should be informed as well as possible about how their 
money is used; and, 
Whereas (5):  The broad varieties of religious views expressed by students are 
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equally important, and the variety of services they disagree with should be 
treated with equal importance. 
Therefore Let it be Enacted (1):  
That the Texas A&M Student Senate shall support the current standing process 
allowing students who object, for religious and moral purposes, to the use of their 
student fees and tuition to fund various services to opt out of paying an amount 
equal to their share of the service funding from their fee and tuition money, at the 
time of paying said bills; and, 
Let it be Further Enacted (2): 
That students are provided an electronic outlet to communicate their religious 
disagreements at the time of paying tuition and fees, with specific instructions on 
the process and a clear link to the proper office provided, as to make the process 
more publicized so that an opt out may be requested in person; and, 
Let it be Further Enacted (3):  
That, after students have expressed a disagreement, that the University issue a 
reply in a timely fashion notifying the student whether or not his/her 
disagreement is deemed valid; and, 
Let it be Further Enacted (4):  
That, if the disagreement is deemed valid, a refund equivalent to the amount in 
question be provided in a timely and efficient manner to the students, with no 
additional financial burden placed on the students... 
Note that, among the significant changes to the bill, the language specifying only 
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religious exemptions was expanded to include the phrase “and moral” to the first 
enactment point, allowing non-religious ethical beliefs to qualify as well. This change 
displays a similar logic to Welsh212 where coverage is expanded to include nonreligious 
ethical beliefs. This move was sufficient to convince any senators initially put off by the 
blatantly discriminatory language of the previous version, and the bill passed the senate 
35-28 and went to the student body president for a vote.  
 Unfortunately for their cause, the sponsors staked the majority of their case in 
floor discussion on the existence of the “current standing process,” having allegedly 
discovered an under-publicized process to receive an exemption.213 It was determined 
shortly after the vote, however, that this process did not actually exist.214 The student 
body president pointed to this revelation as justification of his vetoing the bill. The 
student body president and the speaker of the Student Senate subsequently issued a joint 
statement requesting that this issue be put to rest for the sake of the health of the campus. 
This technicality allowed the campus to avoid the deeper discussion about 
accommodation due to religious belief and the issue of exemptions. 
 What is perhaps more interesting is the greater social dynamic at play. The 
student senate possesses only one power, that of publicity. It serves primarily as the 
voice of the collective student body. All other effects that it has stem from its ability to 
speak on behalf of its constituents. Any bills that pass in the Student Senate have only 
the affect of making their way to the university administration as recommendations, as 
                                                 
212 Refer to the discussion of this case in  Chapter II.  
213 Refer to the video footage of the floor debate linked at http://senate.tamu.edu/node/1029. 
214 John Claybrook, “An Open Letter from Texas A&M Student Body President, John L. Claybrook,” 
Student Government Association, Texas A&M University, 5 April, 2013, 
http://senate.tamu.edu/node/1029. 
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evidenced by the boilerplate fifth enactment point, omitted above, resolving that a copy 
of the bill be sent to the university president, CFO, system chancellor, and others. The 
student senate has no formal power.  
 Even if it had passed the student senate, the bill had almost no possibility of 
effecting any change as a result of the how poorly conceived the bill was. The policy 
recommendations betray a complete lack of understanding of the challenge of 
implementing the type of exemption policy they suggest. It is extremely difficult to 
enforce these types of mechanisms. Who becomes responsible for assessing the validity 
of the requests? Cases like Cantwell mandate that the power to determine whether or not 
a religious belief qualifies for a protection cannot rest upon the mere discretion of a 
single bureaucrat. Restrictions such as this one can make it extremely difficult to 
implement exemptions policies, as the distribution of exemptions must undergo a 
process more rigorous than simply delegating to an employee. As is the challenge with 
all manner of exemptions policies, it is difficult, practically speaking, to assess 
requirements like sincerity. Expanding such a protection to other beliefs could also 
significantly increase the number of beliefs that qualify for exemptions.  
 Consider the range of other university programs that could be objected to under 
religious belief: Pacifists might object to funding anything connected with the 
university’s military programs. Religions that promote a highly traditional, conservative 
role for women might object to perceived preaching of empowerment by a women's 
resource center. Those who abstain from eating meat out of respect for the animals might 
withhold their share of the funding from a cafeteria. University art galleries often display 
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works of art that would offend the religious or moral sensibilities of many. 
 Once again, the way to change such a program would be through a democratic 
process. Students could lobby for the university administration to invoke its privilege not 
to invest its funds in this way. Indeed, the Texas A&M Student Senate passed such a 
resolution two years before the more recent incident that attempted something similar, 
asking the university to divert some of the funds it invests in the GLBT Resource Center 
toward a "traditional family values center." Although this attempt failed, it represents the 
appropriate means of changing state funding for university administration programs. The 
fact that the democratic process failed does not make an exemptions policy any more 
necessary or appropriate. Upon the failure of changing the entire system, individual 
exemptions do not become any more fitting of a remedy. This is not to say that all rights 
should be left to the democratic process rather than protected by judicial enforcement of 
constitutional rights. Expression, belief, speech, and association, to name a few, still 
grant protections that reach religious citizens. But when it comes to making laws and 
policies that affect all citizens regardless of their brand of belief, religious citizens must 
speak within the framework of democracy just like everyone else. They must make a 
convincing case to the public regarding how to allocate state resources.  
 Universities are, of course, not obligated to provide LGBTQ resource centers. 
Consider that Texas A&M was infamously involved in a suit over its refusal to 
recognize a student organization formed by gay students, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University.215 This case focused 
                                                 
215 737 F. 2d 1317 (1984). 
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primarily on the recognition of student organizations, which is in fact quite a different 
strand of precedent from extensions of the university itself, such as student affairs 
programs and academic departments. In fact, the opinion in Gay Student Services 
repeatedly emphasized that it did not extend itself to cases focused on official university 
programs. While universities cannot choose the student groups they recognize based on 
message content, they do have discretion over which programs to create. They have vast 
discretion over the services that they choose to provide for their students.  
 But by attending the university and paying tuition and fees, students are 
unavoidably investing in the larger mission and message of the university. For practical 
purposes, the university cannot afford to have every action undertaken by its various 
offices subject to sanction in the form of losing funding due to a punitive withdrawal of 
funds on religious or ethical grounds. Consequences for a politically unpopular decision 
could be immediate and highly destructive. There may already be similar pressure from 
state legislatures, and adding this level of variability to the financial structure would 
create enormous instability. At most, some state programs allow students to have a more 
significant voice in how their fees that are designated for student life spending will be 
assigned, as for example in bringing speakers or concerts to campus for student 
enrichment and entertainment. However, these programs do not typically allow students 
to designate how their fees will be assigned in reference to parts of the university’s 
organizational chart that are under the broad category of student services.  
  The authors of this bill did not understand that they were asking for a radical 
overhaul of the financial system. They also did not realize that even if this overhaul were 
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enacted, it would likely not allow for the specific type of exemption that they demand: 
the assurance that their individual contributions do not make their way to the 
objectionable program. The example of funding highlightsan issue underlying all 
exemptions policies: their appropriateness is contingent upon context.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The appropriateness of exemptions is always sensitive to the policy area in 
question. My main observation is that the presence of religion does not resolve the 
incongruence between exemptions and numerous issue areas. Religion does not 
transcend the conventional rules of policymaking. Note, for example, that individuals are 
not granted tax-exempt status on account of a religious belief that objects to either the 
state or contributing to it.  
 The same problem emerges here as has occurred repeatedly: people treat the 
category of religion as a talismanic invocation that will bring about whatever policy 
outcome they desire. These arguments often fall apart on a very practical level. Little 
thought is given to enforcement. The situations of the sort discussed above activate the 
latent impulse to isolate religion as separate. At the very least, it reveals the assumption, 
familiar from Chapter II, that if we are going to protect anything, we of course would 
want to protect religious beliefs. There is a dire need for political theory that situates the 
needs of individuals in relation to others. 
In Chapter VI of his Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart 
Mill discusses the dangers of one of the potential defects of a representative government: 
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“the disposition to prefer a man’s selfish interests to those which he shares with other 
people,”216 which is especially exacerbated by the acquisition of power. As citizens 
entrusted with the democratic process, we must be careful not to use that influence to 
institute unnecessary privileges to specific groups, as many attempt to do with the 
political category of religion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
216 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 
95. 
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